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military administration, recruitment, fixation and payment of salary, inspection or review (muster-rolls), supply, transport and commissariat. He accompanied the army as Quartermaster-General but did not direct war operations and policy. He was next to the Commander. He had no power to appoint, dismiss or promote his subordinates.[16]

In the Mughal empire the officer responsible for military administration was the *Mir Bakshshi* or *Bakhshi ul mumalik* (lit. paymaster, but really Inspector General of the Forces, supported by assistant Bakhsis under Aurangzeb). He had to enlist soldiers, pay their salaries, draw up a scheme of offense, assign positions to each commander in different divisions and arrange for musters. There were *Bakhsis* in the provinces as well.[17]

(c) *Leadership*

Notwithstanding the differences between western and Marxist-Leninist ideologies regarding the role of the general and of the people in war, the fact remains that the role of the general cannot be minimized. The supreme and decisive part which a general plays in war was emphasized very well by Napoleon: "In war men do not count; one man is all-important."[18]

Similarly Timur observed: "One tried soldier of magnanimity, and of bravery, and of resolution, and of skill, and of circumspection is more valuable than a thousand men who want discretion and knowledge. For one experienced and able soldier can direct the efforts of thousands of thousands." And again, "....he only is equal to stations of power and dignity, who is well acquainted with the military art, and with the various modes of breaking and defeating hostile armies; who in the hour of battle giveth not his heart forth from his hand, nor permitteth apprehension and terror to take possession of his soul; who can direct the efforts

16. 'Ariz; *Is. Culture*, 1937, pp. 462-3, based on *Sirat-i-Firuz Shahi*, 72, 108; Bosworth, 122-26; JIH. Apr. 1935, p. 12; Qureshi, *Adm. Delhi Sult.*, Ch. vii.

17. Irvine, *Army*, 37-40; Qureshi, *Adm. Mughal Emp.* (1966); Sarkar, *Mugh. Adm.*

18. Sokolovskii 495-7; Lachouque, *op.cit.*, 454. The same idea is expressed differently: 'In War it is not men that count but *the man*'. Sarkar, *Mil. Hist.*, 62.

of his troops; and if their ranks be thrown into confusion, can by abilities restore them to order.

He is capable of filling the station of chief of the Omraus, who is worthy of being my lieutenant in peace and in war; who can rule the armies with majesty and with authority; and who hath the vigour to chastize those who rise in opposition to his commands."[19]

Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamen mentions that a fundamental responsibility of a war 'captain' or commander-in-chief in the true sense of the term is to produce the proper 'atmosphere' or to create a state of mind in which everybody—privates, commanders and staff may live and work. This may be done by taking his men into confidence and telling them the fundamentals of his policy and giving proper guidance and lead. This was done by Mir Jumla, the general of Aurangzeb on many occasions.

Another important way in which the proper 'atmosphere' can be created is by keeping the morale of the army alive. The true general has to foster among his own men the same zeal which he seeks to smother in the enemy. Here comes the need of propaganda in war. The general has to appeal to the psychology of his own men and consider their passions and feelings.

Mention may be made here of the part which eloquence plays in warfare. The addresses of ancients, of Chinghiz Khan, of Napoleon, of Paskevitch, Russian General, and Count of Suvorov, Russian Field-Marshall, and Sir Winston Churchill, may be cited as examples. During our period we may refer to the inspiring address of Babur on the eve of Khanwah (1527) and Mir Jumla's harangue after the flight of Prince Muhmmad Sultan to Shuja. Mir Jumla's tune is the same as that of Churchill.[20]

19. Davy & White, *op.cit.*, pp. 7, 269.

20. Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, *A History of Warfare* (Collins, 1968), p. 16.

Aurangnamah, ff. 156-7, *Mir Jumla*, 162-3.

Jomini and His Summary of the Art of War, ed. by Brig. Gen. J. D. Hittle, p. 54; M. Prawdin, *The Mongol Empire, Its Rise and Legacy*, tr. by Eden and Cedar Paul, London, 1952, p. 10; H. Lachouque, *Napoleon's Battles*, ... tr. by Roy Monkton, London, 1964, p. 240.

Aurangnamah, 172-3; *Mir Jumla*, 166-168; Mir Muhammad Masun, bin Hasan bin Saleh, *Tarikh-i-Shah Shujai*. Sir Jadunath's transcript of India

But every general may not necessarily be a great leader, merely because he is victorious. Leadership is a principal requisite of military success. For on the commander's qualities of leadership the control of the human factor in war directly depends. Successful leadership implies that the leader must be able to carry his men with him and make them understand his ideas, war aims and operations. At the same time it implies the ability to make a comprehensive and correct assessment of the entire situation and turn it into its own favour.[20-a]

The essential pre-requisites of military leadership are intellect, military education, exceptional qualities of character, strength of mind and soul, deep devotion to duty and all-round personality. A superior military leader requires these "heroic decisions based on reason" as the truest mark of superior leadership.[21] Ziauddin Barani mentions ten qualities for (*sari-i-lashkar*): fear of God; loyalty to the King, balance of mind; nobility of birth (disorders arise if low-born men are appointed to high posts); faithfulness; experience of war; belonging to good tribe; courage and cleverness; generosity; truthfulness of speech and purity of mind.[22] The *Sukranitisara* emphasizes agility, elasticity and flexibility on the part of a general. He must be stimulated by a powerful emotion. Motivation thus plays a great part in leadership.[23] Caesar was fired by ambition, Hannibal by hatred of the enemy, Frederick the Great by pride in a glorious victory, Mir Jumla in Assam by ambition and the urge of self-preservation. Examples may be multiplied. Speaking of Central Asia Barthold writes of "the ideal of the hero of the steppe, with his irrepres-

Office Library Ms. 533. The author, an old servant of Shuja, wrote this history of Shuja's exploits. Written in 1070/1659-60. Ends abruptly on April 18, 1660. It was copied by Jadunath himself. See O.P.I. (Patna) Ms. p. 75a-b. Photostat copy shown to me by Muhammad Jawaid Iqbal, M.A. There is a verbal change here.

Aurangnamah, 188-93; *Mir Jumla*, 170-72.

20a. A few regulating principles notwithstanding, natural genius has the greatest part in the general conduct of a war.

Jomini, 43; Sokolovoskii, ch. 8. 466-7.

21. Clausewitz, *Principles*, pp. 12, 13-14 emphasizes that "no military leader has ever become great without audacity".

22. Barani, *Fatawa-i-Jahandari*, tr. Habib and Dr. Mrs. Afsar Umar Salim Khan, pp. 23-4.

23. *Sukranitisara;* Sarkar's tr. ch. IV, sec. VII; *Manasollasa*, vol. i, p. 37.

sible valour, his unwavering fidelity to the head of his nation, and unlimited hospitality."[24]

The truth of Napoleon's statement can be illustrated in innumerable cases during medieval India. Dahir's ignorance, initial apathy, lack of leadership and foolish mistakes were largely responsible for the fall of Sind before the Arabs. Chandella Vidyadhar's resistance to Mahmud of Ghazni, one of the greatest military leaders of Asia, saved Central India. The bad leadership of Chalukyas of Gujrat led to the sack of Somnath (1026). Prithviraj neglected to utilise the advantage of victory after the first battle of Tarain and thereby allowed the tactical initiative to pass to his adversary. Alauddin and Kafur showed qualities of leadership, which were the despair of Muhammad Tughluq and Firuz. While Babur was a military genius of first rank, neither Ibrahim Lodi nor Rana Sanga was able to show generalship and direction or ensure cohesion among their respective followers. The Turks were natural soldiers but they could fight under good generalship and Humayun was no leader. Sher Shah exemplified Napoleon's dictum in medieval India. Comparing Humayun and Shershah's leadership, Abbas writes: "Sher Khan knew all the devices and stratagems of war, and knew how to commence and conclude an engagement, and had experienced both prosperity and misfortune. The army of the Mughals had not extricated themselves from their camp, before the Afghan army were already upon them, and coming boldly on, attacked the army of the Emperor without hesitation. In the twinkling of an eye they routed the Mughal forces."[25] Daulambapur (1612) illustrated that the character of the general decides the issue, other things being tolerably well-matched.[26] At Talikota (1565) true generalship overcame four-fold superiority in numbers. During the war of succession (1658-59) Aurangzeb's generalship proved to be superior to that of his rivals at Dharmat, Samugarh and Khajwa. Mir Jumla was not a whit behind his master in the art of generalship. At the same

24. Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 43.

25. A. C. Banerji, *Lectures on Rajput History*, 78; Sarkar, *Mil. Hist.* 52; *Tarikh-i-Sher Shahi*, E. & D., iv. 375; Qanungo, *Sher Shah*, 1st edn. (411-12). In his 2nd edition (ch. x) Qanungo speaks of Sher's flexible strategy.

26. Mirza Nathan, *Baharistan-i-Ghaibi*, Eng. trans. M.I. Borah, I, 173; Sarkar, *Mil. Hist.*, ch. 13; *History of Bengal*. ii. 225.

time much of his spectacular success was due to his conducting war with humanity and justice in a degree unparalleled in that age. About Shivaji's qualities of leadership, Sir Jadunath Sarkar writes: "He had the born leader's personal magnetism and threw a spell over all who knew him, drawing the best elements of the country to his side and winning the most devoted service from his officers while his dazzling victories and ever ready smile made him the idol of his soldiery. His royal gift of judging character was one of the main causes of his success, as his selection of generals and governors, diplomatists and secretaries was never at fault, and his administration was a great improvement on the past .... His inborn military genius is proved by his instinctively adopting that system of warfare which was most suited to the racial character of his soldiers, the nature of the country, the weapons of the age, and the internal condition of his enemies." Again Mirza Rajah Jai Singh possessed the essential requisites of leadership in full measure. He was, 'an ideal leader of the composite army of Afghans, Turks, Rajputs and Hindusthanis, that followed the crescent banner of the sovereign of Delhi." He not only showed great initiative even while serving under a hard task-master like Aurangazeb but could also boldly argue his case (e.g., terms of Shivaji's surrender) and justify his course of action when these ran counter to the Emperor's policy. He also possessed the supreme art of discernment and the royal gift of judging human character and of appreciating who was who.[27] .

The best Muslim general of India during the first half of the 18th century was the Nizam-ul-mulk, out-shining his rivals in planning, command over men and management of complicated problems with tact and promptitude. Ratanpur (1719), Balapur (1720) and Shankar Khera (1724) illustrated his qualities as a general. Moreover his foreign officers were more enlightened, better educated and cleverer than those of his rivals. His force was a 'corps of captains'.[28] Yet he was defeated by Baji Rao I. Of the latter it has been said: "The victory of Bhopal marks the zenith of the Peshwa's triumphant career .... By defeating

27. Robert Sewell, *A Forgotten Empire*, First Indian Edn., 1962, pp. 194-195; Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, ii; *Shivaji*, 104, 383-84; Jagadish Narayan Sarkar, *Mir Jumla*, ch. 8, *Mil. Despatches*, 138, based on *Haft Anjuman*, 56b.
28. Yousuf Husain Khan, 247-8; Sarkar, *Mil Hist.*, ch. 19.

the confederate armies at Bhopal the Peshwa established the supremacy of Maratha arms in India and announced the birth of a new Imperial Power. (Dighe).[29] But he made the mistake of not pursuing the Nizam. Alivardi of Bengal was an effective military leader. Ghulam Husain mentions that he "had not his equal in the art of ranging an army in battle and in choosing a post."[30] Nadir Shah and Ahmad Shah Abdali were the greatest Asian generals of their times. Sadashiv Rao Bhao failed miserably as general.[31]

5. *Decimal System*

What little is known about the military organization of ancient Hindus would show that there were sections, platoons and brigades. The army was based on a decimal system of organization which was known to them. According to Kautilya the army units in ascending order were (i) a squad of ten chariots and 10 elephants under a *padika,* (ii) a platoon of a hundred (i.e., ten *padikas*) under a *senapati,* (iii) a regiment of one thousand (i.e., ten *senapatis*) under a *nayaka* (general). The decimal system was also the one common characteristic of military organisation among the early Muslims, the Ghaznawids, the Mongols, the Turks and the Indian Mughals.

The army of the Sultanate (1206-1526) was hierarchically arranged under commanders of different grades. But their exact nature is not very clear. According to Barani, Bughra Khan advised Kaiqubad to keep a large army organised on the old Persian model. The lowest unit was 10 horsemen under a *Sar-i-Khail,* and then through *Sipah salar* (100), *amir* (1,000), *malik* (10,000), the highest was 100,000 under a *Khan.* But Qalqashandi, the fourteenth century Egyptian writer, thinks that there were only four grades, the *Khan* being commander of 10,000 horses, and the lowest the *sipahsalar* of less than 100. There are other ranks occasionally mentioned by other writers, e.g., *'arif*

29. Dighe, *Baji Rao,* 149; H. N. Sinha, *Rise of the Peshwas;* Sarkar, *Mil. Hist.,* ch. 20.

30. *Siyar ul Mutakharin* ii, 52; K. K. Dutta, *Alivardi & His Times* (1963), 139; Sarkar, *History of Bengal,* ii. 448.

31. Irvine, *Later Mughals,* ed. by Sarkar, ii. 317-8; Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire,* ii, ch. xxi; Sardesai, *op. cit.*

(commanding 10, 30 or 40); *Khalifa* or *amir-i-panjah,* 50; *naqib,* 100; *Sarhang,* 500; *muqaddam* commanding a large (but unspecified) force.

The Surs under Islam Shah had army commanders from 50 to 20,000. But the entire military system came to be reorganised by Akbar. His mansabdari system (1573-4) with 66 grades ranging from commanders of 10 (*mirdah,* later twenty, or *bisti*) to 10,000 (later 12,000), was also based on the decimal system.[32]

6. *The Mansabdari System*

To understand the Mughal military system in India we have to go back to the days of Timur and even of Chinghiz Khan. For it was a story of gradual improvement of organization and technique, subject to some modifications. In fact the Mughal military organization was "Turkish in origin and maintained its Turkish character till the end." A compound of Mongol, Chinese and Tartar elements, it reflected the traditions of Chinghiz and Timur. Chinghiz Khan (1154-1227), Asia's World conqueror, conquering almost half of the known world, "grafted a wise, subtle and shrewd Chinese head on to the thickset Mongol body." He united innumerable savage pagan hordes (Tartars or Moghuls), Turks and other Scythian races, all enjoying religious toleration but subject to an iron discipline and strict organization. The 'Golden Horde', as his army was called, consisting exclusively of cavalry in practice, was well-disciplined, well-organised and well-trained while leadership was youthful and superb. The inexorable war machine of Chinghiz Khan, a fusion of Mongol and Chinese principles, was based on five fundamentals:

(i) It was properly graded: Regular division of the soldiers into squadrons (each of 10 men under a captain), compact regiments (*Kushun,* each of 10 squadrons under a centurion, nominally 1000) and brigades or divisions (*tuman,* the largest independent unit, each of 10 regiments, i.e., nominally 10,000), corresponding to cavalry divisions of later periods, each with a head or commander. But this was a feature of all nomadic nations which Chinghiz

32. Decimal System: Kautilya, 10.6.45; *Is. Culture* 1937, 463-4, based on Barani, 145, 376 Qalqashandi Jurji Zaydan. 178; *Adab* 144b, 194-6, Yahya 78; Nazim, 142; Surs in Abbas and Badaoni.

inherited from before. The army (30,000) usually consisted of three *tumans* under three commanders.

(ii) Order and discipline: A soldier leaving one general and joining with another was executed before the army and the general who welcomed the deserter was severely punished. Precise regulations were laid down for royal hunting excursions, which, among the Mongols, were not only pastimes, but also means of supply as well as military manoeuvres and inexorable schools of discipline. Violation of hunting regulations meant death sentence. Further, everybody was responsible under pain of death for the safety and honour of his subordinates.

(iii) a thoroughly dependable and highly efficient body (*corps d'elite*) of brave royal bodyguards. The guard was organised successively in 1203 and 1206 and was subject to severe discipline.

(iv) Selection of able lieutenants: Most of Chinghiz Khan's generals were selected from the guard. Naturally the leadership of his army throughout his vast empire rested on men, already personally tested by himself. The successful record of his generals indicates with what art and knowledge of men Chinghiz selected his lieutenants. The masses were merely an instrument in their hands.

(v) Incredible mobility or rapidity of movements: Chinghiz constituted his empire on an aristocratic basis. As an aristocratic family or clan is the head of a tribe, so in his organisation the "golden clan" (*altan uruk*) with all vassals and followers was the head of all Mongol tribes, of all "generations living in full tents, of all peoples of all the world." Thus Chinghiz's army contained the seeds of the idea of military aristocracy, the prototype of the Mughal mansabdari system. "Quality rather than quantity was the secret of their amazingly rapid sequence of successes. Alone of the armies of their time had they grasped the essentials of strategy, while their tactical mechanism was so perfect that the higher conceptions of tactics was unnecessary." (Liddell Hart). Black and white flags regulated battlefield manoeuvres, eliminating oral or written orders. Mobility, speed and the shock effect of the first two of five lines of horsemen with leather armour and sabres and lances were the main factors. A master strategist and tactician, Chinghiz knew how to organise the army, use spies and propa-

gandize enemy peoples. The Mongol army displayed a capacity for synchronizing the arrival of various columns at one place miles distant "which would be brilliant even in the age of radio and telephone." The leaders used ruses to win victories and showed fine strategic sense in selecting distant battlefields.

The age of Timur was more civilized and his political system was also more stable than that of Chinghiz. Timur's Chaghtai or eastern Turks had the fiery zeal of neoconverts to Islam. Contact with the Muslim world enabled him to harness the services of learned men of Persia, Arabia and Egypt. A ferocious cripple though he was, this first rate military genius "organised the administration and the army on rational basis", with 92 squadrons, each of one thousand armour-clad cavalry. Like Chenghiz he collected a band of able and dependable lieutenants, imitated and even improved upon the Mongol tactics of frightfulness, raising pyramids of human skulls or burying thousands alive for their brave but sinful resistance. Timur's tactical mechanism never equalled the Mongol system. But he added a genius for war unequalled by any Mongol to the traditional mobility and hardihood of the Turks. Capable of tactical dispersion and concentration his cavalry completely disconcerted enemy plans. His strategy consisted in seizing the initiative by "swift movements and sharp decisive blows." His incredibly swift and hardy cavalry could breast streams and build bridges of wood and boats. Reconnaissance for selecting sites preceded battle, while the arrows served as long-range missiles. Throughout his career his approach was unerring and his enemies were forced to take his offensive at a disadvantage. This joint Mongol and Turkish inheritance of Babur was further strengthened by artillery borrowed from the Persians. But this powerful, first rate Mughal army came to be impaired under Humayun.

At first Akbar did not maintain a large standing army but depended on contingents,—men and horses, supplied by his commanding officers, consisting of Mongols, Turks, Uzbegs, Persians, Afghans and Indians and enjoying assignments of land instead of salaries. So it was not a homogeneous force. There was no organization, regimental or otherwise. But this military aristocracy proved to be recalcitrant, rebellious and corrupt keeping less than the scheduled number of men and horses. It was necessary to create a unitary and disciplined force as an effective instrument of

war. In theory all able-bodied citizens were potential soldiers of the empire. Abul Fazl estimated the total effective manpower at about 44 lakhs. But in practice there were well-defined rules of recruitment and the numbers actually enrolled were regulated by an elaborate system. Akbar's mansabdari system (1573-4) introduced a revolutionary change in the character and organization of the army. It made the army organization more complicated, vastly expanded the size of the army and reshaped the art of warfare in medieval India. The system became fully developed and universal by the end of Shahjahan's reign. The 'most remarkable characteristic' of the Mughal army, according to Sir Jadunath Sarkar, was that "in its pristine purity it harnessed the rude vigour of the nomads of the prairies to a highly intellectual organization, guided at the top by the most civilized of the Asiatic races, the Persians." Rooted in Mongol and Turkish elements, the system was 'the army, the peerage and the civil administration all rolled into one'. In its palmy days the army, with its sense of discipline and cooperation under the inspiring presence of a strong ruler, proved superior in organisation and discipline to the clan levies of the Hindus. Each distinct platoon or group of troopers under a separate commander held "its allotted place in a duly graded series of ranks from a company to an army division" and could be smoothly moved to a new position, if necessary, like pawns in the chess-board of war, without disturbing the tide of combat.[33]

33. Mansabdari system.

For the Mongols and the Turks, Lynn Montross, *op. cit.*, 147-9, 218 ff; B. Y. Vladimirstov, *Life of Chinghiz Khan*, 65-66; Howarth, *History of Mongols*, Part I, Ch. 3 (Chinghiz), Part IV, pp. 81-85 (Army); for Chinghiz's three commanders, one, Muquli, commanded the left or eastern wing (among the Mongols the south was regarded as the most honourable side): the second, Bughurji, commanded the right or western wing: the third, Naya, commanded the central troops. In Rashid-ud-din Naya is mentioned only as Muquli's assistant; Bughurji-noyon likewise had an assistant but the corresponding title, so far as is known, is not met with in Mongol sources. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 386; *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, ii. 858 (art. on Chinghiz by W. Barthold); iv. 779 (art. on Timur by L. Bouvat); Raverty, tran. *Tabaqat--Nasiri;* Gibbon, *Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 64; Elias & Ross, *Tarikh-i-Rashidi* (tran.) Intro. 88-89; Prawdin, *The Mongol Empire, its Rise and Legacy;* Sykes, *History of Persia*, ii. 85.

"As regards the Tartar army which every day and all day waits on the orders of Timur following his Highness wheresoever he goes, this is organized after the following fashion. The host is divided into Captaincies;

7. *The Marathas*

In the Maratha Swarajya, all soldiers (musketeers, spearmen, archers or swordsmen) were recruited only after a careful personal inspection by Shivaji himself or taking security for every new soldier from men already in service. He established unity of command in the army by establishing a regular cadre for infantry and cavalry alike. But he avoided it in the forts. Shivaji realised the potenital dangers of forts in the country. He demolished all adulterine castles and even banned private houses with bastions. Every fort (and *thanah*) was placed under three officers of equal status, the *havaldar,* the head of the garrison, the *sabnis,* in charge of accounts and *sar-i-naubat,* who were to act jointly,—to prevent treachery. The first and the third were of Maratha caste and the second, a Brahman,—one caste acting as a check on the other: the commissariat stores and provisions were under a Kayastha officer,

and there are captains of one hundred and of one thousand and of ten thousand men. Over the whole force is a single commander in chief, as with us may be the constable of castile. When any warlike expedition is on foot these captains each are called on, and by the number sent for it is known how great the force assembled is to be. At the present day the commander in chief of Timur's armies is Jahan Shah Mirza (his nephew)... It is the custom of Timur to give in charge his stud of horses and his great flocks of sheep each to some one of his nobles who must see to their wants, giving pasture in the lands they personally possess. One noble thus may have in charge a thousand head of cattle and another ten thousand. If when the time comes for Timur to regain possession of his own it should appear that the number falls short or that their condition anywise be wanting, his Highness will seize whatsoever that lord may possess and very probably in addition put him to death, for such is his rule and ordinance." His Justice & Order, *Ibid*, 294.,

Clavijo, *Embassy to Tamarlane*, p. 300.

Encyclo. Britannica, xv, 706-708 (art. by Captain Liddel Hart); Davy & White, *op. cit.*, 133. 229-336, 275-300, 373-407.

The speed of Timur's cavalry was 150 miles in 24 hours, and 80 miles a day for a week. Aziz, the *Mansabdari System and the Mughal Army*, pp. 1, 13; Aziz, thinks that the Mongol invasions to India probably helped to disseminate Mongol principles of recruitment and organisation; *Malfuzat-i-Timuri*, E. & D., iii, 402 f; *Zafarnama* of Sharfuddin Yazdi, E & D., iii; Davy and White, *Institutes of Timur*, pp. 33-35.

Irvine, *Army*, ch. i-iv; Sarkar, *Mil. Hist.*, 46; 'Aziz, *The Mansabdari System and the Mughal army*, p. 1.

It was a common imagery of those days to compare the battlefield with a chess-board, cf. Amir Khusrau, *Tarikh-i-Alai*, E. & D., iii. 73.

Karkhanis. Every fort had one or more *Tat Sarnaubat* according to size. He also provided against the danger of vested interests (as for example, the hereditary *naikwaris* in Bijapur) by not recognising any hereditary rights in forts, transferring the officers from one fort to another and his civil governors from one district to another and ministers from one post to another. Nevertheless treason and corruption could not be eradicated.[34]

8. *The Sikhs*

It was Guru Govind who first completed the transformation of the Sikhs into a militant power. He abolished caste and creed, laid down certain restrictive regulations in matters like food and dress, and established the *Khalsa*, a brotherhood in arms, an armed democratic community.

Banda adopted guerilla tactics and did not face the imperialists in an open battle. After Banda the army was divided into two groups, the *Budha Dal* (i.e., Elder) and the *Taruna Dal* (i.e., younger), comparable to early Roman army. The younger was sub-divided into 5 (five) *jathas*, the elder was placed under certain commanders.

During 1739-45 the Sikhs were organised in small plundering bands under individual leaders. The existing sixty-five groups came to be leagued together in 11 main divisions or *jathas* in 1748. Thus was organised in a federal union the *Dal Khalsa*, the army of theocracy of the Singhs. Its leader was regarded as the head of the Church and the State. During the anarchy and confusion of the mid-eighteenth century the Sikhs guaranteed the person and property of the villagers who placed themselves under the *Dal Khalsa* by paying one-fifth of their income twice a year. This was known as the *Rakhi* system or *Jamdari*. The Sikh associations came to be called *misls*, each group being a confederacy of equals under a chief of its own selection and all forming one commonwealth.[35]

34. Marathas, Sen, *op. cit.*, chs. 1,4,5,6.

35. For the Sikhs, Macauliffe, *Sikh Religion*, vols. 5 and 6; Cunningham, *History of the Sikhs;* Irvine, *later Mughals;* I. B. Banerji *Evolution of Khalas*, vol. 2; Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, vol. 3; N. K. Sinha, *Rise of the Sikh Power; Ranjit Singh;* H. R. Gupta; Polier's Account. Khuswant Singh, *History of the Sikhs*, 1963, Vol. I, 1469-1839, chs. 5, 6, 7.

9. *The Ahoms*

The Ahoms had a 'highly organised, well-equipped and disciplined army', which extracted unstinted praise from their Mughal adversaries. All adults (except certain specified classes like nobles, priests and high caste men) were liable to serve as labourers or soldiers. They were known as *Paiks,* arranged by *Khels* with a hierarchy of officers, Bora commanding 20 paiks, *Saikia* (100), Hazarika (1000), Rajkhowa (3000) and a Phukan (6000). At first the king depended on three Gohains. Later new officers were appointed.[36]

10. *Discipline*

The value of discipline in an army has been emphasized by Jomini in an immitable passage: "Concert in action makes strength: order produces this concert, and discipline ensures order; and without discipline and order no success is possible." It was not unknown to ancient and medieval theorists and rulers in India. Kautilya ascribes the duty of maintaining discipline to the commander-in-chief and thinks it possible to enthuse even the timid by discipline and training. He prohibited disputes, drinking and holding of merry gatherings and gamblings. The *Sukranitisara* has some verses on discipline by advocating a respectful distance between civilian population and the military, physically and socially, banning all credit transactions as also the need of keeping arms, weapons and uniforms bright.[37]

In the Sultanate period discipline was maintained by the king or the commander issuing needful instructions and warnings directly or through *naqibs* and *Khalifas.* Violaters were punished immediately as a warning to others. In the Mughal empire apart from mounting guard of nobles (*chaukis*), ceremonial parades, reviews, hunting or sword play or horsemanship of individuals, regular drill or manoeuvres seemed to have been absent. There was no uni-

36. Ahoms, Gait, 252; *Atan Burha Gohain and His Times,* 40, quotes the view of Rashid Khan about the efficiency of the Ahom army.

37. Discipline: Jomini, 52, 158-9; Cambridge, *op. cit.,* xxxvi-xxxvii; Kautilya, tr. 354; *Sukra,* Sarkar's tr. ch. IV, sec. vii, lines 763-4, 775, 777-8; Niti, P. (vii. 60-63) prescribes summary punishments to disobedient and treacherous soldiers; Kane, III, ch. 8, pp. 207-8.

formity in dress, no regimental organsiation, no training in combined movements.[38]

What Jomini has observed about the effects of indiscipline (and lack of courage) among the troops and the envy and deception of subordinate officers, even where the general is a competent strategist and tactician, applies equally well to the case of Mirza Rajah Jai Singh in Bijapur (1665-7) who found his "fine hopes fade away." His "admirable combinations" only diminished "the disasters of an almost unavoidable defeat". His despatches show that even as early as the first decade of Aurangzeb's reign sound discipline was lacking in Aurangzeb's army. It did not act in unison. Jai Singh had to suffer beyond measure on account of the recalcitration, non-co-operation and insubordination of his lieutenants, Dilir Khan, Daud Khan and Qutbuddin. They were sincere and devoted but at times allowed their personal considerations to override the wider interests of the empire. The first showed disaffection against Jai Singh, while the other two were recalcitrant during the Bijapuri siege of the Mughal post of Mangalbira (Feb., 1666). The *qiladar* of Parenda showed disloyal negligence causing dislocation of supplies of provisions. Some Hindu captains also (Manohardas Gaur and Amar Singh Rathor) also showed indiscipline. Among the Indian Mughals discipline, judged by European standards, was 'extremely lax, if not entirely absent'. A *jagir* being an *imperium in imperio*, Akbar's policy was anti-*jagir*. Mansabdars were paid in cash, wherever possible. But payments were usually made in *jagir*, with imaginable consequences on discipline of the army and financial resources of the State, especially after Aurangzeb's death.[39]

The initial successes of the Marathas over contemporary Muslim states were due to superior discipline. Shivaji abolished jagirs and heritability of jurisdictions. Discipline was strictly maintained. There was a ban on the presence of women in the army, which was enforced under pain of capital punishment. This absence of women is attested by Dr. Fryer and Biship Navarette. It compares very favourably with presence of women in Mughal

38. Qureshi, *op. cit.*, 143, based on Amir Khusrau, *Khazain*, 101-2; Afif, 369, 370, 95-6, 276, 193-4, 220-1.

39. For the Mughals, HA, 82b, 93a; 73b-74a; My *Mil. Despatches*, 32-3, 142; Irvine, *Army*, ch. xv, pp. 23, 25.

camps and siddis. Women, Brahman and cows were not to be molested. Khafi Khan bears testimony to Shivaji's scrupulous consideration for mosques, the Koran and women. Shivaji and Baji Rao I to a lesser extent kept a balance between war and diplomacy. But there was an excess of finesse and intrigue among later-day Marathas which proved hollow.

Shivaji's military organization continued under Shambhaji and Rajaram (at Jinji) under whom the state of Maratha army was described by Francois Martin in 1692. But with gradual expansion of empire and acquisition of wealth, the Marathas began to imitate the Mughals and discipline became lax. Under Shahu the march of the Maratha army resembled a Mughal ceremonial procession rather than a military expedition. However, the Maratha system at its best was illustrated by Baji Rao's northern expedition (1740). After Shahu the Peshwa became the military head of the state. The needs of the army were supplied by the camp bazaar, a source of revenue to the Maratha chieftains. Unlike Shivaji's times, the Peshwa's camp was full of women and animals (like asses, camels and bullocks used for transport). The state of moral laxity among the Marathas was reflected in the Bargi raids into Bengal. The state of discipline in Indian armies about mid-eighteenth century is succinctly put by Cambridge when he remarks that without discipline "numbers are but an impediment and bravery ineffectual".[40]

11. *Strategic Intelligencers*

Well organised military espionage or strategic intelligence in peace and war alike makes rational war preparations possible. It supplies various kinds of information about the potential enemy's plans and capacity, ensures adoption of precautionary measures, political, economic and military, before aggression and helps proper decision in conducting operation.

Jomini prescribed five means for getting information of the enemy for planning an offensive: (i) efficient and properly organised espionage system, (ii) aggressive reconnaissance by skilful officers and light troops, (iii) enquiries from war prisoners (but

40. For the Marathas, Sen, *Mil. Sys. Marathas*, chs. 1 and 8; Fryer and Navarette, quoted in Orme, *HFM*, 91.

not free from danger), (iv) forming probable hypotheses, — the ability of the general to do so, constituting the real secret of military genius, and (v) signals. None might be reliable, but none was to be neglected.

Military strategic intelligence is now mainly collected by secret agencies working within a state or its borders, legal foreign intelligence agencies (attaches officials through personal observation, visits, etc.), reconnaissance and 'information analysis service', studying and processing the open sources of foreign states. There are also arrangements for naval intelligence with similar methods.[41]

In medieval India, the necessity of getting and using strategic intelligence was fully understood, though it was not as ramified as in modern times. Spies played an important role in civil and military affairs alike in ancient and medieval India. They were regarded as the 'eyes of the king' just as Hobbes describes them. Their activities covered not only the length and breadth of the country like the 'Mysterious thread' of China but also foreign states. The pattern of espionage in early medieval India was set by the Kautilyan system and the ordinances of Manu which were generally followed by later Hindu theorists. Kautilya distinguishes five institutes of espionage, members of which were sent over the country and reported by means of signs or writing (*samajna lipi*) or cypher writing (*gudhalekhya*). Spies sent to foreign kingdoms were known as *ubhayavetans*. Spies also discovered spies of foreign kingdoms. Kautilya recommends a regular secret service department, utilising the services of spies, prostitutes, artisans, actors and singers constantly ensuring the loyalty of the soldiers. Manu advises the king to constantly ascertain the strength of the enemy as well as his own through spies, through display of energy and through actual conduct of operations. "His enemy should not know his weak points, but he must know the weakness, the weak points of the enemy: he should guard the departments (of government) as the tortoise does its limbs; and he should guard his own weak points."[42]

41. Sokolovskii, *Strategy*, ch. 8, 446-8 & ff; Jomini, 141, 20: 'Military Intelligence' by Major Gen. S. N. Anita in *The Statesman*, dated 17-6-70.

42. Ancient and early medieval system in Kautilya, Bk. V. ch. 3,47; Bk. I, chs. 11, 12, 14, 16; Bks. VII, X, XVII; Jha, *Manusmriti*, vol. 3 (Pt. 2),

Under the Sultanate, apart from scouts (*talai'ah* or *yazkis*), or light troops, described as 'eyes of an army', who were taught to reconnoitre and bring news, there were spies who used to go and mix with the enemy and worm out secrets. This exactly anticipates the prescriptions of Jomini.

Before entering a new land spies used to collect information about the enemy. The plans of the imperial army were sought to be concealed from the enemy. The *Barid-i-mamalik* in charge of the Department of Intelligence and Posts, was subordinate to the wazir and used to send information to the Sultan, who was also informed about the state of the route of any proposed invasion. A chain of post-houses, built at intervals, where carriers, horse and foot were kept ready for letters, connected the capital with far-off places of the empire. A Master of Posts and Intelligence (*Sahib-i-barid-i-lashkar*), attached to every army, sent reports to the capital. Speaking of Alauddin's system Barani writes: "It was the practice of the Sultan, when he sent an army on an expedition, to establish posts on the road, wherever posts could be maintained, beginning from Tilpat, which is the first stage. At every post relays of horses were stationed, and at every half or quarter *kos* runners were posted, and in every town or place where horses were posted, officers and report-writers were appointed. Every day, or every two or three days, news used to come to the Sultan reporting the progress of the army, and intelligence of the health of the sovereign was carried to the army. False news was thus prevented from being circulated in the city or in the army. The securing of accurate intelligence from the court on one side, and the army on the other, was a great public benefit."[43] About Muhammad Tughluq's espionage, we learn from the information of the learned Siraju-d din Abu-s Safa 'Umar Shabali. It appears that "the Sultan is very anxious to know all that passes in his territories, and to understand the position of all

sec. 9, v. 105, p. 349; vol. 5, Discourse IX, v. 298, p. 222; *Yajnavalkya* in S. C. Vidyarnava, ch. 13, vv. 328-32. *Ordinances of Manu* (Burnell & Hopkins), vv. 154 ff. p. 167 (spies and behaviour of neighbouring states); Kamandaka, XIII, 25-49; *Yuktikalpataru*, pp. 9-10; *Nitivakyamrita*, pp. 53-55; Agni P. 220, 20-22; 241, 11-13; *Rajatarangini*, vi. 171, vii. 629, 1016, 1045, viii. 1326, 2085, 2200.

43. Nazim, *Sultan Mahmud*, 141; *Adab*, 192b, 193; Qureshi, *Adm. Delhi, Sult.* 143.

those who surround him, whether civilians or soldiers. He has emissaries, called intelligencers, who are divided into a great number of classes. One goes among the soldiers and people. When any fact which ought to be communicated to the Sultan comes to his notice, he reports it to the officer above him; this one, in like manner, communicates it to his superior; and so in due course the fact comes to the knowledge of the Sultan. For communicating the events which happen in distant provinces, there are established between the capital and the chief cities of the different countries, posts, placed at certain distances from each other, which are like the post-relays in Egypt and Syria; but they are less wide apart, because the distances between them is not more than four bow-shots, or even less. At each of these posts ten swift runners are stationed, whose duty it is to convey letters to the next station without the least delay. As soon as one of these men receives a letter, he runs off as rapidly as possible, and delivers it to the next runner, who starts immediately with similar speed, while the former returns quietly to his own post. Thus a letter from a very distant place is conveyed in a very short time with greater celerity than if it had been transmitted by post, or by camel express. At each of these post-stations there are mosques, where prayers are said, and where travellers can find shelter, reservoirs full of good water, and markets where all things necessary for the food of man and beast can be purchased, so that there is very little necessity for carrying water, or food, or tents."[44]

"All through the country which separates the two capitals of the empire, Delhi and Deogir, the Sultan has had drums placed at every post-station. When any event occurs in a city, or when the gate of one is opened or closed, the drum is instantly beaten. The next nearest drum is then beaten, and in this manner the Sultan is daily and exactly informed at what time the gates of the most distant cities are opened or closed.[45]

Regarding Sher Shah, Abbas writes: "For the enforcement of the regulations which he had published for the protection of the people, Sher Shah sent trusted spies with every force of his nobles, in order that inquiring and secretly ascertaining all circumstances relating to the nobles, their soldiers, and the people,

44. *TFS*, E. & D., iii. 203: *JIH* Apr. 1935, pp. 9-15.
45. *Masalik ul-Absar*, etc. E. & D., 111. 581-2.

they might relate them to him; for the courtiers and ministers, for purposes of their own, do not report to the king the whole state of the kingdom, lest any disorder or deficiency which may have found its way into the courts of justice should be corrected."[46] About Islam Shah, Abdullah writes: "His father had erected *sarais* at a distance of one *kos* one from the other. Islam Shah built others between them, so that there was a *sarai*, at every half *kos*. He caused two horses and some footmen to be stationed at each *sarai*, for the purpose of acting as posts and bringing him every day the news from Bengal, after the manner of *dak-chaukis*."[47]

In the Mughal Empire the intelligence department, forming a branch of the postal department, worked under the *darogha-i-harkarah*. There were four classes of reporters in Mughal India, viz., the *Waqianavis* or *Waqianigar* (news-writers) the *Khufia navis*, the *Sawanihnigar* and the *harkara*. Sir Jadunath Sarkar held that the harkaras, the most secret class of spies, carried oral news. But from the *Haft Anjuman* it appears that they sent written reports also. Reporters (*waqianavises*) and spies were attached to all expeditionary forces and embassies to foreign countries. Two spies sent to Bengal told Babur that "Bengalees" under Makhdum-i-Alam were raising defences in twentyfour places on the Gandak where they were posted. Aurangzeb's embassy to Persia was accompanied by a *waqianavis* and *Khufianavis*. Shihabuddin Talish, Mir Jumla's *Waqianavis*, left an account of the conquest of Kuch Bihar and Assam in the *Fathiyya-i-Ibriyya*.[48]

The Marathas and the Sikhs also had their military espionage. Under the Marathas there were regular news-writers of the camp,

46. *Tarikh-i-Sher Shai*, E. & D., iv. 425.

47. *Tarikh-i-Daudi*, E. & D., iv. 479. According to *Tarikh-i-Khan Jahan Lodi*, "in order to insure regularity of despatch, every day a turban of Sunargaon and a handful of fresh rice were delivered to the king, wherever he might be, by the *dak-chauki* establishment.". *Ibid*, n.

Timur's regulations regarding intelligence and espionage, in Davy & White, *op. cit.*, 169, 349-55.

48. J. N. Sarkar, *Mughal Adm.* (1963), 61-64. For a critical account of the System with its merits and defects, see Jagadish Narayan Sarkar, 'News-writers in Mughal India' in *The Indian Press.* ed. by Dr. S. P. Sen, 1968 (Calcutta). For despatches see also '*Military Despatches of a Seventeenth Century Indian General*' by the same author, 141-2.

independent of military commanders. They reported to the king or the *Waqnis, Waqainavis,* or *Mantri* (a member of the Ashta Pradhan Council) who was in charge of the intelligence department. Shivaji had a department of scouts (*jasuds*) under an exceptionally able chief scout Bahirji Jadhav, whose knowledge of byways was largely responsible for not only Shivaji's success but also safety. In the Peshwa-period also they acted as scouts in each army as well as mail-bearers (moving day and night in pairs, *jasudjodi* and *kasidjodi*). They were helped by village headmen and district officers and could use cottage and rest houses on the highways, using camel riders for sending urgent messages. G. H. Khare has found much first-hand material in diplomatic correspondence, envoys' reports and newsletters. There are also numerous news-letters in Persian and Marathi in various daftars (e.g., Chandrachud, Hingane, Dabhada, Purandare, stored in B.I.S. Mandala, Nana Phadnis daftar in Deccan College and Peshwa, Parasnis and other Daftars in Alienation office, Poona). There was a firm of Khemkaran wald Manasaram (perhaps from the Punjab) at Delhi. His agents were posted at all important places in N.India and also at places like Kabul, Bukhara, Balkh and Qandahar. The news collected was edited and sent to different courts including the Peshwa's.[49]

Among the Ahoms too, there were trained spies or secret service men whose duty was to watch and report the dispositions, movements and strategy of the enemy. For carrying messages to foreign states and transacting diplomatic matters with the enemy there were royal agents or messengers known as *Katakis.* The nature of their duties required them to be not only intelligent and tactful but thoroughly honest as well. Military manoeuvres or activity depended on their reports. The *Kakatis* served as writers.[50]

12. *Diplomatic Corps*

Diplomatic espionage was fully known. There were both ambassadors (*duta*) an spies (*chara*). Kautilya mentions three classes of ambassadors *nisrstartha* (performing miscellaneous func-

49. Sen, *Adm. Sys. Marathas,* 52; *Mil. Sys.* 138; J. N. Sarkar, *Persian Records of Maratha History,* vol. I, Delhi Affairs; G. H. Khare, "Newswriters of Medieval Period" in S. P. Sen (ed.) *The Indian Press,* 146-50.

50. Gait, *Hist. of Assam,* 240; S. K. Bhuyan, *Asom Buranji,* 60-1.

tions, and qualified as ministers), *parimitartha* (entrusted with a single mission) and *sasanchara* (carriers of royal writs). Similarly the *Agnipurana* also mentions three classes of envoys and prefers diplomacy to war. The ambassador acts as an open spy. The *Kamandakaniti* follows them and mentions the duties of these agents:—to survey the strength of *Antapalas* and *Atavika* princes on way to the enemy's kingdom, know the extent of enemy's army, treasury, forts and weak spots. According to *Sukranitisara*, an ambassador is one of 10 main ministers. He should be loyal, capable of reading the signs, demeanour and behaviour of the adversary, skilled in all arts and sciences, eloquent and devoid of fear.

Ambassadors played an important part in ancient Indian diplomacy and war but were not permanent agents in foreign courts. Rajaraja (acc. 985 A.D.) punished those who had insulted his ambassador.[51]

In Islamic countries also there were arrangements for diplomatic intercourse primarily religious (under the Prophet) and political (under the Umayyads and Abbasids). But commercial relations with non-Muslim countries (i.e., world of war) were to be avoided as much as possible though this was permitted by Abu Yusuf. The jurist Malik, following Abu Yusuf, advises appointment by the Caliph of officials on "the borders of the world of Islam to prevent believers from going to the world of war", though non-Muslim traders might come to the world of Islam."

Emissaries were not to be executed, Envoys and diplomatic missions enjoyed immunity. Even without *aman* an infidel official messenger would be unmolested.[52]

'Alauddin Khalji violated the prevalent diplomatic etiquette. The Mongol ruler, Uljaitu Sultan, was anxious to resume the older diplomatic relations which had not been renewed by the latter. But the Mongol ruler's proposal of marrying a Delhi princess evidently so annoyed 'Alauddin that he had the ambassadors imprisoned and some of their attendants trodden under the

51. Kautilya, i. 16; Agni, P. 241.1-14; Sukra II. 72, 87-8.
52. Khadduri, *Laws of War and Peace in Islam*, 115-6; Ash Sha'rāni, *Kitab Kashf ul Ghimmah*, in Ibid, ch. xvii.

feet of elephants. Abdullah Wassaf, a contemporary writer, has justly observed that this tarnished Alauddin's 'good fame'; "for to bring trouble on an ambassador is, under every system of religious faith, altogether opposed to the principles of law, social observance, and common sense. With respect to law, an ambassador receives his credentials without even the suspicion of criminality; with respect to social observance, the oppressor and the oppressed, friend and foe, peace and war, are all equally in need of embassies and communications: with respect to common sense, it is abundantly evident that the killing of one man, or even ten, entails no infirmity or injury on a kingdom. Inasmuch, therefore, as 'Alau-d-din, free to do as he chose, was guilty of a deed from which danger might have resulted, and without any cause exhibited enmity, he must be considered to have acted contrary to what a peaceful policy and sound prudence dictated."[52-a]

The Mughal empire had arrangements for inter-state espionage. After his enthronement Aurangzeb sent rich presents to other Muslim states and maintained diplomatic intercourse with the Sharif of Mecca and the Shah of Persia and also with the Kings of Balkh, Bukhara, Kashghar in Central Asia, Turkey and Abyssinia.[53] It was the practice of rulers in those days to entrust traders and pilgrims with letters to distant countries and these couriers sometimes assumed the airs of ambassadors. The Mughal Emperors posted envoys in the Sultanates of Bijapur and Golkonda. The Mughal envoys posted at Bijapur (Mulla Muhammad Sadiq) and Golkonda (Khwaja Muhammad Darwesh) used to send reports about the defences, internal conditions, military movements in these countries, to the Mughal General, Mirza Rajah Jai Singh I.[54]

Shivaji selected able persons to man his diplomatic corps. His Chief Justice, Niraji Raoji, used his master's money as well as his own skill as 'a clever logician', induced Bahadur Khan, the Mughal Viceroy of the Deccan (1676) to promise neutrality during his planned invasion of the Karnatak in 1677. Shivaji posted a shrewd diplomat, Prahlad Niraji with considerable per-

52a. Wassaf, E. D., iii, 51-2.
53. Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, iii. ch. 29, p. 121.
54. *Haft Anjuman*, 85a, 93b; My *Military Despatches*, etc., 142.

sonal magnetism and persuasive power as his envoy at Haidarabad to win Qutb Shah's alliance.[55]

The practice of writing reports of battles (*'arzadasht*), comparable to modern military despatches, was quite well known in Mughal India. Such reports were submitted to the Emperor by the General. However, we have very few extant examples of military despatches in Medieval India. Hence the *Haft Anjuman* of Munshi Udairaj alias Taleyar Khan, possesses a unique value. Sometimes, for reasons of expediency the despatches were accompanied by separate sheets (*band*) and by secret enclosures.[56]

Thus during the medieval period the basic principles of strategic intelligence and diplomatic espionage were fairly well known to the theorists and rulers alike. But it was in practical application that the efficiency of espionage varied in different periods.

55. Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV. 245-6.

56. Irvine, *Army*, etc. 254; *HA*, 60b-61a, 55a, 58a; My *Military Despatches*, Preface, 134-5.

A Nineteenth Century Development Project in India: The Dharwar Gin Factories, 1843-92

BY

Peter Harnetty

During the nineteenth century intensive efforts were made to develop India's resources for the benefit of British industry. To this end there was extensive railway construction, financed by British capital at favourable rates of interest guaranteed by the Government of India,[1] manipulation of the Indian tariff to suit the interests of the Lancashire cotton manufacturers,[2] and cotton improvement programs designed to relieve Lancashire's dependence on he United States as the major source of its raw material.[3] In the 1840s American planters were brought to India to carry out the experimental cultivation of American cotton, and one of them succeeded in introducing and acclimatizing New Orleans cotton in the Dharwar district of Bombay. However, this variety of cotton had to be cleaned by a mechanical saw gin and so required a more complex technology than was present in Indian peasant culture at the time. As part of the effort to introduce into India varieties of cotton that would be suitable for the Lancashire cotton industry, a government factory was established to develop and manufacture the necessary gins. The operation

1. W. J. MacPherson, "Investment in Indian Railways, 1845-1875," *Economic History Review*, 2nd ser., VIII (1955), pp. 177-86.

2. Peter Harnetty, "The Imperialism of Free Trade: Lancashire and the Indian Cotton Duties, 1859-1862" *Econ. Hist. Rev.*, 2nd ser., XVIII (1965), pp. 333-49; and "The Indian Cotton Duties Controversy, 1894-1896," *English Historical Review*, LXXVII (1962), pp. 684-702.

3. The first cotton improvement program began in 1840 and lasted for about ten years; see Seth Leacock and David G. Mandelbaum, "A Nineteenth Century Development Project in India: The Cotton Improvement Program," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, III (1955), pp. 334-41. During the American Civil War a second such program was undertaken; see Peter Harnetty, "The Cotton Improvement Program in India, 1865-1875," *Agricultural History*, XLIV (1970), pp. 379-92.

of this factory and its branches for nearly half a century provides an early example of the difficulties involved in development work and of the need to combine adequate technical knowledge with an understanding of relevant social and cultural factors.

The original factory was founded in 1843 in a small cotton farm in Koosigul run by an American planter, Mercer. A succession of Americans remained in charge and in 1851 the factory was shifted to Dharwar into a small building erected for the purpose. Great results were expected from the factory's operations. But when the first cotton improvement program was wound up in 1852 and the remaining Americans recalled, the cultivation of Dharwar American cotton fell off and orders came from London to close the Dharwar factory and others that had been set up in Gujarat and Khandesh.[4] These orders were cancelled as a result of intervention by Dr. G. F. Forbes, the civil surgeon of Dharwar and a successful amateur mechanic and inventor.[5] Forbes argued that the reason for the declining value of Dharwar American cotton on the Liverpool market was the injury done to the staple by the cleaning machinery. He was appointed as Superintendent of the Dharwar factory in 1855 and he invented a new gin to replace the existing cotton-cleaning machinery. Thereafter, and with the added stimulation of favourable prices, the cultivation of Dharwar American cotton increased. This caused steady demand for the gins produced at the Dharwar factory and branch factories were established at Karajgi in 1858 and at Gadag in 1861. The branches served as bases for parties of itinerant workman who visited the surrounding country to repair gins in the owners' houses. The branches were managed by Forbes with the aid of a local panchayat and were under the immediate control of foremen trained at the main factory. The branches were not the property of the government, like the main factory at Dharwar, but belonged to the gin owners whose voluntary subscriptions supported them. The head factory supplied men and materials; each branch employed fifteen to twenty artisans during the

4. Report by G. F. Forbes on the Cotton Crop of the Southern Division, Bombay, for 1867-68, dated 9 May 1868. Bombay Record Office, *Revenue Department Compilations*, V (1868), No. 988.

5. Report by the Collector of Dharwar on the Cotton Gin Factories, 30 Aug. 1872. Bombay, *Rev. Dept. Comp.*, IX (1873), no. 647.

busy season and a similar number of ordinary labourers. The artisans were formed into travelling parties to tour the country and repair the gins. Each gin was inspected every two weeks and the results were recorded. Standardization of the pattern of gins supplied by the Dharwar factory made it possible to carry out most repairs on the spot.[6]

At first, the gins supplied from the Dharwar factory were made of wood but Forbes wanted to construct them of iron and in March 1858 he sent a model to Manchester for construction there.[7] In 1860 Forbes visited England himself. He went to Manchester for consultations with cotton manufacturers and to purchase supplies for the Dharwar gin factory.[8] The outbreak of civil war in America in April 1861, with the consequent threat to Lancashire's cotton supply, provided a great stimulus to the operations of the Dharwar factory. Cultivation of cotton increased enormously and Forbes made great efforts to spread the growth of Dharwar American cotton.[9] This required the manufacture of many more saw gins and the India Office in London authorized the construction of certain parts of gins in Manchester to specifications laid down by Forbes. These parts were then shipped to the Dharwar factory.[10] From September 1861 to April 1863

6. William Walton, Acting Superintendent, Dharwar Cotton Gin Factory, to Govt. of Bombay, no. 107, 31 Jan. 1867. Bombay, *Rev. Dept. Comp.*, VIII (1867). no. 281. Four additional branch factories were later opened.

7. Bombay, *Rev. Dept. Comp.*, LIV (1859), no. 582.

8. For example, Under-Secretary of State for India to G. F. Forbes, 18 Jan. 1861 authorizing him to purchase two saw gins to be worked by bullock power, at a cost of £ 40 each, and for various stores for the Dharwar factory amounting to £ 353. India Office, *Rev. Dept., Home Corresp., Letters Sent*, I (1859-62), no. 66.

9. For the increased cultivation of cotton in India in the 1860s, see Peter Harnetty, "Cotton Exports and Indian Agriculture, 1861-1870," *Econ. Hist. Rev.*, 2nd ser., XXIV (1971), pp. 414-29, especially Table 3.

10. For example, Parl. Under-Sec. of State for India to John M. Dunlop, manufacturer of machinery, Manchester, 24 Dec. 1861, authorizing Dunlop to construct as a matter of urgency parts for one hundred 18-saw gins for shipment to Dharwar. India Office, *Rev. Dept., Home Corresp., Letters Sent*, I (1859-62), no. 113. In 1862, cast iron materials for the construction of 600 saw gins at Dharwar were purchased in England. In April 1863. parts for another 100 saw gins were shipped. *Ibid.*, Letters Received, IV (1862), no. 368, and V (1863), no. 431A.

the value of saw gins and other stores imported from England for the factory amounted to Rs. 77,467.[11] These costs were recovered by the sale of gins to the ryots. In the middle of 1862 Forbes reported that the rise in the price of cotton caused by the war in America had led to an increased demand for cotton-cleaning machinery, and that he had 591 registered applicants for gins who had paid a deposit against purchase of them when they became available. He also claimed that in the six years from 1856 to 1862 receipts from the sale of gins by the Government factory had fallen short of expenditure by only Rs. 1,280.[12]

By 1863 the Dharwar factory was apparently turning out eight gins a day and had more than 1,000 orders on the books, with more coming in. The Bombay government considered that the manufacture of the improved saw gin was one of the few substantial improvements effectively introduced into Indian agricultural practice. In reply to a query from the Government of India, it argued that such manufacture was not yet in a state to be left to the chances of its being taken up by private enterprise. The value of the gins depended not only on general design and correct manufacture, but also and more particularly on the accurate fitting together of the parts. It was not possible to obtain the necessary perfection except at the government factory. Workmen trained at that factory had been tempted away by offers of high wages and employed by private parties to manufacture gins of an inferior quality. Yet such was the demand that the ryots were prepared to pay Rs. 600-700 for these inferior models rather than wait their turn for a government-manufactured gin at Rs. 300. Given the state of the demand and the fact that the government factory was the only one producing gins of good quality, the Bombay government considered it impossible to give up the manufacture of gins without perceptibly diminishing the supply of the best cotton currently exported from Western India. Moreover, gins had yet to be invented to do for the indigenous Deccan cotton what Forbes's gin had done for Dharwar American. The Bombay government

11. Bombay, *Rev. Dept. Comp.*, XXVII (1862-64), no. 1408. From Aug. 1844 to Sept. 1861, Rs. 44,952 were spent on such imports.

12. Report on the Cotton Gin Factory in the Dharwar Collectorate for the Half Year ending 31 May 1862. *Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government.* n.s., LXVII, p. 21.

believed it should aid such inventions by encouraging and sharing the expense of the necessary experiments. It therefore proposed to instruct Forbes to try and develop a gin suitable for the cotton of the Deccan, Berar, and Gujarat.[13]

Soon after, the sphere of Forbes's activities was widened with his appointment as Cotton Commissioner for Bombay. He was given the tasks of improving the machinery for cleaning indigenous cotton, superintending the supply of acclimatized American seed from Dharwar to other parts of India, and generally assuming responsibility for problems connected with the improvement and extension of cotton cultivation in Bombay.[14] Meanwhile, the first notes of criticism of the Dharwar factory were heard. For several years Forbes had reported modest profits for the factory. But in the fiscal year 1862-63 they climbed from the previous year's figure of Rs. 408 to almost Rs. 16,000 and for the next six months to more than Rs. 4,200. At the end of 1863 the Bombay government requested its Auditor-General to report whether the profits of the factory were correctly shown. Various delays held up report until September 1864. The Auditor-General secured a statement of receipts and expenditures of the factory from its first year of operations in 1843-44 to 1862-63. But he found it impossible to tell from the figures what the profits of the factory were, because experiments in cotton cultivation and the establishment and working of the factory had always been considered parts of the same operation. The accounts were therefore so intimately blended that they could not be separated. But the Auditor-General doubted the accuracy of Forbes's reported profits. Much of the profit was assumed in anticipation of prices expected to be received from gins in stock and yet to be sold. A major portion of the profit was account of gins imported from England and sold at a mark up.[15]

13. Govt. of Bombay to Govt. of India, no. 2717, 1 Aug. 1863. India, *Rev. Consulations*, XLVIII (1863). no. 15, 17 Oct. 1863.

14. Govt. of Bombay to Sec. of State, Letter no. 17 (Revenue), 27 Aug. 1863, submitting a copy of Bombay Government Resolution appointing Dr. Forbes as Cotton Commissioner subject to the approval of the Secretary of State. Forbes was appointed on 1 Oct. 1863.

15. Auditor-General to Govt. of Bombay, no. 1261, 26 Sept. 1864. Bombay, *Rev. Dept. Comp.*, XXVII (1862-64), no. 1408.

The figures collected by the Auditor-General throw some light on the operations of the Dharwar gin factory during the first twenty years of its existence.

TABLE 1

OPERATIONS OF THE DHARWAR COTTON GIN FACTORY.

Receipts	(Rs.)	Expenditures	
Sale of gins, etc.	171,874	Salary and establishment	215,807
Sale of cotton in England (1848-49, 1849-50)	65.390	Contingent charges	140,176
Dead stock, 30 April 1863 (buildings, furniture)	11,071	Advances for purchasing cotton sent to England (1847-54)	317,528
Total	248,335	Total	673,511
		Less receipts	248,335
		Balance against factory	425,176

SOURCE: Bombay, Rev. Dept. Comp., XXVII (1862-64), no. 1408.

In view of this unfavourable report, the Bombay government ordered William Walton, acting-superintendent during Forbes's absence in England on leave, to run the factory at a profit. Walton therefore engaged on other work from which a profit could be expected. This work was unconnected with the factory's purpose and also incompatible with his duties as superintendent. The result was a decline in efficiency. One of Walton's actions was to open two new branch factories for keeping cotton-cleaning machinery in order.[16] Walton declared that these factories would cost the government nothing since the whole expense of establishment and operation would be met by voluntary subscription from the ryots. But all the branch factories were affected by the fall in the price of cotton that followed the end of the civil war in America. Cultivators and dealers were no longer prepared to give the same support to these branch factories as hitherto. Many subscribers withdrew on the plea that they could no longer afford the

16. William Walton to Rev. Commr., S. Div., no. 175, 12 Feb. 1867. India, *Rev. Procs.*, XXIV (1867), no. 1, 3 Apr. 1867.

subscription. They turned to unqualified persons to repair their gins and this had a bad effect on the machinery.[17]

In May 1868, with the future of the factory in doubt,[18] Forbes reviewed its working and proposed a plan of action for the future. He argued that it could not operate on the terms laid down by the government, namely, that it must show a profit, because this had resulted in the factory undertaking work that did not properly belong to it. This should cease and the government should cover the salary of the superintendent instead of charging it to the account of the factory. Forbes also proposed a reduction in the yearly subscription required of all gin owners, so as to bring all gins once more into proper repair. The charge for materials used in repair must be cut and the makeshift gins constructed by village blacksmiths and carpenters at the height of the American Civil War must be repaired at reasonable cost. Finally, Forbes called for increased superintendence of the working parties. He claimed all this could be done for an outlay of Rs. 6,000 a year, exclusive of the superintendent's salary. With this amount, Forbes said he could bring every gin in the area producing Dharwar American cotton within the control of factory workmen and keep them in good order. Not only was the continued future of acclimatized Dharwar American action at stake. He argued that the government had a moral obligation in the matter. Government had supplied many hundreds of persons with gins over the years and was surely bound to continue to provide the means of repairing them. This was an implied condition of the sale of the gins and one from which the government could not in fairness withdraw until relieved of the responsibility by private agencies.[19]

17. Report by Dr. G. F. Forbes on the Cotton Crop of the S. Div., Bombay, for 1867-68, dated 9 May 1868. Bombay, *Rev. Dept. Comp.*, V (1868), no. 988.

18. The Secretary of State called for a report on the working of the factory in Aug. 1866. Sec. of State to Govt. of Bombay, Despatch no. 59 (Rev.), 23 Aug. 1866.

19. Report by Dr. G. F. Forbes on the Cotton Crop of the S. Div., Bombay, for 1867-68, dated 9 May 1868. Bombay, *Rev. Dept. Comp.*, V (1868), no. 988. Forbes denied charges that he had always stood in the way of private enterprise developing cleaning machinery in the southern part of Bombay presidency.

The Government of Bombay accepted Forbes's arguments. The introduction of New Orleans cotton into Dharwar district had given an impulse to the cotton trade and had added to the wealth of the district. By undertaking the distribution of seed the government had incurred the obligation of aiding in the supply of proper cleaning machinery. This had been done in the past and should be done in the future.[20] Moreover, the Secretary of State agreed that the factory was of benefit.[21] But many government officials in Bombay who were well acquainted with the Dharwar factory questioned the wisdom of maintaining it and in March 1871 the Bombay government set up a commission to look into the matter.[22] And when Forbes retired in the following year, the government asked the Collector of Dharwar to submit proposals for closing down the factory. However, the Collector, E. P. Robertson, warned that disastrous consequences would flow from government withdrawal from management of the factory. At the time, there were 315,386 acres of land sown with New Orleans cotton which depended on the saw gin for cleaning. If the factory was closed down, cultivation of this variety of cotton would cease within two years.[23] At the same time, Robertson was critical of the operation of the Dharwar factory and its branches. For some years the head factory had produced only wooden gins but later it had produced gins with cast iron frames imported from England. They were sold at the following prices:

TABLE 2

COST OF SAW GINS PRODUCED AT DHARWAR (Rs.)

	Up to 1868	1868-72	1872
18-saw gins	314	264	175
10-saw gins	207	167	135

SOURCE: Bombay, Rev. Dept. Comp., IX (1873), no. 647.

Although the factory had sold 988 wooden gins and 966 iron ones since its inception, these figures show that they were

20. Resolution no. 3508D of the Government of Bombay, 14 Sept. 1868. Bombay, *Rev. Dept. Comp.*, V (1868), no. 988.

21. Sec. of State to Govt. of Bombay, Despatch no. 84 (Rev.), 23 Dec. 1868.

22. Bombay, *Rev. Dept. Comp.*, VII (1871), no. 595.

23. Report by the Collector of Dharwar on the Dharwar Gin Factory, 30 Aug. 1872. Bombay, *Rev. Dept. Comp.*, IX (1873) no. 647.

sold at steadily declining prices while operating costs remained the same.

Another criticism of the factory's operations was that from 1855 to 1871 there were no really practical mechanical assistants appointed to the factory. In 1871 a skilled mechanic was appointed superintendent and two mechanics from the Bombay dockyard were appointed as assistants. But the pay attached to the post of superintendent was so miserably inadequate that the government had to resort to the expedient of attaching other duties to the position. Forbes, who was superintendent from 1855 to 1863 had also been civil surgeon of Dharwar and was later superintendent of the port of Sedasheghur.[24] His successor was Major Hassard, an army officer who drew military pay. Forbes resumed the post in 1865 but was by then also Cotton Commissioner of Bombay and Inspector-in-Chief under the Bombay Cotton Frauds Act, which had gone into force on 1 January 1864. He was followed as superintendent of the factory by William Walton who was also an Inspector under the Cotton Frauds Act. When the skilled mechanic was appointed in 1871 most of his monthly salary of Rs. 900 came from the export fee on cotton levied under the Cotton Frauds Act. But when it was decided that payments from this fund on account of the Dharwar factory were irregular, his pay was cut to Rs. 200 and he promptly resigned.[25]

Clearly, the main factory had not been properly supervised and could not be without increased expenditure. Other problems were created by the branch factories. Six were built altogether, all on government land, out of funds subscribed by gin owners who were induced to build them partly so that their gins might be kept in proper repair but also because the gins manufactured at the main

24. For efforts to develop Sedasheghur (Karwar) as the outlet for Dharwar Cotton, see Peter Harnetty, *Imperialism and Free Trade: Lancashire and India in the Mid-Nineteenth Century* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1972), pp. 67-69.

25. Report by the Collector of Dharwar on the Dharwar Gin Factory, 30 Aug. 1872. Bombay, *Rev. Dept. Comp.*, IX (1873), no. 647.

factory were too heavy to transport there for repair. The costs of constructing these branch factories were as follows:

TABLE 3

COSTS OF CONSTRUCTING BRANCH GIN FACTORIES, DRARWAR (Rs.)

Navalgund	3,084	1,922	1,162
Ron	2,517	2,164	353
Gadag	2,684	2,391	293
Bankapur	2,681	2,681	—
Karajgi	1,673	1,673	—
Ranibennur	2,716	2,716	—

SOURCE: Bombay, Rev. Dept. Comp., IX (1873), no. 647.

Because they were built on government land, the government became the owner of the factories although the funds for their construction had largely been paid by the subscribers. But the latter had fallen in arrears with their annual subscriptions which were supposed to cover maintenance costs, and they had also failed to pay the costs of the materials used in repairs. Hence the government had been the loser to the tune of Rs. 31,896.

TABLE 4

LOSSES SUSTAINED BY GOVERNMENT ON OPERATIONS OF BRANCH FACTORIES

	Amounts Outstanding on account of subscriptions			Amounts Outstanding on account of gins and materials		
	Amount	Recov.	Irrecov.	Amount	Recov.	Irrecov.
Navalgund	1,455	200	1,255	361	308	53
Ron	2,570	1,285	1,285	1,188	600	588
Gadag	3,230	1,500	1,730	3,027	1,170	1,857
Bunkapur	5,620	150	5,470	1,078	808	270
Karajgi	6,781	1,910	4,871	400	185	215
Ranibennur	7,590	3,795	3,795	2,047	1,049	998
Hubli	11,155	2,000	9,155	954	600	354
Total	38,401	10,840	27,561	9,055	4,720	4,335

SOURCE: Bombay, Rev. Dept. Comp., IX (1873), no. 647.

The branch factories were supposed to be under the control of a panchayat of gin owners but this supervision was a farce. The panchayats met monthly at the branch factories, signed an attendance book, recorded that everything was in order, and then separated. The visits by the officers of the head factory were of little value since they lacked mechanical knowledge. The

consequence of this inadequate inspection was that although 4,000 saw gins were in use in Dharwar district, only 600 new saws were brought into use to replace old ones in 1870-71.[26]

Having made these criticisms, Robertson recommended that for the future the work of the main factory should be confined to repairing gins and not to making new ones. There were sufficient gins already in the district to supply its needs, and the stock in hand was more than sufficient for several years. Accordingly, Robertson recommended turning the main factory into an industrial school and reformatory and abolishing the system of itinerant workmen and branch factories. His reasons reflected the trend in official thinking in India about the government's educational policy and its consequences:

> Government has been paying for years past great attention to education, great and rapid strides have been taken, and while we have thus been giving the young men a high education as clerks, nothing or next to nothing, of a practical nature has been done to advance them. The result is, we have a number of young men fit to be clerks but fit for nothing else. We are rearing up a set of functionaries of the Chinese type, and there is not and never can be Government employment for them all. Every officer of experience will frankly tell Government that this is causing much discontent, and that the danger arising from this is of the very greatest description and not to be trifled with.[27]

An argument of a different nature was advanced when Robertson's proposals came before the Bombay government. Henry Tucker, a member of the Governor's Council, stressed the role of government in stimulating enterprise in an underdeveloped country: "In a backward country like India we cannot leave everything to private enterprise and it is necessary for Government to take the initiative in many things which, in countries where civilization has reached a higher point of development, are best left alone by Government."[28] Tucker recalled that New Orleans cotton would not have been introduced into Dharwar but for government interference.

26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.*
28. Note by Henry P. St. G. Tucker, 1 Jan. 1873. *Ibid.*

Therefore, it would not be good policy for the government to completely retreat from the field of action. He thought the government would be quite justified in keeping Dharwar supplied with the skilled craftsmen necessary to repair machinery which had come into use as a result of government action. He especially favoured Robertson's plan for an Industrial School, though without a reformatory as an adjunct.

The Governor, Sir Philip Wodehouse, interviewed Robertson personally before deciding what action to take. He agreed that it was necessary to keep faith with the cotton growers of Dharwar by making arrangements to keep their gins in repair. So he decided to keep the central factory as a source of supply at an annual cost to the imperial revenues of about Rs. 10,000. Only those branch factories which could pay their way would be retained; the others would be closed at once. After further prodding from Tucker, the Governor also agreed to the proposal for the establishment of a School of Industry at Dharwar, if funds could be found.[29]

Meanwhile, in January 1873 the Government of India questioned the wisdom of retaining the Dharwar gin factory, as part of a general review of the role of government in improving cotton cultivation.[30] The Bombay government gave two arguments for retainin the factory: to keep faith with those who had purchased gins, and to preserve the cultivation of New Orleans cotton in Dharwar district. It asked permission to spend Rs. 10,000 a year for the maintenance of the head factory on a reduced scale but said it would retain only those branch factories which could pay their way with subscriptions from the ryots.[31] The Government of India agreed on a three-year trial basis and laid down as the primary object of the factory the training of existing village workmen to do

29. Resolution of the Government of Bombay, no. 2192, 17 Apr. 1873.

30. Govt. of India to Govt. of Bombay, no. 3, 6 Jan. 1873. India, *Rev. Agric. and Commerce (Fibres and Silks) Proces.*, Jan., 1873, no. 8.

31. Govt. of Bombay to Govt. of India, no. 2598-129R, 7 May 1873. *Ibid.*, July 1873, no. 4. It should be noted that although the Bombay government was prepared to use government agency to encourage the cultivation of Dharwar American cotton to the extent of financing the operations of the Dharwar gin factory, it refused to agree to another suggestion made by Robertson for legislation authorizing government officers to prevent any man from working a gin which was not certified to be in good working order.

the necessary repairs. It hoped within a reasonable period to withdraw its subsidy and leave the cultivation and trade in cotton "to the natural order of things."[32] The Bombay government made it clear that in future no gins would be manufactured at the Dharwar factory, which would be used only to repair gins and to make whatever parts were needed for that purpose. This would end the unnecessary and irregular expenditures which had characterized the operation of the factory hitherto, and which had included the manufacture and purchase of cotton presses. The workmen already trained by the factory would be given the chance to buy, at the lowest possible rates, such atricles as were required for the repair of gins. They would then he able to compete successfully with the men employed by the branch factories and so render those factories unnecessary.[33]

On this basis, the central factory operated at an actual cost of Rs. 6,472 in 1873-74. But hardly any of the work done there was in the repair of gins. Most of it was general work for the public and for government departments. No purchasers could be found for the saw gins made at the factory and no success was achieved in inducing shopkeepers to take materials for sale. The branch factory at Hubli was closed but the six others were retained. Their financial condition was chaotic. Rs. 4,726 was outstanding in wages to workmen; this sum was paid off and the payment debited to the Cotton Frauds Fund. Apart from this, the branch factories were in debt to the extent of Rs. 11,593, mainly on account of materials supplied to them by the main factory at Dharwar. Gin owners still owed the branch factories Rs. 38,401 in outstanding subscriptions. Thus, when the Collector of Dharwar assumed control of the Dharwar gin factories in 1873 they were indebted to the amount of Rs. 50,000. He was later able to recover more than

32. Govt. of India to Govt. of Bombay, no. 148, 5 July 1873. India, *Rev., Agric. and Commerce (Fibres and Silks) Procs.*, July 1873, no. 5. The Secretary to government in this department, A. O. Hume, noted that from reports he had seen from many quarters, a very large portion of the cotton cultivated in Dharwar consisted of hybrid cotton of far less value than the original stock. Hume also thought that from the results of ginning trials, it was no longer true to say that there was no other gin than the saw gin that could satisfactorily clean New Orleans cotton.

33. Govt. of Bombay to Govt. of India, no. 4683-236R, 16 Aug. 1873. India, *Rev., Agric., and Commerce (Fibres and Silks) Procs.*, Aug. 1873, no. 3.

Rs. 5,400 of this sum; the rest had to be written off. The six branch factories had only 897 gins subscribed for out of about 3,000 in the district; in the case of five of these branches, efforts to get the panchayats to take some interest in their affairs failed. The burden of management consequently fell on the mamlatdars.[34]

Clearly, the operations of the Dharwar gin factory and its branches were inefficient. Then came evidence that the gins they had manufactured were also inefficient. This became clear from the results of an exhaustive series of trials of cotton gins used for cleaning the different varieties of cotton grown in India. These trials were held in Manchester, Broach, and Dharwar in 1871-72 and again in 1874-75. They were sponsored by the India Office and supported by the Manchester Cotton Supply Association and the Society of Arts, both of which appointed committees to assist in their execution. Forty-six different gins were tested with thirty-two varieties of cotton. In the course of the trials, in England and in India, 120,000 lbs. of seed cotton were cleaned and the quality of the cotton produced was determined by actually spinning 168 of the 400 samples of clean cotton. Then, the breaking strength of the resulting yarn was ascertained in more than 5,000 experiments.

The prime object of the trials was to find out the relative merits of the various gins used for cleaning Indian cotton. The results had an important bearing on the solution of several questions relating to the ginning of cotton which had been raised in India since the introduction of European machinery for the purpose. Up to this point, the usual opinion in India was that the *churka* could clean the cotton without injuring the fibre, but its great disadvantage was the small amount of work it got through. The fact that it was worked by hand delayed the commencement of ginning operations until after the picking had been completed. This was an important consideration because, apart from the general advantages of a rapid preparation of the crop, in many parts of the country and especially in Dharwar district it was of the utmost importance to finish the preparation of the cotton crop and get it out of the country before the monsoon made communications impossible. The saw gin, on the other hand, had a remarkably high

34. Report by the Collector of Dharwar on the Working of the Dharwar Cotton Gin Factories, 1873-74. *Ibid.*, Jan. 1876, no. 15.

output although the saws injured the fibre markedly. It was usually acknowledged that for rough or woolly-seeded cotton, such as Dharwar American, the saw gins were the most effective. Dr. Forbes had believed that with properly fitted gins, no injury was done to the fibre of Dharwar American although the weaker native staples were cut and spoiled. Others, such as Dr. Shortt who conducted ginning experiments in Madras in 1865, were convinced that indigenous cotton could also be cleaned by saw gins.[35]

Two important facts emerged from the trials. First, it was found that there was no essential difference between the ginning qualities of the indigenous and exotic varieties of cotton. It was not true that the staple of the Indian cotton was so tender that the action of saw gins would be destructive. Equally, it was not true that roller gins could not clean cotton with a wooly seed, like Dharwar American.[36] Second, the trials showed that Dharwar American cotton cleaned by saw gins produced at the Dharwar factory, even when the gins were in perfect condition, was inferior in quality to such cotton cleaned by the best American saw gins. There was no doubt that the gin produced at Dharwar, although twenty years previously it was a considerable improvement on gins then tested in India, was now inferior to other saw gins. It followed that in the neglected condition in which these gins were frequently found in Dharwar district, many of them not having been set or repaired in years, that the inferiority must be greatly increased.[37]

This was in fact the case, and was due to deliberate action on the part of gin owners. The worse the condition of the gin, provided it worked, the greater the profit since cotton was sold by weight and the weight of cotton turned out by a defective gin was greater because of the presence of seed in the cleaned cotton.[38] Support for maintaining the factories now waned. The branch factory at Navalgund was closed in 1874 for lack of subscriptions

35. J. Forbes Watson, *Report on Cotton Gins and on the Cleaning and Quality of Indian Cotton*, 2 vols. (London, 1879), II, pp.210-11.

36. MaCarthy Gins came largely into use for all cotton previously cleaned by the *churka* as soon as the cleaning operation came to be performed by power in large factories.

37. Watson, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 19-24.

38. *Ibid.*

and those at Ron and Bankapur were struggling. The Collector of Dharwar accordingly recommended the closure of the main factory at Dharwar and its incorporation in the School of Industry which had been established there in 1873 under the direction of the factory superintendent. He asked for a grant-in-aid of Rs. 4,000 from imperial funds for the purpose, with the balance of Rs. 5,500 to come from provincial and local funds and from the public works department.[39]

This proposal was accepted and a grant of Rs. 4,000 a year for five years for support of the school was sanctioned.[40] The main gin factory at Dharwar was closed on 1 April 1876 but once more the future of Dharwar American cotton cultivation in the district was raised. According to William Walton, who wrote an historical account of the cultivation of New Orleans cotton in Dharwar in 1877, the area under this variety in the five years from 1870 to 1875 averaged only two-fifths of the total area under cotton in Dharwar district compared with three–fifths in the five–year period before 1870.[41] This report alarmed the Governor of Bombay, Sir Richard Temple, who visited Dharwar in 1877 to discuss the whole question of the cultivation of Dharwar American cotton with local officials. They told him that in recent years there had been a continuous decline in the cultivation of this variety and that if unchecked its cultivation might cease entirely. But they were certain that the cultivation of this cotton could be carried on successfully. They claimed that the reason for the decline was deterioration of the produce by bad ginning. The closure of the

39. *Report by the Collector of Dharwar on the Working of the Dharwar Cotton Gin Factories*, 1874-75, 29 Mar. 1875. India, *Rev., Agric., and Commerce (Fibres and Silks) Procs.*, Jan. 1876, no. 15. The branches at Ron, Bankapur, Gadag, Karajgi, and Ranibennur were also subsequently closed. W. Walton to Collector of Dharwar, no. 745, 15 June 1878. Bombay, *Rev. Dept. Comp.*, XXXVII (1878), no. 411.

40. Govt. of Bombay to Govt. of India, no. 4070, 19 July 1875; Govt. of India to Govt. of Bombay, no. 1, 5 Jan. 1876. *Ibid.* The school remained in operation until 31 Aug. 1883. Such of the stock of the Dharwar factory as could be sold was auctioned in Apr. 1884 but Rs. 26,000 worth of stock, mostly gins and gin fittings, remained unsold. The factory premises were rented to the Southern Mahratta Railway Co. for Rs. 50 a month. Bombay, *Rev. Dept. Comp.*, CCXXII (1883). no. 157.

41. William Walton, *A Short History of Cotton in the Dharwar District* (Bombay, 1877), p. 73.

Dharwar gin factory meant that there were no longer competent persons available to repair gins and the cultivators did not have sufficient power of combination to maintain the organization which used to exist.[42]

Temple believed that one more effort should be made to restore the necessary organization. He proposed to his Council that Walton should be transferred from his duties as a Cotton Inspector to devote all his attention to the repair and working of the saw gins. Walton would be given a small establishment for this purpose but the ryots would have to raise the money necessary to maintain the gins in good order. Temple also proposed to secure fresh New Orleans seed through the India Office. But his Council was not enthusiastic. One member, Lionel Ashburner, who had been active in trying to introduce new varieties of cotton into Khandesh when Collector of that district from 1865 to 1872,[43] argued that as it paid the ryots and merchants to keep the gins out of repair, any effort by government to repair them would be futile. Walton himself had shown that the more rubbish the cotton contained, the more valuable it was to the grower. The damaged saw gins increased the amount of rubbish and seed in the cotton and were therefore a source of gain to the cultivators. Either legislation was necessary to enforce the use of efficient gins and punish the use of inefficient ones, or the attempt to foster the cultivation of this kind of cotton should be given up. But it would be inconsistent, just as the government was about to repeal the Cotton Frauds Act,[44] to pass another Act interfering with the cotton trade. Ashburner, who had failed in his efforts to get the ryots of Khandesh to grow different varieties of cotton in the 1860s, was convinced that the

42. "Culture and Preparation of American Cotton in the Dharwar District." Minute by the Governor of Bombay, 18 Dec. 1877. Bombay, *Rev. Dept. Comp.*, XXXVII (1878), no. 411.

43. Harnetty, *Imperialism and Free Trade: Lancashire and India in the Mid-Nineteenth Century*, pp. 89-93.

44. The Cotton Frauds Act was passed by the Bombay Legislative Council in 1863 at the height of the American Civil War, in an attempt to prevent the adulteration of Indian cotton and thus improve its quality, and its acceptability on the Liverpool cotton market. It was intensely unpopular with the Bombay merchants engaged in the cotton trade and they were able to secure its amendment in 1878 and repeal in 1882. For a full discussion, see Harnetty, *op. cit.*, ch. 6.

extinction of New Orleans cotton in Dharwar was inevitable. He also thought that although the bad state of repair of saw gins was one cause of the deterioration of Dharwar American cotton, the main cause was the increased demand for another variety, Kampta. This was due to decreased demand from Russia, the chief consumer of Dharwar American cotton, due to the Russo-Turkish war and the unsettled conditions which preceded it. At the same time, the rapidly growing Bombay mill industry wanted Kumpta cotton.[45]

Despite Ashburner's advice, the Bombay government decided to make one more effort. On 19 December 1877, the Collector of Dharwar was ordered to provide a small establishment for Walton to assist him in efforts to improve the saw-ginned cotton of Dharwar. At the same time, the Secretary of State was asked to supply 500 lbs. of fresh seed and one hundred/weight of the best brushes for the saw gins. The Collector was warned that unless the subscriptions from those interested in the cotton trade were sufficient to maintain the gins in good order, the Bombay government would have to reconsider its policy.[46]

Walton took charge of the six factories from the Collector and reopened those at Gadag, Ron, Bankapur, Karajgi, and Hubli which became the head factory. In March 1878 he also reopened the factory at Ranibennur and by September he had collected Rs. 17,685 in subscriptions. Between December 1877 and September 1878 1,257 gins were repaired in these factories. Most of the repairs were very heavy because the gins had not been repaired for some time. At the same time, large quantities of saw gin files sent by the Secretary of State arrived at the factories.

Walton submitted an optimistic report for the following year, 1878-79. He said that 1,015 gins were under the management of his factories, of which 843 were repaired during the year, some at the factories and others by parties of itinerant workmen. He claimed an operating surplus of Rs. 12,261 which made possible a reduction in the subscription from Rs. 15 to Rs. 12 a year. But he also reported that he had found owners very reluctant to have

45. Note by Lionel Ashburner, 3 Jan. 1878. Bombay, *Rev. Dept. Comp.*, XXXVII (1878), no .411.

46. *Ibid.*

their gins repaired when they were out of order and that the Dharwar American cotton had continued to decline.[47] This charge had earlier been made in an article in *The Times of India* on 15 August 1879 when it was stated that the saw-ginned cotton of that year was the worst on record. A conference was held on 15 September 1879 at Government House in Bombay to consider the matter. The Bombay government reaffirmed its decision to try and restore the quality of this variety by providing facilities for the repair of saw gins. It would do this in the public interest until Dharwar district was further opened up to trade. But it condemned the financial management of the factories and referred to various complaints that had been made. These included the charge that Walton's subordinates got the gins into the factories under the pretence of repairing them and then kept them there until the owners paid a subscription of Rs. 15 and the cost of the repairs. Another complaint was that Walton had constructed buildings for himself and an office out of the subscription money.[48]

Despite this decision to carry on with the operation of the factories, the matter was reviewed in the following year as a result of the decision to abolish the Bombay Cotton Frauds Department on 51 May 1880. From April to August 1880 prolonged discussions on the future of the factories were held in Bombay. There were sharp differences of opinion. Arthur Crawford, revenue commissioner of the Southern division, thought it would be "suicidal" to close all the factories and would cause great hardship to the people. He argued that the state had benefitted, and would continue to benefit, from the great prosperity of the Dharwar district and that this was due to the cultivation of acclimatized New Orleans cotton. The people had adopted this variety of cotton under pressure from the government and had invested money in saw gins on the understanding that government would provide the means of keeping them in repair. Crawford said that a railway would be built through the Dharwar district within three or four years and this would result in private enterprise stepping in to develop the culture

47. *Report on the Operations of the Saw Gin Factories* for 1878-79, 4 Feb. 1880. Bombay, *Rev. Dept. Comp.*, XLVII (1880), no. 395.

48. Resolution of the Govt of Bombay, no. 5322 (Rev.), 4 Oct. 1879; Govt. of Bombay to *Rev. Commr., S. Div.*, no. 4935, 15 Sept. 1879. Bombay, *Rev. Dept. Comp.*, LV (1879), no. 759.

of this variety of cotton. This would relieve the government of all difficulties connected with the saw gin factories. He pointed out that the Karwar Co., which had two large steam ginning and pressing factories at Hubli and Gadag, had gone into liquidation and could not find a purchaser at any price. This was hardly the moment, therefore, to expect private enterprise to take the place of government. Crawford proposed retaining four of the six factories on a reduced establishment which could be entirely supported out of the subscriptions of the gin owners. Walton, whose pay was provided by the Cotton Frauds Department, would have to go since that department was being abolished.[49]

The Governor, Sir James Ferguson, and Lionel Ashburner supported Crawford's proposal. But another member of the Bombay Council, E. W. Ravenscroft, was strongly opposed. In a lengthy Minute he argued that the time had come for the government to pull out. His argument was grounded in the philosophy of *laissez-faire*, for "though it may have been good policy forty years ago, for a paternal Government to interfere with the cultivation of their tenants, and by considerable pressure induce them to sow a particular kind of seed on the presumption that the ryots did not know what was good for themselves, those days, I am happy to say, have passed away."[50] It was no more the function of government to interfere with what the ryots cultivated than with what they ate for their dinners. Ravenscroft cited the report by J. Forbes Watson on the relative merits of Kumpta and Dharwar American cotton based on the gin trials made in 1871-72 and 1874-75: the latter was inferior in all respects except in its greater freedom from leaf.[51] Since then, it was universally admitted that Dharwar American had deteriorated to a point where further deterioration was impossible. "Such is the effect of Government interference and fostering care for nearly forty years, with an

49. A Crawford to Govt. of Bombay, no. 21A, 21 Apr. 1880 Bombay, *Rev. Dept. Comp.*, XLVII (1880), no. 1103. When the matter was referred to the Bombay Chamber of Commerce, it replied that it was divided on the issue of retaining the government factories but was "inclined to recommend" their abolition. Bombay Chamber of Commerce to Govt. of Bombay, 22 May 1880.

50. Minute by E. W. Ravenscroft, 20 July 1880. *Ibid.*

51. J. Forbes Watson, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 236-37.

outlay of tens of thousands of pounds !!!"[52] Ravenscroft concluded that the government should end its connection with Dharwar cotton as speedily as possible.

But the Bombay Council voted 2 to 1 in favour of Crawford's proposal to retain four of the factories, and the Government of India was asked to give the necessary sanction. The Bombay government argued that the factories should be retained until the opening of rail communications in that part of the country, and the possible development of private enterprise, relieved it of the responsibility. The annual cost of Rs. 5,000 could be met for several years to come from the accumulated balance of Rs. 31,000 to the credit of the factories. The prosperity of the Dharwar district depended on the growth of American cotton, although the quality of this cotton had been declining in recent years, partly due to the deterioration of seed, and partly to the disrepair of the gins used in cleaning the cotton. But fresh seed had lately been procured from America and its effect would be lost unless something was done to improve the gins, since about 900 out of a total of 2,080 gins were in fair working order.[53]

The Government of India received these proposals coldly. It thought it was an extraordinary arrangement to maintain factories at public expense in order to repair privately-owned machinery.[54] After further correspondence, the Government of India gave its reluctant sanction in May 1881, for a period not to exceed three years. But by then there had been new developments in Bombay. The superintendent of the factories, William Walton, resigned from the government service. Then came a report from the commissioner of the Southern division showing that the cultivation of Dharwar American cotton had declined from 141,626 acres to only 77,120

52. Minute by E. W Ravenscroft, 20 July 1880.

53. Govt. of Bombay to Govt. of India, no. 4234, 13 Aug. 1880. India, *Home, Rev. and Agric. Procs.*, Sept. 1880, no. 26. The Secretary of State sent three-quarters of a ton of seed in 1880. Sec. of State to Govt. of Bombay, Despatch no. 3 (Rev.), 10 Feb. 1881. The Bombay Govt. decided to give this seed to the ryots in return for double the quantity of local seed; unfortunately it failed to germinate.

54. Note by Charles Grant, Secretary to the Govt. of India in the *Home, Rev. and Agric. Dept.*, 21 Aug. 1880; Govt. of India to Govt. of Bombay, no. 5305, 8 Oct. 1880. India, *Home, Rev., and Agric. Procs.*, Sept 1880, no. 26.

acres. This meant that far fewer gins would be required to clean the cotton crop and also that the subscriptions from the gin owners would not cover the expenses of the proposed establishment, since owners of gins not now needed would obviously not subscribe.[55]

So the Bombay government decided to change the method of raising subscriptions. The existing method was unpopular because the gin-owner, through his subscription, paid as much for labour if his gin needed minor repairs as if it needed major repairs. The owner was also billed for materials used in repairs. To recoup himself, he often detained the itinerant workmen on other jobs so as to get as much as possible in return for his subscription. The government now drastically reduced the establishment of the remaining factories and cut the subscription; to retain control over idle gins it asked gin owners to store their saws at the factories free of charge. This would mean an operating deficit in the first year but it would be met from the surplus in the cotton gin fund accumulated from subscriptions in previous years.[56]

At first the new system seemed to work well. In the first nine months expenses were only Rs. 1,331 and of the 1,200 gins in the Southern Maratha Country (exclusive of native states, where there were 880 more), 360 gin owners had deposited their saws in the factories; the owners of 704 of the remaining 840 gins had voluntarily paid the reduced subscription of Rs. 8 per year. Cultivation of Dharwar American cotton almost doubled in 1881-82, from 77,120 acres to 138,963 acres because of the high price of cotton. Greatly encouraged, the Bombay government came to a new decision. Extensive inquiries had revealed the undue pressure put on gin owners in the past. Not only had they been made to pay more than was fair; they had very often been made to pay for supposed benefits or work for which they received no adequate return. The divisional commissioner now proposed that before it retired from the concern on 1 July 1884, the Bombay government should try to refund to the subscribers as much as it could of what it had

55. Commr., S. Div, to Govt. of Bombay, no. 786, 21 Mar. 1881. Bombay, *Rev. Dept Comp.*, XLIX (1881), no. 1103.

56. Govt. of Bombay to Govt. of India, no. 3067, 28 May 1881; Govt. of India to Govt. of Bombay, no. 214, 2 July 1881. *Ibid.* A further reduction of the subscription was made in 1882 and the factory buildings at Ranibennur were sold in the same year.

collected from them. This could best be done by taking advantage of the experiments made in England on two Dharwar saw gins. They had been altered on the recommendation or Dr. J. Forbes Watson by substituting Emery saws and grids for those of the Dharwar pattern. Experiments on the altered gins had been carried out in Dharwar by Dr. Watson and further improvements had been made.[57] The Bombay government agreed; the subscription was immediately cut to Rs. 6 a year and it decided that in 1883 every subscribing gin owner would receive free of cost the new iron grids designed by Dr. Watson, provided they purchased the new saw gins which Watson had also designed. The government hoped that this would both cut the cost of repairs and greatly improve the quality of Dharwar cotton.[58]

Over the next few years quantities of supplies were sent out from England, particularly bristles for the brushes of the saw gins; the costs were met from the Cotton Gin Factories fund. But the Bombay government's hopes were not borne out. It proved difficult to collect even the reduced subscription, the balance in the fund declined, and deficits were incurred in 1884-85 and 1885-86. The Bombay government called for a report from the Collector of Dharwar who was told to find out if the new District Local Board would take over the factories; it also sought the opinion of the Bombay Chamber of Commerce.[59] The Collector reported that the factories were in debt to the extent of just under Rs. 3,000 on 1 May 1887 and he anticipated a deficit of more than Rs. 2,000 in 1887–88. The mamlatdars had been lax in collecting sums due to the factories. Receipts depended on the pleasure of individual cultivators and there was no way of enforcing payment of subscriptions or of bills for work performed by the factories. And the District Local Board declined to take over management of the factories.[60] The Bombay Chamber of Commerce thought that saw-ginned Dharwar cotton would again find a market in Europe now

57. Commr., S. Div., to Govt. of Bombay, no. 881, 28 Mar. 1882. Bombay, *Rev. Dept. Comp.*, LI (1882), no. 1103.

58. Resolution no. 3383 (Rev.) of the Govt. of Bombay, 22 May 1882. *Ibid.*

59. Bombay, *Rev. Dept. Comp.* LXXIV (1887), no. 1550.

60. Collector of Dharwar to *Rev. Commr.. S. Div.*, nos. 1307 and 1373, 11 and 17 May 1887. *Ibid.*

that the opening of railway communications with the district enabled the cotton to reach Bombay before the monsoon broke. The cotton would therefore be free of the rain damage which was previously a serious objection to it. But the Chamber held firm to the belief that trade in all its branches should be left to private enterprise and so recommended discontinuance of government maintenance and repair of gins after two years' notice.[61]

The Bombay government now decided that the time had come to withdraw from the operation. In stating its reasons it first of all justified past policies:

> It was perhaps an error in the first place to sell to ignorant peasants machines requiring skilled labour for their repair, but that mistake having been made, it would have imperilled all the results of the large outlay which Government had incurred in establishing a valuable product, if the means of maintaining the gins in good order had not been provided.[62]

The government repeated the hope that the opening of railway communications would mean that private enterprise would fill the gap left by its own withdrawal. It was in no doubt that without government intervention saw-ginned Dharwar cotton would have become extinct, and that the people of Dharwar had profitted greatly by the introduction of this variety. But the refusal of the District Local Board to assume control of the factories showed that they could not be made self-supporting; the government must therefore sever connection with them. It gave notice that the factories would be closed two years hence, on 31 August 1889, unless the District Local Board changed its mind and took control of them.

Before the date fixed for closure the District Board did indeed change its mind. At a special meeting on 1 January 1889 it decided to take over management of the factories but complications soon developed. Certain members of the Board thought that as they lacked the power to levy fees from the gin owners, it would be

61. Bombay Chamber of Commerce to Govt. of Bombay, 15 Aug. 1887. *Ibid.*

62. Resolution no. 2355 (Financial) of the Govt. of Bombay, 31 Aug. 1887. *Ibid.*

difficult to keep the factories solvent. The official members of the Board thought that what the Collector and Mamlatdars had partially failed to do, the Local Board would completely fail to do. The Board therefore asked the Bombay government to guarantee the necessary expenditure for a further period. The divisional commissioner still believed the factories were too valuable to be "smashed up" without due consideration and he was sure the Local Board could not operate them successfully since it had no power or influence in the matter of collecting outstanding debts. He therefore recommended government management for a further two or three years.[63] To this the Bombay government agreed but only to the close of the fiscal year 1889–90.

In 1889 and 1890 the finances of the factories improved and small surpluses were even reported. But by now the Bombay government was anxious to wash its hands of the whole business. In April, and again in July 1891 it instructed the Collector of Dharwar to do all he could to find some firm willing to take over the factories. It also approached the Bombay Chamber of Commerce with the same end in view, and it gave wide publicity to its desire to dispose of the factories. But no private firm came forward.[64] In November 1891 the Collector of Dharwar reported that no private firm would take over the factories and he recommended that they be closed and the stock disposed of. The Bombay government was quick to accept this advice and the factories were at last closed on 4 February 1892.[65]

So ended, after almost fifty years, the government's attempt to develop and manufacture saw gins in the Dharwar district. An examination of the government's involvement in this project raises a number of questions. First, why did it last so long? The answer lies in the desire of the government to foster the growth of a variety of cotton—Dharwar American—which was favoured by the Lancashire cotton industry. This variety was introduced into the Dharwar district by American planters in the 1840s; its cultivation was stimulated by high cotton prices during the American Civil War

63. *Ibid.*
64. Bombay, *Rev. Dept. Comp.*, XLVII (1891), no. 1550.
65. Resolution no. 68 (Financial) of the Govt. of Bombay, 7 Jan. 1892. *Ibid*

in the 1860s, when a major effort was made under the direction of Dr. Forbes, who was both Cotton Commissioner and Superintendent of the Dharwar factories, to induce the ryots to grow more Dharwar American cotton. It was hoped that, as a result, this cotton would find a permanent market in England. To improve its marketability, new gins were devised which were supposed to clean the cotton effectively. The manufacture and maintenance of these gins was undertaken by the government as a means of developing a new resource and as an aspect of agricultural development. But these hopes were dashed after 1870, when cotton prices fell as America re-entered the world market, and as Lancashire resumed its traditional dependence on America as its major source of cotton supply. Cultivation of Dharwar American accordingly declined and the justification for maintaining the factories diminished. But the government was slow to abandon its hopes that Dharwar American cotton would find a continuing and even expanding market overseas and it continued to believe that since this variety had been introduced as a result of government policy, it had a moral obligation to provide the necessary cleaning machinery. Only when it became clear that the cultivation of Dharwar American had declined to the point of extinction did the government feel relieved of this responsibility.

A second question concerns the cultivators. Why did they so reluctantly support, and even resist, a project that was seemingly in their interests? The answer is that they had good reason to be cautious about adopting a new variety of cotton which not only lacked a local market, but was not adapted to the cultural conditions of hand ginning, hand spinning, and local marketing. Dharwar American was only grown when two factors came into play: pressure from government officials and high overseas prices which ensured an export market. The first factor was largely typical of the 1840s and the latter of the 1860s. During the American Civil War years, Dharwar American accounted for about three-fifths of all cotton grown in the Dharwar district. Thereafter, it declined as the export market weakened and as the activity of government officials, such as Dr. Forbes, diminished. The fortunes of the gin factories paralleled this fluctuation in patterns of cultivation. They prospered, at least in a relative sense, when extra-ordinary market conditions abroad created a demand

for Dharwar American cotton and so influenced its cultivation. They waned when these conditions no longer prevailed.

The history of the Dharwar gin factories underlines the connection between technical innovation and societal change. Because the gins were expensive, most ryots could not afford to buy them. This meant that they had to sell their cotton to those local merchants who did own them. These merchants often forced the ryots to wait for days and weeks until the cultivators accepted whatever price the merchants saw fit to offer.[66] Moreover, the necessity to pay both an annual subscription to the government factory and the cost of repairs opened new possibilities for oppression of the ryots. So the ryot who cultivated Dharwar American cotton had to cope with new personages in novel and powerful social roles—such as gin operators—which entailed new social relations that (as with a tube-well operator today) were strange and disconcerting to him.[67]

Those who attempted to introduce the saw gin considered themselves innovators but they lacked the perception of the intricate patterns of village life and of the economic relationships that derived from them which were necessary for success. They were also deficient in theoretical knowledge. The Dharwar saw gins were developed by an enthusiastic amateur, Dr. G. F. Forbes, who had no mechanical training. This tradition of amateurism characterized the management of the factories throughout their existence and contributed to their eventual failure. An example is the way the factories operated for thirty years before systematic trials of the gins they produced were undertaken. The trials then revealed that the gins were actually defective in performing the task for which they had been designed.

In conclusion, this discussion of the Dharwar gin factories illustrates the fact that development requires both advances in knowledge in this case of the cotton plant and of cleaning machinery — and understanding of the social and cultural framework within which the new knowledge must be applied. Both were lack-

66. Walter R. Cassels, *Cotton: An Account of Its Culture in the Bombay Presidency* (Bombay, 1862), p. 147.
67. Leacock and Mandelbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 348.

ing in this early development project. The cultivation of Dharwar American cotton, and the consequent need for new cleaning machinery, was an "induced need" on the part of a government anxious to supply a resource required by British industry. It was not a "felt need" deriving from the conditions and requirements of the local society. In such circumstances the project was bound to fail.

Indian National Congress : Towards Militant Nationalism

BY

P. N. Chopra

The year 1897 is memorable in the annals of the Congress and for that matter in the history of our freedom movement. That year saw the beginning of the arbitrary and repressive measures of government resulting in an open struggle between the government and the Congress which continued unabated till the inauguration of Morley-Minto reforms. Foremost among the causes that led to this change was not only the apathy of the Government towards the Congress demands but also the repressive measures adopted by the authorities against the surging tide of nationalism. The year 1897 was particularly unfortunate as it brought both famine and bubonic plague in its train. To the chronic disease of poverty and the periodic tragedy of famine, as Dadabhai surmised, was thus added another calamity. Bombay was the worst sufferer. Out of 14,257 cases reported, 11,882 proved to be fatal. "The bubonic plague, the forced segregation, the compulsory domiciliary visits," wrote Surendranath "created a feeling of panic and alarm among the population at Poona." The inquistorial searches of the Plague Committee assisted by a European regiment at Poona within private houses and temples created widespread discontent. "There is nothing that touches our people so deeply" writes Surendranath "as interference with their household arrangements and invasion into the sanctities of their domestic life."[1] The excitement culminated in the murder of Rand, the President of the Plague Committee and Lt. Ayerst, another British Officer.[2] This incident provided the authorities with the opportunity to "embark upon a campaign of organised repression."[3] Tilak was arrested on the charge of inciting disaffection against the Government by means of his arti-

1. Bannerjea, S. N., *A Nation in Making*, p. 154.
2. Zacharias, *Renascent India*, p. 130.
3. Chinthamani, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-31.

cles in the 'Kesari' and sentenced to 18 months' rigorous imprisonment[4] while the Chapekar brothers, Damodar and Balkrishna, were tried for the crime and sentenced to death.[5] "There has never been any evidence", writes H. C. E. Zacharias, "that Tilak had anything to do with this murder, that his writings incited to such acts, or even that he personally favoured them."[6] The Natu Sardars (landlords) who had the courage to protest against the excesses of the Plague Committee were arrested under the infamous Bombay Regulation XXV of 1827 and kept in prison without trial.[7] Dadabhai was indignant. He said "Gagging the press is simply suicidal. There rever was a greater mistake than to prosecute Mr. Tilak and those poor editors who were, perhaps not known beyond their villages. This was a new departure from the principles on which British Government was conducted. Now you are introducing the Russian system under which a man can be arrested and imprisoned and sent away without trial and without reason being given."[8] About the Natu case he wrote to Wacha that "it is unfortunate for the Government themselves. It is the greatest blow they have given to British power. The Natu brothers were imprisoned without trial "in connection with the plague riots. The side of the insecurity of liberty will now never leave the Indian mind."[9] The Hindu of Madras commenting on the trial wrote "The progress of the people has been pushed back fifty years. The next aim of our enemies will be the Congress which they want to see stamped out."

The Congress of the year entered a vigorous protest against the use of these obsolete regulations and urged for the repeal of the three cognate measures for the three presidencies, Bengal Regulation III of 1818, Madras Regulation II of 1819 and Bombay Regulation XXV of 1827.[10] "Security of life and property", declared Surendranath, "were the great foundations on which rested the vast, the stupendous, the colossal fabric of British rule in India and these would be seriously endangered if one could be arrested and

4. Lovett, V., *A History of the Indian Nationalist Movement*, p. 52.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
6. Zacharias, *op. cit.*, p. 130.
7. Chintamani, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-31.
8. Masani, *op. cit.*, p. 397.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 398-403.
10. *Proc. I.N.C.*, 1897, pp. 27-28.

kept in custody for months together without trial".[11] It was also in this year that the first steps were taken for the suppression of liberty of speech by widening the scope of the law of sedition by amending section 121-A of the Indian Penal Code. The Congress protest against these measures went unheeded.

It is interesting to record here moderate Malabari's view about Tilak.

"All this makes it the easier for us, then, to put in a word here for that bête noire of British opinion, and the implacable opponent of all-round progress, the Editor of the Mahratta and the Kesari. Many have been the efforts made to bring this eccentric meteor in a line with the steadier lights of our political constellation. But the public of Bombay have, at any rate, seen little in Mr. Tilak's acts and utterances to draw them to him as a leader, much less as a guide. His movement to revive the memory of Shivaji, though deserving of sympathy from every generous heart so far as it aims at the unity of the Dekkan, is historically an anachronism. Shivaji could no more rise again in India than could Bruce or Wallace rise once more to upset the balance of the British Union. Even if the founder of the Mahratta dynasty were to come back for a time to the scenes of his past glory, it is not unreasonable to assume that he would be content with the subhadarship of the Dekkan, with perhaps a seat on the Governor of Bombay's Council or in the Supreme Legislature. Shivaji Maharajah was a much shrewder politician than some of his admiring co-religionists of the present time appear to think.

Mr. Tilak's other movement, the Ganpati Melá (an annual demonstration in honour of the elephant-headed god), cuts away the very root of political unity, setting the lower orders of the Hindu population against the Mahomedan, between whom previously reigned an almost complete harmony of tastes and pursuits on public holidays. What folly, this, to be foisted on poor old Ganpati, the god of wisdom! The fact is, a vast amount of harm has been done in India by the misreading of history, and by the construing of false analogies.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

It would be ungenerous now to deny that there is a phase of Mr. Tilak's life, personal to himself, which appeals to the sympathy of those who, like the present writer, are unacquainted with him, and who often feel repelled by his methods of work. His sincerity of purpose, his simplicity and abstemiousness of habits, joined to a rugged independence, have an attraction for those who are getting sick of the meritricious refinement of perhaps too many of our English-educated men. To them it seems a pity that, with his natural shrewdness, he cannot rise above the narrow earth-bound horizon to which his little clique has condemned him. But whatever his faults, he possesses a virtue that redeems not a few of them, the virtue, namely, of character. That seems to be the secret of his popularity with the sturdy sons of Maharashtra, keen-scented, quick to take offence, always on the look-out for the appearance of a deliverer and redeemer of wrongs, past and present, sometimes real, often imaginary. Such being the case, need we wonder at Mr. Tilak's second return to the Legislative Council?

It may now, perhaps, be conceded that to ask for proof positive of this or that charge against the soldiers or the subordinates of the Plague Committee at work, would be to silence the voice of complaint; or to protest that no irregularity of any kind occurred in course of the delicate and painful investigations, would be to assume an infallibility beyond human comprehension. Let us admit at once that the employment of soldiers, under the peculiar circumstances of Poona, was, in a manner, forced upon the authorities, that it become a necessary evil for which the leaders of Poona Society were more to blame than the authorities; and that no serious outrage was attempted. But what excuse could be pleaded or Mr. Rand's employment here, at such a crisis, with a full knowledge of his unpopularity at another centre of Brahmanic orthodoxy? A prompt transfer, even later, when that officer's life began to be threatened, might have averted his murder along with that of poor Mr. Ayerst, and the serious complications that followed. But unbending is a virtue the British Executive in India are too slow to learn. If it came to that, they would rather lose the country than give up their pet theories of administration."[12]

The next few years were very crucial for the Congress. The Proceedings of the Congress well described the situation. "The

12. Malabari, Behramji M., *India in* 1897, Bombay, 1898.

policy of aggression abroad and repression at home was in full swing and public opinion whether in India or in England was entirely helpless before the sweeping tide of Imperialistic Jingoism. The dark shadow of famine still lingered in the land and the poor people that survived that calamity were only to be squeezed the harder for the taxes, the Government of India had declined the offer of help made by Her Majesty's Government towards meeting the expenses of the frontier war, the new sedition law had become an accomplished fact, the weak and panic-stricken attitude of the Government which struck terror and spread confusion in the land in the summer of 1897 had not been given up, the utterances as well as the policy of Lord George Hamilton more especially his covert attack on higher education and his reference to India among the 'savage' countries of the world had caused general disgust."[13]

It was under these circumstances that the Congress was to meet at Madras under the presidency of A. M. Bose. Many of the leading men replied to the invitations of the Reception Committee in term of despair. "What is the good", they asked, "of the National Congress and all political agitation—thoroughly constitutional and loyal, no doubt, but entirely divorced from the sympathy of the rulers who are now opposed to the liberty of speech and liberty of the press and who seriously believe that liberal education is only a mischievous evil in India." No wonder then that there was a distinct fall in the number of the delegates which were 620 only against 1163 in the Madras session of 1894. The number had risen to 1584 in 1895 but came down at Calcutta and Amraoti to 780 and 692 respectively. The Proceedings state "when famine, pestilence, and the anger of the rulers play havoc with the life, health and personal liberty of the people, mild and loyal subjects like the Indians are apt to show abated enthusiasm in poitical agitation."[14] Frederick Grubb, who attended this Congress, who greatly impressed, as he wrote later, by the "immense gathering, the rapt attention of the delegates and the serious statesmanlike character of nearly all the speeches ......" Formerly he said "it was a Congress of petitioners, now it is a Congress of men and women determined to win their freedom." There was also a change in the financing of the Congress. Previously the large

13. *Proc. I.N.C.*, 1898, p. 1.
14. .The Hindu , January 27, 1936. Frederick Grubb's article.

donations of the rich people had defrayed the expenses of the Congress. Now that aid was not available to that extent and a much larger number of small contributions had to be obtained. The Congress was already on its way to a 4 Anna Franchise.

It was when the atmosphere was so charged with the forces that make for unrest that Lord Curzon assumed the Viceroyalty of India. In one of his earliest speeches delivered just after his earliest speeches delivered just after his appointment as Viceroy of India he had observed that the essential qualifications of a Viceroy of India were "courage and sympathy." He had courage in abundance, courage to defy public opinion and to exalt his personal ideals above those of the community he governed; of sympathy he had but little. "I love India", he said, "its people, its history, its Government, the complexities of its civilization and life." But he loved them in his own way which they did not appreciate. There was little that he did which did not cause resentment not against individuals but against the whole race, the entire regime and prepared the way for their difficulties and embarrassments from which the Government long suffered.[15] Seven long years of his office were a period of drawn out agony for India. He inflicted "in almost breathless succession one contentious measure after another to which the people took the strongest exception. The dominant note of his policy throughout this period was that India was and must remain a possession of England, that England's Imperial grip over India should be tightened and that no political advance should be thought of. "To him India was a country" as Gokhale said in his presidential address at the Benares session "where the Englishmen were to monopolize for all time, all power and talk all the while of duty. The Indians' only business was to be governed and it was a sacrilege on his part to have any other aspiration. In his scheme of things there was no room for the educated classes of the country, and having failed to amuse them for any length of time by an empty show of taking them into his confidence,he proceeded in the end to repress them." And how wise were Gokhale's words: "I think even the most devoted admirer of Lord Curzon cannot claim that he has strengthened the foundations of British rule in India." The Secretaries of State at this time were no better.

15. Bannerjea, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

"Sir Henry Fowler, a liberal Secretary could not have been more Tory," as Chintamani puts it, "if he had called himself one. He was succeeded by Lord George Hamilton and the change was for us like jumping from the frying pan into the fire. If Sir Henry Fowler chastised India with whips, Lord George Hamilton chastised her with scorpions."[16]

Curzon had come out to India determined to crush the rising tide of Nationalism. And as we gleen through his private correspondence with George Hamilton, we are left in doubt about his motives. His first act was to "cut out from native honours list", as he wrote to George Hamilton, "all the names of those of whom I have learned that they were associated with anti-British papers or societies." He blamed Lord Sandhurst, Governor of Bombay who had been recommending and honouring such men.[17] He made searching enquiries about those who were financing the Congress. The names of Maharaja of Darbhanga, Lakshmeswar Singh and Raja of Vizianagrm, Sir Pasupati Ananda Gajapati and Raja of Ramnad in Madras figured prominently.[18] Maharaja Lakshmeswar Singh, it may be added was one of the earliest patrons of the Congress and used to give Rs. 10,000 annually to its funds, besides other donations.[19] According to the secret note prepared by the Superintendent of Thagi and Dakaiti in 1899 on 'Congress Support', in 1888 it was rumoured that he was to be nominated President of the Congress to be held at Allahabad and that he intended to contribute a large sum. In 1890 he and the Raja of Vizianagram each subscribed Rs. 5,000 towards the cost of Babu Surendra Nath Banerji (sic)'s deputation to England to lecture on behalf of the Congress. In the same year he was said to have given Rs. 2,000 to Mr. W. C. Bonnerjee as his first instalment towards the expenses of the next Congress. In 1894 Babu Surendra Nath Banerji mentioned at a meeting held on the 2nd February that in the previous year the Maharaja had contributed Rs. 20,000. In 1893 and 1895 an 'Indian Friend' who was supposed to be the Maharaja of

16. Chintamani, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-35.

17. Curzon's letter to Hamilton, June 7, 1899, *Calcutta Review*, April 1954, p. 40.

18. For details refer to Curzon's letters to Hamilton, dated June 28, 1899, August 2nd. 1899, Sept. 27, 1899. *Calcutta Review*, April 1954, pp. 43-46.

19. *Ibid.*

Darbhanga, gave Rs. 15,000 to the permanent fund of the Congress and Rs. 8,000 to the Special Fund for India." There was also a suspicion that Thakur of Gondal had also contributed to the Congress fund. The Raja of Ramnad was said to have given Rs. 10,000. About the Maharaja of Gaekwad, it was believed, that he was financing Dadabhai Naoroji. Col. Biddulph, Agent to the Governor-General had informed the Government of India that the Gaekwad had taken out over a lakh of rupees out of the Treasury without the knowledge of the Minister presumably for some secret purpose. The Ahmadabad Times had coroborrated that the Gaekwad had given £ 1000 to Naoroji.[20] The Chief Secretary, Bengal mentioned in his confidential note that the principal subscribers of the Congress were the members of the legal profession and their clients. Besides grandsons of the late Raja Ligambar Mittra, Raja Binoi Krishna Deb of the Sobhabazar family, Maharaja Yagendra Nath Roy of Nator in Raj Shahi, Raja Sashishikaseshwar Roy of Gahirpr in Raj Shahi, Maharaja Suryyakanta Acharyya of Mymensingh, Rai Yotendra Nath Chaudhuri of Gatri were the regular subscribers. The members of Debendra Nath Tagore's family were said to be active Congressmen.

Maharaja of Baroda (Maharaja Gayaji Rao Gaekwad) was known for his progressive views. He held a reception in honour of Lajpat Rai in London. After the guests had left, he had a frank talk with Lajpat Rai and the great revolutionary leader Shyamji Krishan Verma and to quote Lajpat Rai, "he laid bare his breast before us." Maharani Sharnamayi of Kasimbazar and Rajas of Kolhapur and Junagad were also believed to be subscribers and supporters of Congress.[21] Curzon expressed his displeasure to the Gaekwad of Baroda. He refuted the Raja's contention that the Congress was a social organisation which had the backing of the educated classes. According to him, the Congress was in the last resort animated by hostile feelings towards the Government. In fact, the Government apprehended as early as 1891 that the princes might be persuaded by the Congress to believe that the Government of India or the Viceroy personally

20. Hamilton Papers, D. 510/2, Vol. 14, pp. 63-70; Select Documents, "*The Evolution of India and Pakistan*", (1858-1947), edited by C. H. Philips, London, 1962, pp. 147-9.

21. *Ibid.*

(as Hume puts it) favoured the Congress and might thus be able to squeeze money from them.[22]

Having thus probed into the working of the premier political organisation of the country, Curzon struck his first blow by ordering the officialization of the Calcutta Corporation.[23] This measure threw Calcutta into a vortex of agitation and there was wide-spread resentment. The Lucknow Congress of 1899 which met under the presidency of Romesh Chandra[24] Dutt strongly protested against this measure and passed a resolution "That this Congress expresses its disapproval of the reactionary policy of local self-Government as evidenced by the passing of the Calcutta Municipal Act in face of the unanimous opposition of the people and by the introduction into the Legislative Council of Bombay of a similar measure which will have the effect of seriously jeopardizing the principle of local self government."[25] Dutt in his Presidential address contended that it was not possible to save India from "distress and discontent, from improverishment and famines", and to spread instead "prosperity and contentment", and to evolve the "zealous and loyal and spontaneous support" of the nation till the people were not given a share in the administration of their own affairs. He held that intensity and frequency of famines was largely due to the poverty caused by over-assessment of land revenue.[26] Curzon was unwilling to agree to these views. He himself prepared a reply to Dutt's charge against the Government and asserted that famines were caused by want of rain and improvement in assessment would at the most mitigate and prevent distress. This session was also important for the Congress constitution which was for the first time definitely framed here and

22. Home—Public, January, 1891, Nos. 1-4, refer to Note by C. S. Bayley, General Superintendent of Operations for the suppression of Thagi and Dakaity, 18th June, 1899, and report of Bombay Police, 20th July, 1899. Hamilton Correspondence, D. 510/2, fos. 63 ff. and D. 510/3. fos. 3388 and Curzon's Memorandum of conversation with Gaekwad on 28th June 1899, Foreign Department Secret I, December 1903, Proceedings 8 quoted in S. Gopal: *British Policy in India*, 1858-1905.

23. Bannerjea, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

24. Mazumdar, *op. cit.*, p. xxiv.

25. Bannerjea, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

26. Dutt R. C., *Open Letters to Lord Curzon and Speeches* (1897-1900), R. P. Mitra, Printer, Publisher & Bookseller, Calcutta, 1904, Presidential Speech at Congress Session, Lucknow, 1899.

its creed was defined as follows. "The object of the Indian National Congress shall be to promote by all constitutional means the interests and well-being of the people of the Indian Empire."[27] At this Congress was passed a resolution urging the appointment of an agency in England for the purpose of organising, in collaboration with the British Committee, public meetings for the dissemination of information on Indian subjects and the creation of a fund for the purpose. But no immediate action was taken to give effect to this resolution.[28] Dadabhai and Hume, it may be said to their credit, fully realised the importance of appealing to the youth to "come forward and hold aloft the torch of freedom". An important manifesto was issued over the signature of Hume, Dadabhai and Wedderburn on October 19, 1900 and was addressed to the President-designate of the Lahore session.

The next session of the Congress at Lahore in 1900 was significant for a Bengali pleader, Babu Kali Prosanna Roy was elected as the Chairman of the Reception Committee. And as Surendranath wrote: "It is evident if evidence was needed, of the good feeling between Bengalees and Punjabis. It disapproves the calumny that the martial races hold in contempt the people of our provinces".[29] Instead of erecting a temporary pandal, it was decided by the organisers to build a permanent hall which could be used for meetings later on. This hall was named after Bradlaugh, though some of the Arya Samajists opposed it.[30] The unexpected death of L. Jaishi Ram who was regarded as "the light and life of the Congress movement" in the Punjab in the prince of life was an "irreparable loss to the cause and the country and cast a shadow over the approaching session of the Congress.[31] A formal proposal for the preferential treatment of home-made products was for the first time submitted to the Subjects Committee of the Congress at the session of the Congress held at Ahmedabad in 1902. The proposal, however, could not be passed due to differences of opinion. The delegates' fee raised at the last session of the Congress from Rs. 10 to Rs. 20 to meet the deficit of the

27. Mazumdar, *op. cit.*, p. xxiv.
28. Bannerjea, *op. cit.*, p. 165.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 166.
30. Lajpat Rai: *Story of My Life, op. cit.*, p. 91.
31. *Ibid.*

Congress organ "India" which came into effect from this session was mainly responsible for the thinner attendance of delegates at some of the the subsequent Congress.[32] Surendranath Bannerjea in his presidential address declared "The present transition period must soon be brought to an end. The policy of retrogression and repression must give way to the older and statesmanlike policy of trust in the people, sympathy in their aspirations and political justice without racial bias or prejudice,"[33] and then he sounded a note of warning to the government: "All history proclaims the truth that autocratic power is devoid of the elements of permanence and that authority to be permanent must be planted deep in the affections of the people and derive its sustaining breath from the vitalising springs of enthusiasm."[34] To the young men of the country Surendranath's appeal was direct and forceful. "Rally round the banner of the Congress to hold it aloft and to carry it from town to town, from district to district and from province to province, spreading broadcast from one end of the country to the other the saving lessons of the Congress."[35]

Curzon's University Bill had sent a wave of indignation throughout the country. The motive which underlay his policy was the tightening of Government control, the strangling of all independence in matters educational and the eventual weakening of all national movement and national sentiment,[36] as Lajpat Rai put it. His University legislation which shocked the country beyond measure,was formulated, it may be added at a secret Educational Conference held at Simla to which no Indian was admitted.[37] The Congress passed a resolution objecting strongly to the recommendations of the Commission whose object it was to officialize the Senate and Syndicate and thus convert the University into a Department of the Government.[38] The authorities had to bend partially to the agitation. Second grade colleges were retained, though the law classes were stopped, central law colleges in the

32. *Ibid.*
33. *Proc. I.N.C.*, 1902, p. xxi.
34. *Ibid.*
35. *Ibid.*, p. xxxi.
36. Lajpat Rai: *Young India*, pp. 157-58.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 158.
38. *Proc.*, *I.N.C.*, 1902, p. 106

Presidency towns were established and the Government did not fix any minimum college fee.[39]

As Mr. Gandhi (later on Mahatma Gandhi) had appeared at the last session of the Congress as a petitioner on behalf of 1,00,000 British Indians in South Africa, Surendranath also touched up this problem in his presidential address "It was a matter of profound regret", he said, "that the unfortunate condition of Indians in South Africa and the degrading disabilities to which they are subjected have undergone no change for the better despite the repeated appeals to the Government of India, the Secretary of State and Parliament."[40] It may be of interest to recall that it was in 1894 that the Congress first raised the question of racial discrimination in South Africa and passed a resolution that "the Congress earnestly entreats Her Majesty's Government to grant the prayer of Her Majesty's Indian subjects resident in the South African colonies by vetoing the Bill of the Colonial Government disenfranchising them."[41] These resolutions were repeated year after year but to little effect and the Congress of 1903 while urging upon the attention of the Government the serious grievances of Indian settlers regretted to "observe that the imperialistic spirit of British colonies instead of mitigating the anti-Indian legislation threatens to impose further hardships on His Majesty's loyal Indian subjects there."

Curzon's darbar of 1902 to mark the coronation of the successor of Queen Victoria had raised a volley of protests from all over the country. A severe famine had just stalked the land and millions had perished.[42] Lal Mohan Ghose, in his presidential address at the Madras Session in 1903 had to warn the Government that "nothing could seem more heartless than the spectacle of a great Government imposing the heaviest taxation upon the poorest population in the world and then lavishly spending the money so obtained over fire-works and pompous pageants while millions of the poor were dying of starvation".[43] While condemning the Universities Bill, Surendranath Bannerjea pointed out that "Government was taking control of higher education, as it had limited the civil

39. *Ibid.*
40. *Ibid.*
41. Besant Annie: *How India Fought for Freedom*, p. 204.
42. *Proc., I.N.C.*, 1902, p. xii.
43. Zacharias, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

freedom of their corporations. The new-fangled Imperialism was darkening the prospects of human freedom. Lord Curzon's "name would go down to posterity indissolubly linked with a reactionary and retrograde measure which has been condemned by the unanimous opinion of educated India."[44] It was at the session in 1902 that the Congress passed a resolution condemning the policy of the Government in "breaking up territorial divisions which have been of long standing and are closely united by ethnological, legislative, social and administrative relations" and deprecated the separation from Bengal of Dacca, Mymensingh, Chittagong Divisions and portions of Chotanagpūr Division and also the separation of the District of Ganjam and the agency tracts of the Ganjam and Vizagapatam Districts from the Madras Presidency."[45]

But Congress resolutions seemed to have no effect on Lord Curzon who treated this organisation with "a superior air of contempt". Hyndman, the editor of the paper 'Justice' of New York described Lord Curzon as the "most hopeless specimen of the aristocratic prig that has even been pitch-forked into the highest place."[46] In fact, Congress seemed to be helpless before such an autocrat before whom such a form of petitioning carried no weight. And even there were suggestions that the Congress as such should be dissolved. And as a correspondent of the Amrit Bazar Patrika wrote: "It would be better if the Congress were split up into Provincial Congress-lings and these Congress-lings with the help of the vernacular language, will succeed far better than the Congress has been able to do with its present methods". The Patrika was of the opinion that the Congress had no doubt a great value if it could be converted from its present moribund position to a healthy one. And this was Curzon's ambition as he wrote to George Hamilton, "My belief is that the best men in the Congress are more and more seeing the helplessness of their cause and indeed many of their papers have begun to argue that they had better trust to me to give them as much as I can instead of wasting their energies in clamouring for what no Viceroy is likely to give them at all".[47] Educated Indians were shrewd enough

44. Annie Besant, *op. cit.*, p. 383
45. *Ibid.*, p. 390.
46. Hyndman in his paper 'Justice', December 15, 1905.
47. *Calcutta Review*, April 1954, p. 51.

to look through the game and they arrived at the conclusion as Lajpat Rai wrote that "it was a mistake to look to the Government to do things or to follow a policy which might quicken the national pulse, strengthen the Nationalist movement or add to the efficiency of the people so as to fit them to stand on their legs and desire to get rid of the leading strings in which they were held by the British."[48] The same theme was stressed by the famous economist Romesh C. Dutt in his open letters to Lord Curzon. He expected his countrymen not to give way to despondency and have faith in themselves. He asked them not to listen to the advice of the so-called 'candid friend' that their agitation was "useless or futile". There was hardly a town or a village in India where the idea of progress and self-Government had not seized the minds of the educated persons who were determined to obtain a real share in the administration of their country. The struggle for the achievement of self-Government should be carried on with determination and conviction.[49]

It was under the gloom created by Lord Curzon's policy which had been rightly characterised in the official report of the Congress as "repressive and reactionary" that the Indian National Congress met in Bombay under the presidentship of Sir Henry Cotton. There had grown up a feeling of deep resentment "when a series of repressive measures—both legislative and administrative—were forced by him on the country in the teeth of the fiercest opposition from the public[50]......"The gathering was the largest since 1895, 1010 delegates being present.

The President declared the Congress to be "the voice and brain of the country" whose function was "to give united and authoritative expression to views on which there is already a consensus of opinion in the country".[51] Sir Cotton bade his hearers to avoid depression and not to submit with resignation to the policy of the Government and he held up as the ideal—"India taking rank as a Nation among the Nations of the East". Autonomy is the

48. *Young India*, p. 158.
49. Romesh C. Dutt: *Open Letters to Lord Curzon and Speeches.* R. P. Mitra, Printers, Book-Seller & Co., Calcutta, 1904. The speech was made at Madras on February 4, 1902.
50. Besant Annie: *How India Fought for Freedom*, p. 393.
51. *Ibid.*

key note of England's true relations with her colonies and "the key note also of India's destiny",[52] he declared. Dr. H. S. Gour, a delegate, condemned the Universities Act which sealed up the portals of knowledge "with golden locks which would open only to golden keys". Lord Curzon would make education "the privilege of the rich and not the birthright of the poor", he concluded. C. Y. Chintamani referring to the Universities Act declared Curzon's motives to be political rather than educational. "A section of educated Indians", he said, "was found inconvenient and they were to be politically suppressed."[53] The Congress recorded its emphatic protest against the "proposal of the Government of India for the partition of Bengal in any manner whatsoever." The division of the Bengali nation into separate units will seriously interfere with its social, intellectual and material progress involving the loss of various constitutional privileges which the province has so long enjoyed and will burden the country with heavy expenditure which the Indian tax–payer cannot at all afford,"[54] its resolution said. The Bengallee, in its issue of December 28, 1904 commended Sir Henry Cotton's presidential speech and wrote, "Moderation is the keynote of this mighty pronouncement and Sir Henry's presentment of the principal demands put forward by the Congress leaves little to be desired."

Lord Curzon was, however, not a person to be deterred from his resolve. He sent his proposals to the Secretary of State on Feb. 2, 1905 and asked for an early approval. The opposition of the Congress, he remarked, was inspired by political motives and directed to a political end. Calcutta was the Centre for which the Congress party was manipulated throughout the whole of India. The perfection of their machinery and the tyranny which it enabled them to exercise were remarkable, so any measure which would divide Bengal, permit the growth of independent centres of activity and influence; dethrone Calcutta and weaken the influence of the lower class who had the entire organisation in their hands was intensely and hotly resented by them."[55]

52. *Ibid.*, p. 396.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 400.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 412.
55. Curzon to Brodrich, 2nd February, 1905. Curzon Papers, Volume 164, Part no. 2; S. Gopal: *British Policy in India* (1858-1905), pp. 271-72.

The Congress did not stop at merely passing resolutions opposing the partition of Bengal. It was decided by the delegates to the Bombay Congress headed by Babu Baikuntha Sen of Berhampur to hold a conference under the presidency of Sir Henry Cotton at the Calcutta Town Hall on the partition question.[56] The object of the Conference was to make it clear to the "Government of India and the India Office that the people of Bengal had not accepted the scheme."[57] The Bengallee (Jan. 4, 1905) urged the delegates in the mufassil to attend the Conference in large numbers and added: "The ground on which the partition is proposed is merely the old cry of "Divide & Rule" in disguise in which any civilized Government ought to be ashamed." The Conference met with unequivocal support from all sides. Commenting on it the Samjivani wrote, "The Jamador, the pleader, and the poor raiyat from every district will come down to Calcutta to join the Conference at a considerable loss and inconvenience for a grave peril threatens to overwhelm them at no distant date. The extinction of the national life of Bengal is at hand and the dismay and disquietude is great.[58] Hyndman, editor of the 'Justice', New York also wrote an article entitled "Modern Pirates and their victims" criticising the British Government for their repressive policy in India." Newspapers in India were warned not to publish these articles.[59] The friends of India also formed a society in London to get Home Rule for India and to carry on propaganda in the United Kingdom for the attainment of the objective.[60]

As the General Elections in England were approaching, the Congress decided to send a deputation to bring the claims of India before the electors and the candidates. The deputation was composed of Gokhale and Lajpat Rai. It was brought to the notice of the Government that the Government servants gave donations to defray the expenses of the deputation. On Risley's recommendation, Curzon issued orders that a Government servant may not take part in or subscribe in any political movement in India or relating

56. 'Samjivani', January, 1905.
57. 'The Bengallee', January 4, 1905.
58. 'Samjivani', January, 1905.
59. Home-Department, Public Proc. No. 16, June, 1905.
60. Home-Department, Public Proc. Nos. 2/4 August, 1905.

to Indian affairs. Nor may he attend any political meeting, his presence at which is likely to be misconstrued or to impair his public usefulness."[61] Many of the Indian Newspapers expressed their misgivings about the success of this deputation.[62] The "New India" in its issue of Dec. 21, 1904 said "Past deputations to England never achieved anything of real worth and value and a fresh deputation next year may create some little feeling against the Unionists' parts in the British constituencies but cannot obtain the grant of any fundamental rights to the Indian people."[63] Lajpat Rai had to tell the same story on his return. He wrote about the achievements of the deputation in his book "Young India": "They addressed a large number of meetings in Great Britain, made many friends, saw some politicians but they were not very hopeful as to the results. He frankly told his people that the British democracy was too busy with their own affairs to do anything for them, that the British Press was not willing to champion Indian aspirations that it was hard to get a hearing in England and that the influence and the credit of the Anglo-Indians was too strong to be met successfully by the necessarily inadequate agitation which the Congress could set up in England."[64] His message was that "if they, the people of India, really cared for their country, they would have to strike the blow for freedom themselves."[65] In fact, it meant the shifting of the emphasis from the British nation to the Indian people. The "New India" also wrote in the same strain, "The belief that England will of her own free will help the Indians out of their long-established civil servitude and establish there free institutions of Government which she herself values so much was once cherished but all hope has now been abandoned. Beyond all changes in the British Cabinet and the administrators in India, there are the permanent and powerful facts of selfish human nature and the established and permanent policy of the British Government." An era of self-help and self-reliance was approaching fast. Indian politics took a new turn, "the policy of "mendicancy" as the

61. Home-Department Public Proc. December 1905, Nos. 229-30.

62. Sandhya (Calcutta), January 11, 1905. The New India, December 21, 1904, Dacca Gazettee, December 19, 1904.

63. 'The New India', December 21, 1904.

64. Lajpat Rai: *Young India*, pp. 159-60.

65. *Ibid.*, p. 160.

Congress method was derisively called, was henceforth even more seriously assailed."[66]

It was in London that Lajpat Rai met the revolutionary leader Shyamji Krishna Verma. His views were more or less similar to those of Lajpat Rai who thus recorded his impressions about Verma. "His political principles are sound to a large extent and he means well by his country. But he loves his money so much and is so conceited that it is impossible for a man to co-operate with him." Lajpat Rai, however, did not leave his bitter criticism of Gokhale and other English leaders of the Congress. The opening ceremony of the "India House" was performed at that time.

It is interesting to recall W. S. Blunt's opinion about Lajpat Rai who called on him in London. Blunt noted in his Diary that Lajpat Rai was "much more purely oriental but inferior in breeding and very much inferior in intelligence to Gokhale." To Blunt it seemed that he had a confused mind, timid and deprecatory in manner. His command of English was also poor. Lajpat Rai presented Blunt with a copy of his book, an account of his arrest and deportation. Blunt regarded it as a "naive and at places quite childish narrative which I hope may not get into the hands of our Anglo-Indians here to make support of."

The Congress met at Benares in 1905. It was a time of great crisis in the political future of the country. Never since the dark days of Lord Lytton s viceroyalty, so says the official report of the Congress, had India been so distracted, discontented, despondent, the victim of so many misfortunes, political and other, the target for so much scorn and calumny emanating from the highest quarters—its most moderate demands ridiculed and scouted, its most reasonable prayers greeted with a stiff negative, its noblest aspirations spurned and denounced as per mischief or solemn nonsense, its most cherished ideals hurled down from their pedestal and trodden underfoot—never had the condition of India been more critical than it was during the said ill-starred administration of Lord Curzon. The Official Secrets Act was passed in the teeth of universal opposition. Gagging Act was imposed. Education was crippled, it was made expensive and it was officialized. In the matter of employment in higher grades of the public service Indians

66. 'The New India', December 21, 1904.

were told that the barrier of race was between them and the higher posts which they coveted. The secret circulars encouraging the employment in a more extensive scale of Eurasians and Christians at the expense of the other communities also saw the light and did much to shake public confidence in his outward professions. The whole Indian people smarting under the afflictions of plague, famine, of broken pledges and repressive measures rose as one man against the monstrous and studied insult flung with a high magisterial air at everything that they loved and revered, at their religion, their literature, their social institutions. But that which above all led to the tremendous explosion of the natural feeling was the partition of Bengal—the cutting in twain of perhaps the most advanced and flourishing society in India, ostensibly in the interest of administrative efficiency, but really to break down the political power and influence of the educated opinion of Bengal. The partition was carried out on October 16th, 1905, in complete defiance of public opinion.

The observations of G. R. Elsmie Edinburgh are very revealing in this connection. He writes in his Thirty-five Years in the Punjab (1858-1893). "I have never seen the official papers about the much criticized 'Partition of Bengal but I have little doubt that Bernard's account of the state of things in 1872 prepared my mind to believe that the old manner of 'divide et impera' must sooner or later be acted upon."

On November 18th, Lord Curzon sailed from India. On February 13, 1906, Campbell Bannerman succeeded Balfour as Prime Minister of England. The appointment of John Morley as Secretary of State for India gave new hopes.

Thus under these circumstances the Congress met in "sorrow and affliction but also in hope and cheerful anticipation" at Benares (Varanasi) under the Presidentship of Gopal Krishna Gokhale. The influence of the Congress was on the wane and as A. C. Mazumdar writes: "The efforts of the Congress during this period were almost paralyzed and the bulk of the people nearly lost all confidence in its propaganda." All this was mainly due to the helplessness of the Congress against a Viceroy like Curzon. Benares, however, gave a great impetus to the movement. Looking at the splendid reception accorded to him, Gokhale thought that the "evil days of the country were over." He was so much overwhelmed

with peoples' enthusiasim that tears rolled in his eyes.[67] The Congress was attended by 756 delegates of whom 718 were Hindus, 17 Muhamadans, 14 Sikhs, 6 Parsis and one Christian. Gokhale in his presidential speech dealt with almost all the topics of the day,—Curzon's administration and its effects, the policy and political effects of the Partition of Bengal, the economic and political aspects of the Swadeshi movement, the aims and objects of the Congress movement and the attitude of the Anglo-Indian community towards it, and such reforms as required an immediate and early consideration.

He compared Curzon's administration to that of Aurangzeb and said: "There we find the same attempt at a rule excessively centralised and intensely personal, the same strenuous purpose, the same overpowering consciousness of duty, the same marvellous capacity for work, the same sense of loneliness, the same persistence in a policy of distrust and repression resulting in bitter exasperation all round. I think the most devoted admirer of Lord Curzon cannot claim that he has strengthened the foundations of British rule in India .... To him India was a country where the Englishman was to monopolize for all time all power, and talk all the while of duty. The India's only business was to be governed and it was a sacrilege on his part to have any other aspiration. In his scheme of things there was no room for the educated classes of the country, and having failed to amuse them for any length of time by an empty show of taking them into his confidence, he proceeded in the end to repress them. Even in his last farewell speech at Byculla Club in Bombay, India exists only as a scene of the Englishmen's labour with the toiling millions of the country—eighty per cent of the population—in the background. The remaining twenty per cent, for aught they are worth, might as well as gently swept into the sea."

Turning to the Partition of Bengal he denounced it as "a cruel wrong" and indignantly flung-back Lord Curzon's false assertion that the agitation was "manufactured", declaring that "nothing more intense, wide-spread, and spontaneous had been seen in Indian political agitation." Gokhale referred to the tremendous upheaval of popular feeling which had taken place in Bengal in consequence

67. Lajpat Rai: *Story of My Life*, p. 110.

of the Partition, and would constitute a landmark in the history of our national progress. Not only had a wave of true national consciousness swept over the province "but the whole country has received an accession of strength of great importance." Though the Congress condemned the Partition of Bengal and the repressive measures, it did not adopt any resolution supporting boycott. It was merely referred to in the Resolution of protest against repressive measures "as a last protest and perhaps the only constitutional and effective means left of drawing the attention of the British public to the action of the Government of India in persisting in their determination to partition Bengal in utter disregard of the universal prayers and protests of the people."

Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya in moving the resolution described the boycott of foreign goods as "a last measure of despair", while seconding the resolution, Lala Lajpat Rai called upon India "no longer to be content to be beggars, whining for favours, for if they really cared for their country, they would have to strike a blow for freedom themselves.' H. C. E. Zacharias writes in his Renascent India: A new turn was given to Indian politics, the policy of "mendicancy", as the Congress method was derisively called, was henceforth even more seriously assailed and significantly enough that great Indian Sinn Feiner (and adversery of Gokhale)—Tilak—was once more received with ovation, as at Benares he rose to speak on Passive Resistance, on Famine and on Poverty. Still more significant was the fact that a Resolution welcoming the Prince of Wales' visit to India was definitely opposed by a section of the delegates who severely criticised the Government for inviting Prince of Wales at a time when "severe famine prevailed in the country and people were dying of hunger, besides the Viceroyalty of Lord Curzon had created great unrest.' They firmly believed that it was a political subterfuge, the intention of the visitors being to allay political unrest by diverting public unrest to gala shows. The resolution was carried in the open session without any protest only by a private arrangement whereby Tilak and the Bengal delegates abstained from the meeting. Gokhale unable to dissuade Tilak had approached Lajpat Rai who played the role of a mediator. Tilak agreed to abstain from the meeting on the understanding that it would not be said that the resolution was carried unanimously. Two young Bengalis refused to abide by it and had to be kept out by force. As Dr. MacNicol puts it: "The Moderates are not

carried off their feet but neither do they carry others off there feet."

Indeed the whole tenor of the speeches made in this Congress by leaders like Tilak and Lajpat Rai and the demeanour of a large section of the delegates demonstrated for the first time the emergence of a new school of politics within the Congress. This may be termed the nationalist as opposed to the old liberal school though in course of time their followers came to be known as Extremists and Moderates. The cleavage between the two was still further widened at the next session of the Congress held in Calcutta. The first open manifestation of the difference was in regard to the election of the President of this session. The Extremists selected Tilak, but the Moderates including Gokhale were opposed to him. To get rid of this impasse the latter by secret negotiations, induced the Grand Old Man Dadabhai Naoroji, who was then in England to accept the Presidentship. This clever maneouvre saved the situation and no other name was put forward against him. About Gokhale W. S. Blunt remarked that he "is a well-bred highly educated and intelligent man, a Mahratta Brahmin, I believe, and according to Nevinson, the leader of the National Movement. He expresses himself well in English and I have no doubt he is an able speaker. But he is clearly no leader of a revolution and they will affect nothing without one. He lacks the enthusiasm which a belief in ultimate successes would give or even the bitterness which is also the force of hatred and despair. He told me that he did not like being called a moderate but if he represents anything that can be called extreme, there is small chance for India". Gokhale's estimate was that India might get provincial Self-Government in another 10 years i.e. in 1918.

The Congress session of 1906 was a memorable one. Never before had the Congress seen such a large gathering as that which assembled at Calcutta on the 26h, 27th, 28th and 29th of December in that memorable year. Bengal had been roused from end to end, all India sympathised with her wrongs and 1663 delegates came from all parts of the country to give vent to their feelings of deep resentment against the partition of Bengal. The attendance on the first day was not less than 20,000 people. Dr. Rash Behari Ghose, the Chairman of the Reception Committee, compared the British methods of persecution to those of the Russians and

said "The Partition of Bengal was followed by Russian methods of Government with this difference that the officials who desired them were Englishmen while the Russian official is at least the countrymen of those whom he governs or misgoverns." The singing of national songs and even the cry of "Bande Mataram" were forbidden under severe penalties. This ordinance was fittingly succeeded by the prosecution of school boys, the quartering of military and punitive police, the prohibition and forcible dispersion of public meetings and these high-handed proceedings attained their crown and completion in the tragedy at Barisal when the provincial conference was dispersed by the police who wantonly broke the peace in order, I believe to keep the peace". "In Swadeshism", he declared, "you see the cradle of a new India. To speak of such a movement as disloyal is a lie and calumny".

Dadabhai Naoroji, in his Presidential address regarded the work of the Congress as twofold: "First and most important is the question of the policy and principles of the system of Government under which India is to be governed in the future". Secondly, to match the present system of administration and introduce reform bill it was "radically altered and based upon right principles and policy". He claimed for Indians in India all the control that Englishmen had in England. This was a necessity, he said, in order to remedy the great economic evil which was as the root of Indian Poverty. It was "absolutely necessary" for the progress and welfare of the Indian people. "The whole matter can be comprised in one word, self-Government or Swaraj, like that of the United Kingdom or the colonies." The Congress accepted a formal Resolution expressing an opinion that the colonial form of self-government should be extended to India and enumerating the different reforms that should be immediately introduced as the steps leading to this ultimate goal. Dadabhai laid stress on "agitation". "Agitation", he said, is the civilized peaceful weapon of moral force when possible...... Agitate: Agitate means inform. Inform the Indian people what their rights are and now and why should they obtain them and inform the British people of the rights of the Indian people and why they should grant them." The Congress through a resolution gave full support to the Boycott movement inaugurated in Bengal as a protest against the partition of that province. It did not, however, support the view of Bepin Chandra Pal who wanted to extend it to other provinces

as well, and give it a wider application than merely boycott of British goods so as to include boycott of councils, educational institutions, etc.

The Congress wholeheartedly supported the Swadeshi movement and requested the people to use indigenous goods even at a sacrifice. The Congress emphatically declared that the time had come to organise National education, literary, scientific and technical, for both girls and boys on national lines and under national control. The mover of this important resolution was Hirendra Nath Datta, the Hony. Secretary of the National Council of Education, who said, "Trust not your education to aliens. In native souls and native hands, the only hopes of succour rest". An outline of the Congress constitution was also discussed and passed, to be tried for a year. It recommended (a) the formation of Provincial Congress Committees which should form District Committees; (b) An All-India Congress Standing Committee; (c) two alternative schemes for selecting a President; and (d) a Subjects Committee for settling the programmes of the Congress each year.

The two sessions of the Congress in 1905 and 1906 are very important in one respect. They brought into prominence a new school in Indian politics within the Congress which definitely opposed to the severely constitutional methods of the older generation and had little faith in achieving freedom through the generosity of the British. Lajpat Rai explained the attitude of the new school when he said: "We are perfectly justified in trying to become arbiters of our own destiny and in trying to obtain freedom."

This new school made its power felt for the first time in the session of 1905. Although this fact was not generally recognised at the time discerning eyes could easily detect the emergence of a new factor of immense potentiality in Indian politics. This will be evident from the following observations of a foreigner on the session of 1905.

"Nevertheless, the Moderates were not prepared for a bold step. They shivered, and the Extremists among Congressmen were impatient to take the plunge. There arose, amongst the latter, great leaders who refused to set any limitation on their national aspirations; they were not prepared to hold aloft a beggar's bowl. They formed a new party, called the Nationalist Party, and held

an open session in the Congress camp to discuss their future programme. At this meeting. Tilak expounded the idea of passive resistance. They advocated self-help. and decided to exhort people to take to indigenous goods and help the boycott movement. They even thought of propagating withdrawal of all co-operation from the British in every sphere of administration and public activity.

"This development was a disturbing factor in the quiet manner of the Congress, and was bound to have its repercussions. A difference quite naturally arose between the old Moderates and the Nationalists in the Subjects Committee. About the time of the Congress session, the Prince and Princess of Wales were on visit to India. In keeping with its traditions, the Congress (Moderates) wanted to offer them "most humbly and respectfully its loyal and dutiful welcome" to them. The Nationalists would have nothing of the kind, and opposed the resolution. An uneasy situaion was created bordering on a crisis. But the old guard found a solution in the compromise that when the welcome resolution would be taken up, the Tilak group would walk out of the meeting. So they walked out, and unity was maintained. There was another occasion threatening a split. The Moderates were not prepared to pass a resolution on the boycott. Swadeshi and National education in the way of the Nationalists wanted it. But the former yielded, and the session concluded peacefully."

The rise of this new school was no doubt largely due to the sense of frustration caused by the attitude of the Government towards the Congress demands. It was an immediate effect of the high-handed manner in which the unanimous protest of the people of Bengal against the partition of the province was brushed aside by the haughty Viceroy, and the severe measures of repression that followed this reactionary measure as noted above. Nevertheless we must stress the fact that the roots of the new school lie deeper, and it practically replaced the old school in the forward march of the movement for freedom.

Reviews

THE KUVALAYAMĀLĀ OF UDDYOTANASŪRI (Part I–Text; Part II–Introduction and Notes), edited by Dr. A. N. Upadhye (Singhī Jaina Grantha Mālā, Nos. 45 and 46), published by Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay. Price Rs. 15-50 and Rs. 21.

The *Kuvalayamālā* of Uddyotanasūri has long been known to scholars. A manuscript of it was secured for the Government of Bombay as early as 1881-82. It is now deposited in the Bhandarkar Institute of Poona. A Sanskrit version of the work made by Ratnaprabhasūri in the 13th cent. A.D. was published in 1916, but the original Prakrit work became known to scholars first from the extracts from it published in the Notes to the *Kāvyamīmāṁsā* of Rājaśekhara, edited by C. D. Dalal and R. A. Shastry in the Gaekwad's Oriental Series in 1916. The original Prakrit text has now been edited by Dr. A. N. Upadhye from two manuscripts—the only ones known to exist—*viz.* the aforementioned Poona manuscript and the other in the Big Bhāṇḍāra at Jaisalmer. The editing of a Prakrit text from only two MSS, neither of them being in good condition is always a difficult task and the difficulties in the present case were further increased by the numerous variations noticed in the MSS. Dr. Upadhye had to spend most of his leisure during the last sixteen years in editing this great work. He had at first little idea of the arduous nature of the work as he has graphically described in the letter he wrote to Muni Jinavijayaji on the 29th April 1959—"You know I paid my respects to Girnar on my way back from Somanātha . . . . If I had seen the height before climbing, I would not have dared to undertake the trip. Luckily, the dark morning did not disclose the height. Well, the same thing has happened in my working on the *Kuvalayamālā*. If I had any idea of the tremendous labour the text-constitution demanded, perhaps I would not have undertaken it." The first part of the *Kuvalayamālā* containing the text was published in 1959 after strenuous work of six years. The second part of the work has just been published after an interval of ten years. Dr. Upadhye must be feeling greatly relieved after seeing the work published.

The *Kuvalayamālā* is one of the earliest known Prakrit Kathās of Champū type. Besides, its date is definitely known. It was completed on the 14th *tithi* of the dark fortnight of Caitra when only one day was less for the Śaka era to reach seven hundred. As Jacobi has shown, this date corresponds to the 21st March A.D. 779. The work has several literary, historical, geographical and linguistic references and graphically describes the manners and customs of the people. It is thus a mine of information of historical and cultural importance. Scholars of ancient history, literature and culture will be grateful to Dr. Upadhye for having made this unique work accessible in a good critical edition.

The *Kuvalayamālā* is a *dharma-kathā*, its object being to show how the souls affected by the passions, *krodha*, māna, *māyā, lobha* and *moha*, have to wander through miserable lives in the worldly existence until they get released by repentence and penance. Kuvalayamālā, the heroine, is one of these souls. She was the daughter of the king of Vijayāpurī and was married to Kuvalaya-candra, a prince of Vinītā (Ayodhyā). They and their companions went through several lives until they reached the *samavasaraṇa* of Mahāvīra. They then took *dīkshā* from him and attained liberation in due course.

The stories of the lives of these five souls are very complicated as in Bāṇa's *Kādambarī*. Dr. Upadhye has first narrated them as in the text and then again broadly summarised them for easy understanding. He has discussed various questions connected with the present work such as the life and date of its author, the literary and historical information furnished by it, the socio-cultural glimpses noticed in it etc. At the editor's request the late Dr. V. S. Agrawala has added a detailed cultural note on the contents of the work with his characteristic penetrating insight. Part II contains a Sanskrit version of the story composed by Ratnaprabhasūri, who flourished in the thirteenth century A.D. The notes added at the end are both critical and explanatory and discuss fully several points of literary and historical interest.

The *Kuvalayamālā* is one of the few works in Sanskrit and Prakrit literatures which are definitely dated. The references to historical matters, literary works and contemporary dialects noticed

therein have, therefore, great importance. Dr. Upadhye has discussed fully all such references in the introduction. See, for instance, the mention of the Hūṇa king Toramāṇa and his capital Pavvāiyā. Dr. Upadhye has discussed the location of the capital and conjectured it to be modern Chāchar. The epithet Raṇahastin of the Pratīhāra king Vatsarāja is another point of great interest; it is corroborated by some coins with that legend which had baffled scholars for a long time.

Like Bāṇa, Uddyotana also has eulogised earlier Sanskrit and Prakrit poets. Some of them like Vyāsa, Vālmīki, Pālittaya (Śrīpālita), Sālāhaṇa (Sātavāhana Hāla), Guṇāḍhya Bāṇa and Vimalāṅka are well known, but some are known from his work for the first time. His mention of a Club of Poets under the name to mean Ṣaṭprajña, but from the *Avantisundarīkathā* it appears to have been understood in the sense of fifty-six, as early as the time of Dāṇḍin. The reference to Rājarṣi Devagupta, who belonged to the Gupta family and was known for his right conduct, is another matter of more than common interest. One is tempted to identify him with the illustrious Gupta king Candragupta II, who bore that name (see the Vākāṭaka grants) and who also was a great poet. Devagupta is, however, here mentioned as the author of *Tripuruṣa-carita*, which is otherwise unknown. It appears more likely that he was a Jaina author, but how he was a Rājarṣi is still a moot point.

Uddyotana's reference to eighteen dialects current in his time is also of great interest. Actually only sixteen have been named and described. One of them was the language of the Marahaṭṭhas. The words cited from it show that the Marathi language was then in the course of formation. There is another reference to the Gollas, which Dr. Agrawala understands in the sense of the people of the Godāvarī (Golā in Prakrit). This would mean, however, that there was another dialect current in Maharashtra besides Marathi. Dr. Upadhye's explanation that the Gollas were an itinerent tribe, akin to the Ābhīras, is more likely to be correct. He is, however, unable to explain *aḍaḍe* or *araḍe* illustrating their speech.

There are a few points here and there on which one may not agree with the editor. He identifies the town of Vijayā with

Vijayadurga in the Ratnāgiri district on the western coast. Dr. Agrawala, on the other hand, would take it to be identical with the Ikṣvāku capital of that name (modern Nāgārjunakoṇḍa) on the eastern coast. Uddyotanasūri does not give sufficient details for the location of this place, but when we read that Kuvalayacandra, starting for Vijayāpurī, joined a caravan bound for Kāñcīpurī, Dr. Agrawala's location of the place appears to be preferable. As a matter of fact, much of the description of places in Jaina *kathās* appears to be more or less imaginary. This is my impression after studying the description of *Rāmagiri* in the *Paümacariya.* Perhaps the references to places in the author's life are more authentic. The case of Pavvaīyā, the capital of Toramāṇa, has been discussed above.

Dr. Upadhye has added a long note on the identification of Vardhamānapura where Jinasena completed his *Harivaṁśa.* This point is discussed incidentally in a foot-note on pp. 105-107. We hold a different opinion on this matter, but it will have to be discussed in a separate article.

There is a slight inaccuracy in Dr. Agrawala's Cultural Note on p.123. He identifies Padmanagara mentioned by Uddyotana with modern Paunār. The latter is, however, now conclusively shown to be ancient Pravarapura. Padmanagara, if that is a historical place, may be identical with the place of the same name mentioned in a Rāṣṭrakūta grant found in Vidarbha—modern Padampur in the Bhandara district of Vidarbha, well known as the birthplace of Bhavabhūti.

Dr. Upadhye has shown that the *Kuvalayamālā* soon fell into oblivion. Very few authors seem to have known it after its Sanskrit version by Ratnaprabha became current. Later, Jaina authors, both of the Digambara and Śvetāmbara sects, began to write *Kathās* in Sanskrit. The *Udayasundarīkathā* of Soḍḍhala names some *kathās* composed by his Jaina contemporaries in Gujarat, but unfortunately none of them has come down to us.

V. V. MIRASHI

JUNGLE ALLIANCE: JAPAN AND THE INDIAN NATIONAL ARMY by Joyce C. Lebra, published by Donald More for Asia Pacific Press, Singapore, pp. xiv + 255.

Although several works on the Indian National Army, the Azad Hind Government and Subhas Chandra Bose have come out since Jitendra Nath Ghosh published his study of them in 1946, there is still necessity for fresh assessment of the motives, activities, methods and achievements of the Indian revolutionaries abroad and the impingements they produced on the life, thought and concerns of Indians on the mainland. In this context, the efforts of Joyce C. Lebra to make an objective and thorough study of the Indian National Army, its genesis, growth and ramification in South East Asian scene, deserve special consideration. Drawn from a wide range of official and private papers of India, Japan, Burma and other South East Asian countries, personal interviews conducted in Bangkok, India and Japan with persons who were actively engaged in the work of the revolutionary movement, and published works in English and Japanese, the book provides an admirable, balanced assessment of the concepts, goals and implementation of Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity sphere in Asia and war aims, and the ingenuity with which Subhas Chandra Bose and his comrades tried to channel Japanese support for achieving their political ends. The book surveys the variegated activities of the early freedom fighters like Pritam Singh, Amar Singh, Captain Mohan Singh who co-operated with the Japanese army officials of *F. Kikan.* The part played by the Japanese agent Fujiwara in organising the Indian armymen who surrendered in Alor Star into an army of freedom fighters against the British to serve the war aims of the Japanese is ably described in the book. The birth of Indian National Army under the leadership of Mohan Singh is graphically portrayed (pp. 23-25). Of the prominent *dramatis personae* of the gripping drama, the figure of Fujiwara is the most alluring and impressive. As against the official Japanese wish to utilise Indian National Army as a show-piece and a puppet to be used to further their secret designs on India, Fujiwara seems to have nourished a sort of secret love for this organisation. On the stalemate over the Bangkok Resolution he says "Secretly I was determined I would give up my life to prevent this from happening (possibility of destruction of the Indian National Army), standing between Japan and Indian National Army.

I told this to Lieutenant Yamaguchi, putting everything in order and entrusting my heirs and my will to him". (p. 87-8). Fujiwara's idealistic sympathy for Indian independence is manifest at every stage of his involvement in the Indian affairs. This assumes larger proportions at the last stage of the story when in October 1945 at the time of the trial of the Indian National Army personnel, a subpoena was presented to him to appear as a witness in Delhi. The character of Fujiwara is well delineated by the author when she says, "Fujiwara was anxious to testify in Delhi on behalf of his Indian National Army and *F.Kikkan* comrades. He would attest that his Indian friends had risen to fight for Indian independence, not as Japanese puppets. This was the only way he could fulfil his obligation to his friends" (pp. 206-7). This fascinating character who is behind the history of Indian National Army till 1942 when he was replaced by colonel Iwakuro as *Kikan* chief, is little known to the students of the history of India's freedom struggle. The author has done a very good job in introducing him along with Pritam Singh and Mohan Singh.

The picture of Bose also emerges agreeably well. With admirable conciseness, the author brings out the personality of Bose. To give but one example, Joyce describes the first meeting Fujiwara had with Bose in his official residence in the Singapore suburbs. She says, "as Fujiwara watched, a huge noble figure emerged from the centre of the line smiling with dignified but casual assurance. It had to be Bose. He looked like a man men would follow. So this was the revolutionary all his Indian friends had begged be brought from Berlin. Bose's face bespoke confidence, friendliness, expectancy, and Fujiwara thought, a touch of the philosopher. Fujiwara was impressed even before Bose spoke". (p. 126). Bose's activities as head of the Indian National Army are delineated with extreme sympathy and understanding, and with detachment which few of the Indian writers could hardly ever attain. The lucidity of diction is marvellous and comprehensive accuracy, and scrupulous scholarly reverence for the recorded evidence are superb. The book also fulfils the qualities of a fine literary work; the skilfully constructed story has the intagliated grains of poesy in it. That makes the book highly readable and a notable additon to the existing literature on the subject.

T. K. Ravindran.

SRI AUROBINDO—AN INTERPRETATION. Edited by V. C. Joshi. Published by Vikas Publishing House Private Limited, Delhi, 1973, pp. X + 174. Price Rs. 25/-.

This book, issued under the auspices of Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, is devoted to the interpretation of some significant aspects of the life and ideas of Sri Aurobindo. The seven essays, contributed by six scholars, deal with the sage's life, philosophy, poetry, political thought and vision of human unity. The essayist, circumscribed as his field is, could deal with his topic only in a general way, leaving much to be investigated and found out by others.

The book includes studies on the growth of the man after 1910—that is the period which put an end to his political activities and initiated his spiritual quest. But modern India cannot ignore the early phase of the philosopher's life which was steeped in the nationalist struggle. The editor is conscious of the defect when he says in the preface "I wish it had been possible to include in this volume an essay on the political thought of Sri Aurobindo in the pre-Pondicherry phase". His contention that this aspect of Aurobindo's life is available in other works, is not a valid reason for not including it here because, if it is so, the present studies also have no special reason to appear now.

Better and more thorough studies on each of these topics are already in the field to make little sense in producing a volume containing these essays. It seems the editor thought it wiser not to include a bibliograyphical list in this volume; this cannot be easily explained away. Any number of studies centred round the unique personality of Sri Aurobindo will certainly be welcomed by the reading public. But their justification lies in their academic worth and originality. The present work can hardly claim either of these. With all these, it must be admitted, in fairness to the editor, that he has done a creditable job in presenting a rather difficult subject in homely, unaffected manner so as to give the student the feel of the subject.

T. K. Ravindran

THE HISTORY OF FREEDOM MOVEMENT IN KERALA, Compiled by the Regional Records Survey Committee, Kerala & Published by the Govt. of Kerala, Vol. I, (1600-1885), pp. xiii + 126 + viii, (1972), Price Rs. 2-50/-. Vol. II (1885-1938), Edited by Prof. P. K. K. Menon (1972), pp. X + 522 + 19. Price Rs. 10-20/-.

No serious study was ever attempted on the history of freedom movement in Kerala by any scholar, with the result that in the history of India's struggle for freedom the contributions made by Kerala find no place at all. When we speak about the movement for political emancipation of India, seldom do we realise that each political community in the vast subcontinent, had played its appointed role in a pre-eminently creditable way to produce the desired total effect as it had turned out to be. The history of nationalist movement consequently, has been made to appear as the story of the efforts of a few men with ideas and indomitable spirit, to free India from the clutches of the foreign imperialists. Only when we analyse the connected movements in the different states, that we are apt to get a glimpse of the broader base of the nationalist struggle, the sacrifices of hundreds of thousands of ordinary men and women constituting the *force majeure*. It is in this context indeed, that the necessity arises for separate histories of the individual efforts of each political unit of India.

The book under review, is a remarkable work as it seeks to trace the different phases and strands of the freedom struggle in Kerala, in the larger backdrop of the Indian scene. Hereafter scholars cannot afford to dismiss the part played by this state as insignificant or obscure.

This book is compiled by the Regional Records Survey Committee, a creature of the Government of Kerala. The aim of the book, as mentioned in the first volume, is to present "an authoritative history of the freedom movement" so that "it would be a perennial source of inspiration to the future generation in the responsible task of preservation of the country's hard-earned political freedom and enhancement of the material prosperity and welfare" (p. iii). This lofty objective is found ably defeated in the first volume of the book. The first volume gives only a short historical introduction to the real drama that is being unfolded in the

second. The brief and slender volume could have been more appropriately clubbed together with the second one. The editor of the first volume has chosen to give only a simplistic resume of certain topics, mostly socio-political themes, dealt with in the State Manuals of Cochin, Malabar and Travancore and some other historical works. The large amount of original sources lying in the Tamil Nadu Archives and National Archives, New Delhi, especially concerning the activities of Velu Thampi, Paliath Achan, Palassi Raja and others is left untouched. Had they been utilized in the compilation of this volume, it would have made itself a veritable store-house of information. It is sad indeed, to see the anonymous compiler, evidently a government servant, busying himself in pejorating the material he collected from local archives. The result is a rawboned history. Anonymity and weightlessness are the only attributes of this volume which is the product of a decades labour.

In clear contrast with this is the second volume edited by Prof. P. K. K. Menon. It suffers only from the opposite quality of the early volume—plenitude of primary sources. In research equipment, in variety of knowledge, in originality, in treatment, in depth and in comprehension of implications, the author stands on a high pedestal. In thirty seven chapters, he traces the story of the genesis of political consciousness and the spread of nationalist activities in Kerala till 1938. This pioneer work illumines our mind with its restraint in treatment of controversial issues, its sober approach and sane conclusions. It is a remarkable specimen of massive scholarship and critical acumen. One may, however, feel justified, if one holds the view that partial impairment of theme has occurred on account of inflating the bulk of the book with unrestrained quotes. A little pruning of the redundance would have made the volume more compact and a superb contribution to historical literature.

A word about the quality of printing and format of the work is warranted here. No printer, worth the name, would have dared to show so much disrespect to his art, as the printer of these volumes has done. As they are not meant for local consumption only, a greater sense of responsibility ought to have been felt by him, in producing them. It behoves on the printer to maintain a minimum standard of quality in printing and finish. This is a sad

monument of a lamentable failure of our printing technique and publishing trade.

In preparing the next volume, efforts should be made to collect original sources from archives outside Kerala also and to bring out the book in a better way.

T. K. RAVINDRAN

THE REIGN OF AL-MUTAWAKKIL, by M. Shamsuddin Miah, M.A. Ph.D., Published by Asiatic Society of Pakistan, Dacca, 1969, Pp. xv + 381, Rs. 25/-.

This is the thesis submitted by the author for the Ph.D. Degree of the University of London, under the guidance of Professor Bernard Lewis. It is a detailed study of one of the most crucial periods in the history of the Abbasid dynasty.

The first chapter surveys the sources for the reign of Al-Mutawakkil (847-861 A.D.). Both traditional and modern sources of information have been utilised. Besides literary sources, contemporary records, such as the *papyri* which give details of revenue administration, coins and archaeological finds are put to use, which make the biography both exhaustive and authentic.

In the second chapter, the author surveys the reign of the Caliph, his accession in 847 A.D., the events of his reign and his eventual assassination in 861 A.D.

The succession of Al-Mutawakkil, brother of the late Caliph, Al-Wathiq, in preference to the latter's sons, was largely due to the pressure exerted by the Turkish commanders. His reign was consequently significant as the starting point of political manoeuvring by the Turkish commanders, which proved the bane of later Abbasid history. The author has succinctly described the rise of the Turks to a position of dominance in the Abbasid court, the fall of the bureaucratic element and the resulting chaos in the country.

The ills that afflicted the empire in the time of Al-Mutawakkil were the continuing state of war with the Byzantine empire, the

agitations that rocked several parts of the empire, and the struggle for political supremacy between the bureaucrats and the Turkish generals, culminating in the assassination of the Caliph. It was the nomination of Al-Muntasir, his eldest son, as heir-apparent and his later supersession, that precipitated a split in the country, and resulted in the murder of the Caliph. The Caliph seems to have sensed the breaking out of violence in the capital, as a result of sharp antagonism among the different political groups. The transfer of the capital first to Damascus and the later construction of 'Ja'farīyah', a new palace-city, in the vicinity of Samarra, the Abbasid capital, were in fact, as the author has pointed out, attempts to free himself from the hostile Turkish military junta. But as events turned out, the plan did not succeed.

The chapter on religious policy deals with the anti-Alid and anti-Mu'tazilah policy, which the Caliph followed in common with his predecessors (excepting Al-Ma'mūn), who allied themselves with the Sunni orthodoxy. The anti-Alid and anti-Mu'tazilah policy was a political necessity, as far as Al-Mutawakkil was concerned, in order to stem the rising tide of Shī'ism and Persianism. The religious policy of the Caliph took two forms: one, the support given to *'Ahl us-Sunnat Wa'l-Jamā'ah'* and two, persecution of the *Dhimmis*. As the author has pertinently observed, the persecution of the Dhimmis was aimed at increasing his popularity with the ulama and the common people who were under their strong influence.

The author has dealt elaborately with the revenue administration under Al-Mutawakkil, basing his conclusions largely on the newly discovered *papyri* sources. The papyri sources are more dependable as they deal with instructions, reports, etc. relating to day-to-day administration. It would have been more useful for researchers, if relevant extracts of the papyri have been given in an appendix, as they are not easily available.

The final chapter traces the intellectual and cultural trends in the period of Al-Mutawakkil. One important result of the support given to *Ahl us-Sunnat Wa'l-Jamā'ah* was the efflorescence of the science of *Hadith* literature. The compilation of the *'Musnud'* of Ibn Hanbal was soon followed by the outstanding works in Hadīth literature of Bukhārī, Muslim, Tirmidhī, Abū Dāwūd, Ibn Māja and Nasā'ī.

The book also contains three appendices, a detailed bibliography covering 30 pages and an index. One or more maps illustrating the extent of the empire and illustrations of coins and archaeological explorations at Ja'farīyah would have enhanced the value of the work.

The author and the publishers deserve commendation for publishing such an excellent work.

A. P. IBRAHIM KUNJU

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE FREEDOM MOVEMENT IN ANDHRA PRADESH, by Sarojini Regani, Government of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, 1972, pp. 234 + viii, Rs. 2-50/-.

Andhra has an age old tradition of freedom struggle which may be traced to A.D. 1323, when Prolaya Nayaka and Kapaya Nayaka drove out Muslim troops left by Ulugh Khan (later Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq) and soon after restored Hindu rule over Warangal. It was to thwart the aggressive Hindu chiefs like Sambuvarayas of Tondaimandalam, Koppula of Pithapuram, the Reddis of Kondavidu, and the Velamas of Rajakonda that Muhammad bin Tughluq sent south two captive Hindu brothers, originally from Warangal, Harihara and Bukka, who promptly founded the Vijayanagara Empire, the bulwark of the Hindus against the foreign invaders.

The heroic deeds of a bygone age were forgotten, as was the great Empire, but it seems permissible to assume that the spirit of the Nayakas and the Reddis survived, albeit in a latent form, among the masses. For, the freedom struggle in Andhra during the present century is remarkable for intermittent mass uprisings, or 'riots', sometimes by leaderless people exasperated beyond measure by the misdeed of some local white ruler. The earliest of such risings was the Kakinada Riot of July 1907 (p. 39), five months before the Surat Congress. This was followed by the more serious Kotappa Konda riots of February 1909, and the Tenali Bomb Case (pp. 40-2). The Chirala-Perala struggle (pp. 83-6), under Duggirala Gopalakrishnayya, was a unique instance of mass movement of this period (1919) which seems to have influenced the subsequent no-tax campaign and the Peda-

nandipadu Satyagraha under Konda Venkatappaya called off at Gandhiji's direct intervention lest the satyagrahis should get out of control were the Government to apply inhuman modes of oppression (p. 93). Evidently the non-violent attitude of the masses was limited to a certain degree of toleration which was realised by the leaders.

The Andhra leaders, particularly those at the top, like T. Prakasam, Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya and others were staunch followers of Gandhiji with implicit faith in non-violence. Did the attitude of the leaders moulded by Congress discipline and the aspiration of the masses determined by historical tradition create the hiatus which not only burst out into sporadic riots mentioned above, but the far more significant Rampa Rebellion which lasted from January 1922 to May 1924 (pp. 94-101)? The Rampa Rebellion was the only struggle of its kind in India, and its leader, Sitarama Raju, richly deserves a permanent niche in the gallery of Indian freedom fighters. Of this rebellion the British Additional Magistrate remarked: 'I am prepared to believe that the rebel leaders obtained followers by harping on the wrongs done by Britain.... The pillaging, the destruction of Government property, and the horror that marked, for example, the Moplah rebellion, are conspicuously absent here, and nothing is more noticeable than the respect shown to police officers who fell in the hands of the rebels.... I find that Raju, who ruled his followers with a firm hand, openly said that his object was to drive the British out of India. This explains his treatment of Indian officials and his refusal to allow Government property to be injured. As his intention was to set up another Government, he would naturally not destroy buildings, which he would require when his Government was established'. (p. 101).

There is also the possibility that the leaders and the mass were divided by non-political factors. The early political, that is, Congress leaders in Andhra—as indeed in whole South India—were mostly Brahmins, and it was much later that the Kamma, the Reddi, and the Raju communities joined the nationalist movement under the Congress. They formed the landlord class, and may be presumed to have had a hold over the peasantry not wielded by the urban elites, which the Brahmin leaders mostly were.

So effective was the leadership of the non-Brahmin communities that when the Satyagraha movement was launched in Andhra on 30 March 1930 (Telugu New Year's Day), people from all communities, including Adi Andhras and Christians, joined the movement—for the first time. And commenting on the arrest of the Congress leaders the Government report stated: 'As the leaders were arrested the lesser lights arose and the tone of the speeches became violent'. (pp. 47, 106, 116, 125).

These incidents and not too illuminating official statements indicate the necessity for an analysis of the motivation and the socio-economic forces at work behind the façade of the Congress movements in Andhra under Gandhiji's leadership. Dr. Regani's work stimulates our curiosity, but her slim volume is devoted to briefly chronicling the main events under appropriate headings which leaves scope for a deeper and more detailed investigation. An intensive study is possible only at provincial level. In the meantime, however, the present work is welcome for what it contains, and it is to be hoped that each State will publish handy low-priced monographs on the same subject relative to each State.

A provincial history of the freedom movement should, however, avoid descriptions or discussions of well-known incidents of all-India character, for example, the Rowlatt Act and Satyagraha (pp. 58-9), or the Jallianwalla Bagh Tragedy (pp. 63-5), or such unnecessary information as: 'Gandhiji, who had earned a great reputation for himself as a saintly leader by the successful conduction (*sic*) of Satyagraha in South Africa, Champaran district in Bihar, and also by giving relief to the peasants in the Khera district in Ahmedabad (*sic*) . . . .' (p. 58). It would have been far more profitable if the author had given thumb-nail sketches of important Andhra leaders like, Harisarvothama Rao, who are little known outside Andhra.

The glaring defect of the book is poor editing and bad proof-reading. On p. 39 is stated: "The Government felt that the Sessions Judge, Kershasp, was too lenient in his attitude towards Harisarvottama Rao demoted him from the post of District Magistrate to that of a sub-Collector. . . ." From the following pages it becomes apparent that Mr. Kershasp was an executive officer and not a judge. It is doubtful, however, if he was ever a District Magistrate (in those days usually an I.C.S. man), and in any

case since he was later practically forced to resign, his career deserves more than incidental notice.

As for printing errors, one finds them throughout the book, few of the more interesting being Lord Amery for Mr. L. S. Amery (p. 144) and Monctan for Monckton (pp. 197 and 210).

The writing of the history of Andhra's freedom struggle presents some peculiar difficulties, as parts of the present state were included within the Madras Presidency while the rest formed a part of the Nizam's dominion, and the movements in the two regions were practically unrelated. Hence Dr. Regani has properly treated the movements of two regions in two different sections, but a much better account of the later phase of 'The Telengana Freedom Struggle' (pp. 167-234) could have been given on the basis of the published works like those by Mr. V. P. Menon, Mr. K. M. Munshi and Mr. Laik Ali. Unfortunately Dr. Regani has not given any reference, nor is her work provided with a bibliography.

A. K. MAJUMDAR.

TWILIGHT OR DAWN, THE POLITICAL CHANGE IN INDIA (1967-71), by Iqbal Narain, Shivalal Agarwala & Company, Agra 1972, Pp. ii + ii + 244, Rs. 20.

This book is a collection of studies published at various dates in different journals between 1968 and September 1971. The author belongs to the younger generation of Indian political scientists, and each of these studies offers his assessment of the situation at a given moment. An attempt has been made to edit the original studies in the light of later events, but much editing seems to have been done none too systematically, and one fails to get a correct or consistent picture of 'political change in India'.

Between the year of independence and 1967 the Indian National Congress had an overwhelming majority in the Parliament at Delhi and with the exception of Kerala, in the State legislatures. But the general elections of February 1967 resulted in a drastic reduction of the Congress majority at the Centre and its loss or near-loss of control over the legislatures of several important States. Commenting on these reverses at the time the author expressed his belief that "The singular contribution of the

fourth general election has been to strike [drive?] a wedge in the one-party dominance and thereby unleash the forces of political polarization, hopefully to the advantage of both democracy and federalism in India" (49). But in the first half of 1969 two of the defeated Congress stalwarts, Kamaraj Nadar of Madras and S. K. Patil of Bombay, won parliamentary bye-elections with comfortable majorities. This prompted our author to say that their success had "rehabilitated the Syndicate, the group of old-line leaders who dominated the organization, and as such can be taken as an earnest for [of?] future political developments, particularly in the Congress" (163). However, the latter half of 1969 witnessed a split in the National Congress, brought about by the fact that the younger elements turned their backs on the older leaders and rallied round Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who sensed that the older men were manoeuvring to bring her down. Analysing these events the author ventured to state that "The Congress, or rather the two Congress organizations, will have wide fluctuations in their electoral fortunes, but it is unlikely that either will regain the dominance enjoyed during the 1947-1967 period" (159).

But in February 1971, Mrs. Gandhi held a snap parliamentary election—the fifth in the country's history—and the ballot boxes returned her with an overwhelming majority: such of the opposition parties as had formed an electoral alliance against her were just routed, the Old Congress among them. Undaunted by the fact that his earlier predictions had been proved wrong, our author calmly analysed the causes of the Prime Minister's success and pronounced it to be a "case of change in continuity" (201). By that he meant that the Indian voter had all along been in search of equality and social justice: he voted against the undivided Congress in 1967 because it had belied his hopes in this respect, and he voted for Indira Gandhi's New Congress in 1971 because by nationalising the bigger banks and derecognising the princes she became, it seems, for the masses the symbol of their yearning for justice and equality. All the same, our author could not completely shed his earlier views and ventured to suggest that the Jana Sangh, at least, might possibly stage a recovery in the State and local elections due to be held in 1972. He could not of course, foresee the Indo-Pakistani conflict of December 1971 and the faith which the ensuing victory inspired in Mrs. Gandhi's leadership. When the elections to the State assemblies were held

early in March 1972, the Prime Minister's party again scored an overwhelming victory and the Jana Sangh was bady mauled even in it's stronghold of Delhi. It is true, though, that the Jana Sangh polled a higher percentage of votes than it had in the parliamentary election of 1971.

The foregoing paragraphs show how the course of Indian political developments in the last few years have obliged Iqbal Narain to modify his theories from time to time. When we examine his analysis of the detailed working of the political system in the wake of the general elections of 1967, we find that he has missed some significant facts. Take the case of Bengal. As a result of the elections of February 1967 a coalition government headed by Ajoy Mukherjee, the leader of a break-away Congress group, assumed office in West Bengal. In November that same year one of the ministers, P. C. Ghosh, withdrew from the coalition claiming that he had the backing of his followers in the Legislative Assembly. If his claim was correct, it would mean that the Government had lost the majority and was not entitled to carry on. P. C. Ghosh sent his resignation directly to Governor Dharmavira. The latter accepted it and called on Ajoy Mukherjee to summon the Legislative Assembly to test whether he still enjoyed a majority. The Chief Minister refused. The Governor thereupon fixed a last date for the summoning of the Assembly by the Chief Minister. The latter now agreed to face the Assembly but at a date one week later than that fixed by the Governor. Mr. Dharmavira thereupon dismissed Ajoy Mukherjee and installed P. C. Ghosh as the Chief Minister.

Two important constitutional issues were involved in this episode. Firstly, was it proper for the Governor to permit a Minister to tender his resignation directly to himself or ought he to have asked him to submit it in the first instance to the Chief Minister? Secondly, was it proper for the Chief Minister to refuse to summon the Assembly? For after all, as the constitutional head, the Governor has to see to it that there is fair play between the parties; and a government which insisted on retaining office even after it had lost its majority would clearly be violating the rules of the game. Iqbal Narain has passed over these issues in silence.

Very similar is the author's treatment of the office of President. At one point he seemingly promises to discuss the possible repercussions of the elections of 1967 and the split in the Congress ranks on the position of the President. It was natural to expect that the President would now play a more eventful role, like the Governor in those States which witnessed the downfall of the Congress and the rise of coalition ministries. The author brings us to the threshold of the problem and then bypasses it (164). Events however indicate that the President was in some cases unwilling to exercise his constitutional discretion and remained content to do the bidding of his Council of Ministers. A fairly evident example of this was the manner in which President's rule was introduced in Uttar Pradesh in October 1970. President Giri was away at the time on a state visit to Russia. There was in Uttar Pradesh a minority government which had been carrying on precariously with the support of the Prime Minister's party, which at this juncture withdrew its support. The opposition parties claimed that they were in a position to provide an alternative government. Governor Gopala Reddy, however, reported to the Centre that there existed a state of constitutional breakdown, the only answer to which was President's rule. A messenger was despatched to Russia by special plane and returned with the proclamation of President's rule duly signed. Shortly afterwards, the President was back in the capital and was interviewed by the opposition leaders. The proclamation was withdrawn and a coalition government of the opposition parties inducted into office. The episode showed that the President had, at the behest of the Prime Minister and acting in the interests of her party, been willing to abdicate his function of being the constitutional custodian of the rules of fair play amidst party rivalries.

Iqbal Narain expresses himself a good part of the time in learned and somewhat abstruse language. To cite just one example: the succession of unstable coalition governments in the States, following the general elections of 1967, is characterised as 'politics of individuation'. To explain his meaning he gives the reader a further dose of technical language: "Politics of individuation as a *process* stands both for differentiation of contradictory and irreconcilable forces and for the synthesis into an organic unity of like-minded mutually complementary elements; both these forces

ultimately having the potential to operate on the ideological plane" (158).

The author, moreover, concerns himself by and large with narrow, rather abstract issues, and misses the salient concrete realities of the Indian political scene. To understand this, we need to go back to 1920. In that year, at the Nagpur session, Mahatma Gandhi imposed his will on the Indian National Congress and got it to accept changes in its creed and organisation. A working committee was set up, on which the Congress organisation was made to hinge, and in the composition of which the Congress president was given a large say. However, from 1920 till the achievement of independence in 1947, Mahatma Gandhi was the uncrowned king of the Congress and the Indian masses. At crucial moments it was to him that the leaders and the rank and file looked up for the decisive word. Once independence was attained, Gandhi did not put forth his hand to grasp at office—he did not even enter the Constituent Assembly. All the same, he continued to dominate the Congress and the nation, and Prime Minister Nehru took second place. On January 30, 1948, Mahatma Gandhi was removed from the scene in tragic circumstances and, from that time on, Nehru's was the dominant personality. India's defeat at the hands of the Chinese in 1962 dimmed Nehru's lustre somewhat in the nation's eyes, but still he continued to dominate the Congress. His death in 1964 appeared to provide the older leaders who controlled the Congress organisation with the opportunity to assert themselves. Indeed, Kamaraj Nadar was openly talked of as the king-maker, and was believed to have been mainly instrumental in getting Lal Bahadur Shastri elevated to the post of Prime Minister in succession to Nehru and later Indira Gandhi in succession to Shastri.

Poll reverses have been observed to have a demoralising effect on Indian politicians and been followed by defections to the winning side. The reverses suffered by the Congress in the general elections of 1967 apparently shook the faith of the older party leaders in Mrs. Gandhi's ability to win elections and enable their party to continue in office. The differences between Mrs. Gandhi and these party leaders emerged into the full glare of publicity in the presidential election of 1969. On the eve of the election, the Prime Minister in a spectacular move nationalised 14 major

banks. This secured her the support of the parties of the Left, and her candidate, V. V. Giri, succeeded though only with a fairly narrow margin. The presidential election being an indirect one, in which only the elected members of Parliament and the State assemblies participate, the outcome showed that among the upper ranks of politicians the forces ranged for and against the Prime Minister were almost evenly balanced. But the older Congress leaders had by now clung too long to power and office, and this had bred discontent among the younger men who were awaiting their turn. These rallied round Indira Gandhi. They enthusiastically joined her in creating the image of their party as one committed to secularism and economic equality. Iqbal Narain believes that this had an impact on the electorate and accounts for Mrs. Gandhi's victory in the fifth parliamentary election. At any rate, with that election and still more the State Assembly elections of 1972, we have a return to the dominance of one person and one party as in the days of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru.

Iqbal Narain believes that the Indian voter has increasingly given greater evidence of political maturity, and exercises his vote after considering the programmes of the parties. However, a more adequate analysis might show that the voter has also exhibited a certain indifference towards the question of the maintenance of standards of public morality. The Simon Commission in 1929 had this to say of the relationship between the Indian candidate and voter: "The candiate at present best utilises his scanty resources and sufficiently serves his ends if he concentrates his energies on a short electoral campaign before polling takes place. Often his activities are confined to the period between nomination and election. Once elected, he has no inducement, even if he had the means, to nurse his constituency for the next contest or to explain the course of events and the view he takes in regard to it. If he has put forward any political programme at the elections, he may ignore it in the confidence that he will not be called to account." Indian leaders at the time disputed the correctness of the Commission's view. But today, after twenty-five years of independence, an Indian historian is in a position to attempt a more detached evaluation of it.

As a political scientist, Iqbal Narain is perhaps entitled to confine himself to high, abstract issues and select his data accord-

ingly. But a student of history, such as this reviewer, is obliged to recall how in the wake of their success in the fifth parliamentary election, Mrs. Gandhi's partymen forcibly seized the headquarters of the Old Congress in Delhi, and the Prime Minister seemed either unwilling or unable to restrain them. Incidents such as these make one hesitate to agree outright with the author that it is Dawn and not Twilight.

ANTHONY D'COSTA

CARRACKS, CARAVANS AND COMPANIES: *The Structural Crisis in the European-Asian Trade in the early 17th Century;* by Niels Steensgaard, (Scandinavian Institute of Asian Studies Monograph Series No. 17). Studentlitteratur, 1973.

The discovery of the sea route to Asia, in itself, was not responsible for the disappearance of the traditional intercontinental trade routes connecting Asia and Europe. The Portuguese power and its trading company could not strike a mortal blow on the Caravan trade mechanism, for "after a set-back at the beginning of the 16th century the trade routes through the Middle East regained their former importance and at the end of the 16th century the transcontinental Caravan trade reached dimensions which must presumably be regarded as its historical culmination" (p. 9). It was the establishment of the North-east European trading companies. the Dutch *voorkompagnieen,* the East India Company and the Dutch United East India Company that made the land routes to the East fall into desuetude. The significant events that led to the triumph of the Companies and the retirement of the transcontinental traders in favour of the chartered companies and the long array of causes and consequences of the shift of balance in the European-Asian trade in the 17th century are analysed in this book with fascinating lucidity.

It is a study in structural crisis, in the sense of a confrontation between fundamentally different commercial institutional complexes. The central theme of the book is an investigation of the circumstances, causes and cardinal events that brought about an unsuspected turn in the direction of trade routes and the fall of Hormuz which under the Portuguese rule in the second half of the

16th century and the beginning of the 17th experienced its hey-day. The importance of Hormuz as a trading centre, as a redistributive centre for world's commodities is well recognized in the description of Pyrard "If the world was an egg, Hormuz would be its yolk."

Defects inherent in the system of trade followed by the Portuguese estranged the merchant communities that converged in Hormuz and made them seek other routes viz., via Kandahar. The examination of this structural change yields new and excitingly original results. The problem is approached from a different angle also by analysing the external events that led to the Persian-English attack on the Portuguese fortress of Hormuz in 1622. The investigation shows the intrinsic superiority of the North-west European trading companies over the Carracks and Caravans.

There is more of economic than historical analysis in the book. At times the details of the profit and loss accounts, and other minor problems which have little or no direct bearing on the thesis, lead the reader to the verge of boredom and despair. But that does not, in any manner, minimise the value of this study. The critical scholarship paraded through the pages of this book is simply astonishing. The volume of original archival sources collected from England, France, Italy Spain and Portugal and the extent of literature consulted will certainly prove the worth of this study. But what is more important here, to be sure, is not the profusion of sources utilized, but the critical objectivity achieved in interpreting them. The book can be regarded as a worthy contribution to the existing literature on the commercial history of the world.

T. K. Ravindran

THE COLLAPSE OF BRITISH POWER, by Correlli Barnett, Published by Eyre Methuen, London, pp. XII + 643. Price £ 5.

This learned work recounts, in a critical manner, the story of a most momentous period in the history of Great Britain—1918 to 1945, which witnessed the decay and collapse of the British power, if not the decline and fall of the British empire. This decay had eaten into the vitals of the great and imposing Empire and showed manifestations of weakness and paralysis in the organization of the state. As a result, factors that contributed to the strength and

affluence in material and mental spheres, were generally permitted to contract and go in declivity. The author gives a thorough and almost suffocatingly fact-packed analysis of the long array of misguided policies followed by the successive governments in Britain during this period which sought to preserve or extend the national strength and allowed the empire to slid into disaster. His merciless scholastic suffumigation causes many a politician and busy romantic of Britain who believed that morality rather than power ought to govern relations between states, to come out as the approvers in the nation's debacle. Mr. Barnett attributes the causes of this collapse to the yielding readiness of the British statesmen to appease the wrath of other nations. The pacifist tendency of the British politics is subjected here to hypercritical treatment. "The very bedrock of the national character" says the author, "had been crumbled since the eighteenth century. Whereas the pre-Victorian Englishman had been renowned for his quarrelsome temper and his willingness to back his argument with his fists—or his feet—now the modern British, like the elderly, shrank from conflict or unpleasantness of any kind" (p. 241). One cannot certainly ignore the sentiment behind this statement when one is aware of the fact that the British discharged the 'White Men's burden' only with their fists and feet rather than with soft sentimentalism. But could this national character have been maintained constant for all time, even if the British statesmen desisted from moralising and tried to strengthen their fists and feet? The conceptual basis of the thesis is weak but the material bases from which the analysis of the problem of the collapse proceeds are strong. The author's success lies in his locating the 'whys' behind the deeply pacifistic and escapist public opinion that permitted the British government to handle the national and international policies in a feeble and nerveless way. The economic, technological, political—national and international—and strategical situations in England could not be, in the changed conditions of the twentieth century, guided and controlled by Britain alone, without reference to other powers. Mr. Barnett rightly recognises this when he said. "And it was shortage of resources—economic and financial—which posed by far the gravest question of all for the British Government after the fall of France in 1940. For whether or not England escaped defeat at the hands of the enemy, the mere continuance of the war would itself, inevitably, inexorably, bring

independent British power to an end through national bankruptcy and economic ruin. It was a situation which no British Government had to face since England first emerged as a great power in the wars against Louis XIV" (p. 586).

It is true that victory for Britain was not synonymous with the preservation of British power and that her emphasis on victory was not with reference to the maintenance or extension of her power. But what was the cognizable alternative to victory Barnett says: "Churchill and his government quite deliberately, if in their view inevitably, chose to sacrifice England's existence as an independent power, a power living and waging war on her resources, for the sake of victory. It was the most romantically noble gesture of them all: the climax of British altruism in foreign policy" (p. 588). Plain commonsense would suggest that Britain, shorn off all power is any day preferable to Britain defeated and crushed under the boot of the German invader. Inspite of victory, it is true, that Britain had to bear the pangs of becoming "a warrior satellite" of the United States. With a heavy heart the author notes, "The British power had quietly vanished amid the stupendous events of the Second World War, like a ship-of-the-line going down unperceived in the smoke and confusion of battle."

It is no use blaming one individual or a group for what have taken place in England or in other countries during the period. Time is a great leveller and no man or nation can escape its hands perpetually engaged in reshaping and recasting existing things.

The nostalgic feelings for the good old order apart, the book gives a penetrating analysis of the major developments connected with the economy, politics, imperial policy, grand strategy, defence, industrial policy, technology, education etc. of Great Britain during the inter-war period.

The division of the book into six parts without providing for chapters, appears to be rather unnatural and cumbersome. The long-winding, unending discussions in part V. (pp. 237-577) certainly pose the prospect of a rough crossing for the reader. Nevertheless the inquiring student will revisit this mine of solid scholarship for what it contains and seeks to offer.

T. K. Ravindran

THE ROOTS OF ANCIENT INDIA, by Walter A Fairservis, Jr., pp. xxv + 482, Allen and Unwin, 1971.

Fairservis' monograph ties together the theme of many of his articles and papers, on the proto-history of the Indian subcontinent. The monograph begins with the early Stone Age and terminates with the emergence of Buddhism which is associated with the urbanisation of the Ganges valley. The special contribution of the book relates to the neolithih and chalcolithic settlements on the borderlands of Iran and the Indian sub-continent, which at the end of the fourth millennium B.C. and the start of the third millennium were to be the precondition to the Indus valley urbanisation.

Fairservis discusses at length the crucial sites of South-eastern Iran, Baluchistan and the Makran, particularly the latter which he connects with the process of urbanisation. His discussion of sites such as Amri and pre-Harappan Kot Diji, and those of the Las Bela area, is both detailed and provocative. His major contention is that such sites demonstrate the successful adaptation of agriculture to the Indus valley environment and were therefore of substantial importance in the change from peasant communities to towns. His analysis of nucleated and extended village settlements in Baluchistan suggests mainfold possibilities for further enquiry particularly in association with the general question of preconditions to urban evolution. In itself the analysis seems somewhat hypothetical, possibly because of the limited evidence, but if such analyses could be suggested for all areas where there is a nuclear town site surrounded by village settlements it may well lead to an interesting shift in the priorities of excavated evidence.

The emergence of civilisation in the Indus valley according to the author was due to a combination of three main factors: that the Indus plain was capable of supporting urban centres which links up with his discussion on the successful adaptation of agriculture, that there was some commingling of Iranian (from Bampur, Khurab and Seistan) and indigenous elements in Baluchistan which became the basis for the innovatory trends so necessary to civilisation, and that there was a social readiness for civilisation. In the last rather ambiguous phrase he includes a variety of factors but gives special emphasis to the migration of peoples from the hills to the Indus plains (either because of a rise in popu-

lation or because of a sub-division in land holdings), the contact being maintained with the highlands possibly through trade and itinerant smiths and the intensification of the traditional village organisation. These factors are then linked with the Harappa cultural style in which he emphasises the strong central control. The preconditions to Harappan urbanisation in the Punjab and Gujarat are not given the same detailed consideration.

The decline of the Indus civilisation is treated comparatively briefly. For the post-Harappan period there is at best a summary of the information and the general theories concerning the identity of various archaeological cultures, such as those of the Copper Hoards and the Painted Grey Ware, with the Aryans. There are a number of useful appendices such as the extensive list of Radio Carbon dates for south Asia and the population of the Indus civilisation and also the population estimates for selected sites in the Indo-Iranian borderlands.

There is considerable emphasis on the ecological factor and this is a comparatively new dimension to the study of archaeology in India. The understanding of a transition from one type of society to another involves a consideration of the environmental factors. These Fairservis relates to the material culture with good effect.

The excursus into 'the historical dawn' closes the book—and perhaps just as well, as here it seems, that the author is out of his depth, if the definition of *kshatriya* (p. 378) is an indication.

The most useful portions of the book are the chapters on the pre-conditions to and the evolution of, the Indus civilisation, the area which Fairservis knows best and on which his own major experience is based. Possibly if he had concentrated only on this area and tried to co-relate his hypotheses more closely with the material remains, the result would have been more rewarding. Nevertheless Fairservis' study is different from most books on Indian pre and proto-history in that, apart from the documentation of information, it does attempt to take the archaeologist onto the final stage—that of interpreting the information in an effort to describe the type of society which produced a particular culture.

ROMILA THAPAR

SOCIALISM IN INDIA (edited by B. R. Nanda) Vikas Publications, Delhi, 1972, p. 299, Rs. 35/-.

This work is an outcome of two seminars held on 'Socialism in India 1919-39' by the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi in November 1968 and October 1969. The organizers of the seminars selected the inter-war period because they believed that Gandhi's leadership had given to these two decades 'an underlying unity' (preface v). The discussions following the papers were 'stimulating' (p. vi) but it is a pity that they have not been included probably for want of space.

The study of the idea of Socialism and its development in relation to Indian politics is likely to throw light on the content and meaning of the Freedom Movement in India. And the nine papers included in this book cover, inter alia, the influence of the Communist International on Indian Politics, the interaction of the British labour and the Indian left, the nature of the Agrarian Movements, and the effects of Socialist ideas on literature in some of the Indian languages.

Shri B. R. Nanda, the Editor, provides in the first paper a lucid and broad historical survey of the Socialist ideas from the Russian Revolution to the formation of Trade Unions, and the Congress Socialist Party at Patna in May 1934. Nanda thinks that the Russian Revolution which had provided a vision to the intelligentsia in India, was rejected by the Congress hierarchy which looked to Gandhi for leadership—Gandhi, 'the creative leader of Nationalism in History' (p. 16) whose methods yielded dividends, while those of M. N. Roy who misjudged the political situation ended in futility. But he regards Jawaharlal Nehru's view in the formulation and propagation of Socialist ideas as crucial. Dr. Vijay Sen Budhraj offers a refreshing and tightly-packed account of the impact of the Communist International on Indian politics which has been in the long run marginal, though M. N. Roy played the key-role. But the reason why the Communist movement could not gather strength in India was (the author maintains) due to the dominent influence of Gandhi over the Indian masses, and the Russian leaders' confusing the 'emancipation of the working class with the greatness of their state' (p. 39). Zafar Imam examines on the basis of vernacular papers (usually neglected by Indian scholars) the Soviet influence on Indian poli-

tics which is evident in the concept of self-determination, in the phenomenal rise of prices involving 1.5 million workers in 1920 (p. 47) in the Workers' and Peasents' Party activities in Bombay and Calcutta (p. 61) and in the emergence of organizations like the All India Socialist Youth Congress which gave an impetus to the Indian National Movement, though he concedes that the Muslim Nationalist opinion was not sympathetic to the Russian revolution because of the anti-religious orientation of the Bolshevik policy. The author shows that by 1929 anti-imperialism became the hallmark of the Indian National movement.

In a learned and meticulous paper on 'British Labour and the Indian Left' Dr. Partha Sarathi Gupta analyses the interaction of the British Labour Movement and the Indian Labour and Socialist Movements (1919-1939). Dr. Gupta writes, "The most important achievement was to organise a tour of India by three British Labour Politicians (of whom two were ex-M.P.s—Ellen Wilkinson, Leonard Matters, and Monica Whately' (p. 109). What is not mentioned is that V. K. Krishna Menon was also a member of this delegation, and acted as its Secretary, and the members of the delegation expressed their gratitude to Menon 'for a considerable research involved in the preparation of the historical part' of the Report. Furthermore his judgment seems questionable: 'The Indian Left was getting psychologically prepared to fight Britain even when she was at war with Fascism. The seeds of 1942 and the Indian National Army were sown'. The answer to this is post-hoc and not propter-hoc. In a cogently argued and illuminating article, P. C. Joshi discusses Jawaharlal Nehru's role and examines the crucial factors why the Socialist ideas did not gain potential strength. Nehru had the vision, but was not able to create the supporting organisation (which really means funds, an influential press and a net-work of local machinery) to carry the ideas to the masses, and nowhere the ideas were given an ideological or institutional form. Thus the intellectual framework of Indian socialism was evolved in a rudimentary form. Dr. Bimla Prasad seeks to establish an objective co-relation between anti-imperial approach towards international affairs and socialism and shows that India's anti-imperialist strength merged with an unprecedented upsurge against imperialism and colonialism.

Dr. Bipan Chandra restores in a candid and learned way to its historical context the revolutionary terrorist movement of Northern

India during 1920's. The author attempts to assess critically not the role but the social base and the ideological make-up of those youngmen who were not 'mindless patriots', but who had acquired the Socialist understanding of society, the State, Nationalism, Imperialism and Revolution. These youngmen belonged to the lower middle class and were committed to Socialism, but did not go beyond nationalism; and the fruits of their sacrifices were reaped by the Congress. Bipan Chandra offers valid reasons for their failure which he attributes to their pre-occupation with individual action, and apathy to the total mechanism of revolutionary political action. The portrait of these revolutionaries is largely based on memoirs and autobiographies, which are reconstructions in retrospect, and are regarded as low grade type of historical evidence. It is perhaps misleading to put ideological labels on Bhagat Singh and his like (p. 177) because they are conspicuous for a certain temper of mind, not for the propagation of a line of any kind. Binay Bhushan Chaudhri offers a learned piece on the Agrarian Movements in Bihar and Bengal (1919-1945). This is one of those examples, where local leadership being disillusioned with Gandhi's methods, embarked on a more sustained and revolutionary activity. And, finally, there are papers on the impact of socialist literature on Marathi and Telugu literature.

Socialism is a vague word open to various interpretations. Does it mean social ownership of means of production or social equality? What will be its organisational form, highly centralized form or democratic type? These questions remain unanswered, and the word Socialism has been taken for granted. There is no cross reference here to Socialism in other countries. This work is basically a historical account of the origin and development of Socialism in India, and the crucial role has been ascribed to the role of ideas of certain leaders. The total impression left on the mind is that the propagation of Socialism in India was, the work of ideologues to whom ideas have a more inspiring import than material force. If his conclusion is sound, then it is difficult to reconcile it with the generally accepted notion that Socialism does not penetrate from above but from below. This probably explains why the Socialist movement in India did not gain the force and the intensity of a revolutionary movement. Socialism is never the work of the idealogues only. The Socialist theory does not subsist, so to speak, 'in the air' it does not emerge from the society as a flower from a

bud. In socialist terms the problem before our leaders was not simply to interpret socialism which some of them like Nehru and M. N. Roy tried to do in their own way (though they did not formulate it ideologically) but to change society. And the possibility of producing a change is dependent on certain necessary conditions, on the reaching of a critical point which precipitate a cataclysm.

It is the class consciousness of the proletariat which precedes and prepares the Socialist revolution, though historical understanding is provided by scholars in the initial stages. The vanguard party is the necessary carrier of the proletarian class-consciousness. This work does not analyse the state of contemporary society which should explain why Socialism as a movement, if not as a creed, did not assume wider dimensions in the body politic of India; it does not unfold the different elements and their interactions in society which impeded the revolutionary movement. P. C. Joshi has hinted at some of the factors responsible for the set-back caused to the Socialist movement, and Zafar Imam on some of the reactions of the Indian nationalists towards the Socialist ideological methods, but the question what were the conflicting tendencies, resistances and rival forces—nationalist, liberal and governmental—which jeopardised the growth of socialist movement, remains unanswered by the participants in the seminar. Could one say then that the contributors to this volume over-looked the role and psychology of the peasantry and working classes in the contemporary society which is like playing music without instruments? Could one go a step further and add that the views of leaders to whom the cause of Socialism was dear were conditioned by the bourgeois mentality which they had begun to acquire? Did not Marx say that neither thought nor language forms an autonomous domain but is fashioned by the voluntary actions of the contemporaries and long accepted ideas reflecting contemporaries' limited horizon. Could one conclude then that this work is largely a burgeoise interpretation of the Socialist ideas and movements? That perhaps would be a facile generalisation. This collection, has considerable merit of comprehensiveness and scholarship, and, it is a great convenience to have so much put together in a single volume.

V. N. DATTA

COINAGE OF THE SĀTAVĀHANAS AND COINS FROM EXCAVATIONS, edited by Ajay Mitra Shastri, published by the Nagpur University, 1972; pp. 142 with a few plates: price Rs. 40.00.

The volume under review comprises the proceedings of two seminars organised in connection with the 59th Annual Session of of the Nagpur University in November, 1970. There are eight papers in Section I (Coinage of the Sātavāhanas) and four in Section II (Coins from Excavations).

We are glad to note that the volume exhibits the care its editor has devoted on it. Thanks to him, it is not full of misprints and other blemishes as such volumes, printed in our country, are often found to be. The reviewer congratulates Dr. Shastri and feels for him as a fellow-sufferer having conducted sixteen such inter-university seminars and edited and published their proceedings during the past seven and half years. It is no secret that only a few papers presented at a seminar are of any importance, that many of them recapitulate more or less known facts and that a few exhibit a tendency to theorising and a lack of critical acumen. It is also known that errors of language and facts are fairly wide-spread while a number of the papers cannot be printed without thoroughly revising the authors' language. The difficulty of a conscientious editor is considerable because he may not like to publish something which is below the standard and to show a participant's scholarship in a poor light.

It is a matter of satisfaction to us that parts of the volume under review are quite informative and interesting. The difference between seminars on a numismatic and a general subject is that it is possible for the participants in the former to bring to light new coins and types, although here also the decipherment of the legend and determination or identification of a symbol may be erroneous. In any case, we are glad to note that a few new or rare coin types are noticed in the volume under review. The most interesting among them are the square copper coin (1.85 cms., 77.5 grs.) of one of the earlier Śātakarnis said to be manufactured in the punch-marked technique and Śāta's east copper coin

(2.2 cms., 100 grs.) bearing what has been described as a female figure and identified with the goddess Lakshmī. See K. D. Bajpai's paper, pp. 27 ff, Plates I, Nos. 1-2.

Among articles which we read with some interest falls P. R. K. Prasad's 'Silver Portrait Coins of the Sātavāhanas' (pp. 68 ff). The legend, on the reverse of the silver coins of Vāsishṭhīputra Śātakarṇi and Gautamīputra Yajña-Śātakarṇi were read by me respectively as—(1) *Arahaṇasha Vāhiṭṭimākaṇasha Tiru-Hāta-kaṇisha* and (2) *Arahaṇasha Gotami-putasha Hiru-Yaña-Hāta-kaṇisha*. Recently it has been suggested that what I read as *ha* and *sha* following the footsteps of Rapson, Bühler and other *pūrva-sūris*, should be read respectively as *cha* and *ku* so that the reverse legend on Vāsisṭṭhīputra's coin would read *Arachaṇaku Vāhiṭṭi-mākaṇaku Tiru-Chātakaṇiku*. Prasad accepts my reading of *ha* and my critics' reading of *ku* so that the legend stands as *Araha-ṇaku Vāhiṭṭi-mākaṇaku Tiru-Hātakaṇiku* in his reading. I am sorry that I cannot accept such modifications in the reading. The change of *sa* or *śa* to *ha* in the Southern Prakrit is demonstrated by *Hakusiri* (Sanskrit *Śaktiśrī*) in the Nanaghat inscriptions in which it is impossible read *Chakusiri*. Cf. *Hāla*=*Śāta*, *hiru*=*śrī*. The letter *ha* in the case of the legend does not resemble *cha*, but very closely resembles one of the forms of *ha* as found in the Jaggayyapeta inscriptions and the Kondamudi and Mayidavolu plates. Likewise, the use of *sha* for the 6th case-ending in the Southern Prakrit is demonstrated by the Bhattiprolu inscriptions in which it is not possible to read it as *ku*; cf. *Kurasha*, *Samana-dāsho*, *Shīhagothiya*; also *majusaṁ* and *majusha*. It has to be noticed that the letters *k* and *r* have lower limbs of the same shape so that the medial sign of *u* when attached to *ka* would have resembled the sign in *ru* in *tiru* and *hiru* in the reverse legends on the coins of Vāsishṭhīputra Śātakarni and Gautamīputra Yajña-Śātakarni. This is not the case and it shows that the proposed reading of *sha* as *ku* is improbable. Moreover, the language of the legends being Prakrit, a Prakrit suffix is more expected than a Dravidian one.

The volume is a welcome addition to our numismatic literature.

D. C. Sircar

LAKSHMINATH BEZBAROA: THE SAHITYARATHI OF ASSAM by Maheshwar Neog (Ed.), (Gauhati University, 1972).

Lakshminath Bezbaroa, more familiar in Assam by the sobriquet Sahityarathi, 'a chariot—borne warrior in the field of letters', was a pioneer and in more ways than one. Primarily he was a prose writer, albeit he composed some beautiful lyrics and songs too. What was more, he wrote, to the annoyance of many, (including the poet Rabindranath Tagore, to whose sister he was married), in his native Assamese—discarding the more sophisticated, and culturally advanced, Bengali. His prose style is inimitable, racy and easily readable. His medium was fiction, drama, folk tales, essays on literary, cultural—even political—subjects, studies of outstanding religious personalities of Assam. By no means an uncommon achievement was his own autobiography—'Mor Jiwan-Sowaran'—rated as 'one of the finest works' in Indian literature.

The book is an anthology, a compendium of articles written on the occasion of Lakshminath Bezbaroa's birth centenary. Typical of the genre, it suffers from a basic unevenness of the fare doled out. Thus such well-turned out essays as those by Professors Suniti Kumar Chatterji and Lalit Kumar Barua mingle with trite compositions by his two daughters, Aruna Mukerjea and Ritha Devi and his sister, Dipika. Another difficulty, and this again is perhaps endemic to all such works, is a remarkable lack of any degree of editing or critical appraisal—without exception, most of the pieces are sickeningly repetitions and unduly adulatory in tone. A little more care too could have been taken in the reproduction of photographs and more specifically the one on the dust-cover, a more composed demeanour might have brought out the man better.

Such works as the one under review do no doubt have their place in our scheme of things and centenaries provide appropriate enough occasions for their appearance. One wonders though if their usefulness could not be further enhanced by a conscious, if determined effort at providing an appraisal—agonising though it may prove—and a definitive assessment that would place their subject-matter at its true worth, and in its genuine, historical perspective.

PARSHOTAM MEHRA

FROM GURU NANAK TO MAHARAJA RANJIT SINGH: ESSAYS IN SIKH HISTORY, by J. S. Grewal, (Guru Nanak University, 1972).

This slender volume of 18 essays big and small, ranging all the way from 3-4 pages to 13-14, and showing a distinct imprint of having been composed at different periods of time afford a panoramic view of Sikh history. There are three principal themes—Guru Nanak, Guru Gobind Singh and 18th century Sikh polity—with such miscellany as Cunningham as an historian of the Sikhs and Toynbee's interpretation of Sikh history thrown in on the side. By and large they are useful bits giving an interesting, if at times controversial, interpretation of men and affairs. Professor Grewal is knowledgeable and writes with facility.

Three principal criticisms may be made. At the outset the author, or someone in his place, could have with advantage edited the work, taking away most of its often-times annoying repetitiousness and arranging the pieces under separate heads. And ideally for the reader, if one may add, preceding each with a brief introduction. The whole would thus fall into a well-order ed volume instead of a cluster, loosely held together between two covers. A second point stems mainly from the first. In most research, foot-notes instead of being lumped together at the end, where their usefulness is minimal, are carried alongside the text. This makes it easier to follow the argument and co-relate it to the evidence that sustains it. And finally proof-reading and the printer's howlers. These are literally a legion: on one page, by no means exceptional, this reviewer counted five! Somehow one has the uncomfortable feeling that the book was hurriedly conceived—and even more hurriedly rushed through the press.

Such blemishes however, and they are trite at best, detract from the credence and authenticity that normally go with a research publication and that too sponsored, or under-written, by a University.

PARSHOTAM MEHRA

INDIAN CIVILIZATION: THE FIRST PHASE, PROBLEMS OF A SOURCE-BOOK, transactions of the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Volume 17 (General Editor V. K. Gokak), Edited and Introduced by S. C. Malik, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla, 1971, pages 305 + xxii, Rs. 40.00.

The Central Ministry of Education and Social Welfare has among its projects for the Fourth Five Year Plan one on "A sourcebook of Ancient Indian and Asian Civilization". The project was assigned to the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla, which arranged a preliminary seminar, in the third week of September, 1970, to discuss general problems concerning the planning of a sourcebook for the ancient period of Indian Civilization. The present work includes the papers read and a summary of the discussions held at the seminar. The champions of academic freedom may not like the idea of the government dictating the work to be done. But projects of such magnitude cannot be completed by individuals; it is only through institutional endeavour that their financial and organizational problems can be managed. What should legitimately be objected to is the eventuality of the government using the projects to propagate the official view, if any. There is nothing wrong if the government asks the scholars to investigate a problem, but, if it points out what to say, then the scholars may refuse to oblige.

In his introductory remarks S. C. Malik speaks of the romance and fascination of writing a history of Indian civilization, 'the fruitful lessons about human history' which, its 'patterns and generalizations' can teach and the necessity for giving 'something meaningful to the dwindling students of humanities' to wean them and the lay 'from chauvinistic and parochial thoughts'. It is a fact that history, like other subjects of art and humanities, does not have any utilitarian purpose, but, it can be helpful in building up the mind and mood of the people.

Malik criticises 'a large majority of all shades of historians' for shutting their eyes to any effort to use concepts, theories or frames of reference. No doubt, absolute objectivity may have only a philosophical existence. But, if hundred percent objectivity cannot be achieved (I do not know why Malik chooses to single out history alone as liable to subjectivism, when, what to say of humanities, even social sciences, such as sociology, are not free

from some amount of subjectivism), it does not mean that we should reject the ideal of objectivity altogether. Ideals, like morals, serve to improve and uplift the actual performance.

It has often been pointed that every generation has to write its own history. Historical research consists in asking significant questions. The history has to be in the conceptual framework relevant to the generation writing the history which employs idioms known to it. If this amounts to subjectivism, it is not to be given up. The task of a historian is to determine facts: a researcher may stop his work after determining the nature of isolated facts; but, the process of historical interpretation goes beyond it. If the historian is accused for not philosophising or for not generalising with a view to find out general laws, then the historian will blissfully admit his inability. He does attempt generalisations of a different nature, but, in view of the limitations of evidence, will submit that the new role is beyond his competence and may gladly be taken up by a sociologist or a philosopher.

In preparing such a sourcebook a vital consideration is the background of the readers for whom it is meant. The nature and content of the information to be compiled in the sourcebook will depend upon the extent to which the readers are already acquainted with the subject.

Another ticklish question in this connexion is the scope of the term civilization. There is no single definition of the term acceptable to all concerned. One can have some idea of the different shades of opinion from the six papers included in the present volume under the section, 'Approaches to Civilization'. It has generally been felt that 'a comprehensive definition of civilization touches almost all the fields of human achievements'. In view of its wide scope, civilization covers diverse and varied aspects and hence is a fit subject for interdisciplinary approach of study.

There is no fixed rule to determine the share of different disciplines involved in a multi-disciplinary study. Apparently there is no question of a democratic equality with mathematical precision. The role of the disciplines is in accordance with their importance in the investigation of a particular problem. The subject "Indian Civilization: the first phase" belongs to a well-defined time and space. The study pertains to the past and hence is a part of history. The historical method, with all its limitations,

will be the major discipline for the study of this subject. The multidisciplinary approach is intended to supplement the main discipline, to make up for its shortcomings and gaps. But, the other disciplines, with all their importance, have only a subsidiary role.

In studying Indian civilization the vexed question of periodization and chronology has often been discussed but probably without an answer acceptable to all. In the seminar the general opinion was in favour of using the term 'first phase' in place of 'ancient period'. The end-date was roughly taken to be A.D. 1200, but, as the chronological divisions for north India may not suit the landmarks in south India, it was suggested that scholars entrusted with the project may alter it to A.D. 1300 according to the requirements of their case. The question has been discussed in the section on 'geographical and chronological limits'.

Another significant question in this context is the coverage of other countries which came under the impact of Indian culture. The original project, as conceived by the Ministry of Education, envisaged equal emphasis on Indian civilization and Asian civilization. Even in this seminar, though it was confined to Ancient India, the problems concerning Ancient Asia often cropped up before the participants. A book on ancient Indian civilization must give some space to describe the form and contact of Indian civilization with other countries of Asia. There cannot be any dispute about it; the only difference of opinion can be about the manner of description and the space to be assigned. In the present volume eleven articles in the section "Other Asian countries and India" survey the sources for different aspects of culture in these countries. But, considering the fact that the seminar was intended to discuss the problems in the preparation of a sourcebook, some of these papers could have found a place in a modified and abridged form in the sourcebook itself; they do not have any justification for being included in the present volume.

General problems about the preparation of the sourcebook, have been discussed by some of our senior scholars in the two sections "The Perspective" and "Difficulties". It is not possible to discuss, in the limited space of this review, different views on individual points and problems. They contain useful advice which people who plan the sourcebook must keep in mind.

More businesslike suggestions about the sourcebook are to be found in the section entitled "structure". A. D. Pusalkar, Sudhibhushan Bhattacharya, A. Sharma and R. Thapar give a table of contents for the proposed sourcebook, B. N. Mukherjee, B. Saraswati and V. N. Misra discuss problems of methodology.

In the seminar it was generally felt that the sourcebook has to be selective in its treatment; it cannot possibly be an exhaustive catalogue of all the sources. Further, there should be a judicious blending of references to sources or quotations from sources, narrative and bibliography. There may be a general introduction to the sourcebook in which most of the topics which V. K. Gokak lists for the first part of his plan of a sourcebook (pp. 114-118) may be covered. The sourcebook proper may be divided into a number of sections and sub-sections to cover the topics and subtopics coming within the scope of civilization. The sources of references are to be arranged in a chronological order and, to avoid repetition of information, subsequent references may be mentioned or quoted only to the extent they give additional information. The compilation of sources may be done in such a manner as to reflect the diversity of sources and regional variations. For every section and subsection there should be a separate introduction which should aim at 'scientific analysis and integrative descripton'. A selected bibliography may be added as an aid to further reading.

The reporting of the discussions has been done in a new but useful way. "Only the main points and issues arising out of these discussions have been briefly noted, without resorting to a verbatim record of trivial corrections and objections to specific points in the papers, unless these contributed to the essential involved. The names of the speakers, of who-said-what, has also thus been dropped".

The volume, however, includes a number of papers (pp. 151-289) in the section "Utilization of sources: Examples", most of which should not have found a place in it. They generally demonstrate the usefulness of different types of sources; but, this is unnecessary argument for an obvious point. The occasion for these articles is not when we discuss how to plan a sourcebook but actually when we prepare it. Some of these articles can be used as introductory articles in the sourcebook.

The seminar has no doubt served a useful purpose. We have at last made a serious effort to complete a project of great magnitude. A large number of scholars sat together and squarely faced the problems and difficulties involved. Obviously nobody can expect unanimity on all the problems, but, there was a sincere effort to come to some decision. It is a good beginning and those who are associated with the preparation of the sourcebook will find the volume of great use to them.

LALLANJI GOPAL

KATHERINE MAYO AND INDIA, by Manoranjan Jha, (Peoples' Publishing House, New Delhi, 1971), 128 pp.

Dr. Manoranjan Jha has done a commendable job of writing and research in digging out information on an extremely controversial and anti-Indian book, published in U.S.A. in 1927. Katherine Mayo's famous (or infamous) *Mother India* created a sensation in India when it came out. Mahatma Gandhi called it 'A Drain Inspectors' Report' that succeeded in prejudicing the minds of Americans against India.

In five short, but well—documented chapters, Dr. Jha has convincingly answered the questions—what motivated her to write the book, what were the sources from which she drew her inspiration, what was the impact of the book on English and American public opinion and what reaction did it produce in India. Dr. Jha's judgment and conclusions are based on a study of all available sources, in particular he had the opportunity to study the private papers of Katherine Mayo lodged in the Historical and Manuscript Division of the Yale University Library in U.S.A.

Katherine Mayo was an American journalist and writer. She was sixty years of age when *Mother India* was published and was chosen to visit India as a part of the British Government's policy to have influential American writers who were generally hostile to subject people struggling for freedom, to visit India and to produce books and write articles to educate American public opinion in favour of the British administration. Her book *The Isles of Fear* (published in 1925) attracted the attention of British authorities and the choice fell on her as the best instrument to provide the American public prompt and interesting intelligence on Indian affairs.

Two years after the *Isles of Fear,* followed *Mother India* and was given wide circulation not only in U.S.A. but Britain and India.

In *Mother India,* she made a scathing attack on Hindu society and culture, Indian national movement and Indian national leaders. She chose Mahatma Gandnhi as the target of her attack as he was an arch-enemy of the British. As the government's strategy was evolving clearly, she had nothing to say against the Muslims. In fact the Government was anxious to get the Muslims to welcome her book.

Dr. Jha further shows how the Rockefeller Foundation was made to take interest in her visit to India. It was thought that she could effectively present a picture of the menace that India posed to the health of the world. This explains why she was so eloquent on depicting ugly and unhealthy sectors of Indian life.

Her primary motives was clear—to prevent Americans from developing any sympathy for Indian constitutional advance and to create an impression on their minds that Kipling was right when he sang:

> "Oh, East is East, and West is West,
> and never the twain shall meet...."

The book did do damage to India, Americans wrote critically of India; even the most advanced Liberals in Britain began to hesitate to advocate constitutional reforms for India, the reaction in India was different from what the Government officials had expected. There was widespread and bitter criticism of Miss Mayo, hundreds of meetings were held in protest. *Mother India* had a very adverse effect on the development of cordial relations between Americans and Indians. Books such as *Uncle Sham: Being the Strange Tale of a Civilization Run Amok* came out, in retaliation. Some newspapers even suggested that American goods be boycotted by Indians.

Dr. Jha's is a lucid but objective presentation of the whole story of how *Mother India* came to be written and the varying reactions it produced. Though it has long since passed into the realm of poisonous propaganda, a study such as the one under review, is refreshingly new.

AMBA PRASAD

A HISTORY OF SOUTH KANARA, by K. V. Ramesh, published by the Karnatak University, Dharwar, 1970; pages 26 + 340 including Bibligraphy and Index, with a few maps and plates; price Rs. 30.00.

The history of South Kanara is more or less of local interest and Dr. Ramesh was specially interested in it because he hails from the area. The choice of the subject was bold since there was, in the field, another work on the same subject by another historian of South Kanara. It is the *History of Tuluva* (*Ancient Karnataka*, Vol. I, 1936) by the late Dr. B. A. Saletore. However the young author deserves credit for his performance. We are glad to note that he has succeeded in dealing with the epigraphical evidence more thoroughly and satisfactorily.

Besides the chapters entitled 'Introduction' (pp. xvi-xxvi), 'Beginnings of History' (pp. 1-34) and 'Conclusion' (pp. 308-13), the subject is treated by the author under the following heads: Ch. III—The Early Āḷupas (pp. 35-96); Ch. IV—The Medieval Āḷupas (pp. 97-136); Ch. V—Hoysaḷa Occupation and the Last Āḷupa Rulers (pp. 137-49); Ch. VI—Under Vijayanagara (pp. 150-240); Ch. VII—Administration (pp. 241-68); Ch. VIII—Social and Economic Conditions (pp. 269-91) and Ch. IX—Religions (pp. 292-307). The author's collection of data is satisfactory and his treatment of the subject sober.

We have noticed only a few cases of carelessness; e.g. 'Ray Chaudhuri (sic): *Political History of India* (*sic*)', p. 8, note 24) and 'Rayachaudhari (sic): *Political History of Ancient India*' (p. 38, note 17); '*Raghuvaṁśa*, Chapter (sic) 4 (p. xxiii); 'Satiyaputo which is mentioned as such in the Girnar and Kalsi versions, as Satiyapute in the Jaugaḍa version and as Satiyaputra in the Shahbazgarhi and Manshera (sic) versions of the second rock edict' (pp. 1-2); etc.

It may be noticed that the reading of the Kalsi version is not *Satiyaputo* but *Sātiyaputa* which seems to go against those who are inclined to associate *Satiya°* with *Satya°*. And this doubt seems to be supported by the fact that, in the Girnar version of Aśoka's edicts, Sanskrit *tya* is modified to *cha* and not to *tiya*. The author should have noticed that the Erragudi version gives *Satīkapute*

which also goes against Sanskrit *Satya*.° The Kalsi and Erragudi versions, taken together, suggest that the Sanskrit form could be *Śātika*° or better *Śāntika* (*Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XXXII, p. 11, note 4). It should also be remembered that the king of the Kerala people was called *Keralaputra* (Greek *Kerobothra*) so that *Śātikaputra* or *Śāntikaputra* would indicate the king of the Śātika or Śāntika people. The location of the dominions of this ruler to the north of the territories of the Keralaputra seems to be justified. For some coins tentatively attributed to the said people, see Sircar, *Studies in Indian Coins*, p. 133 and note 1, p. 143.

We recommend the interesting book to the students of South Indian history.

D. C. Sircar

THE ST. THOMAS CHRISTIAN ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF INDIA, edited by George Menachery, Vol. II, 1973, 8 + 218, Price Rs 175.00.

The St. Thomas Christian Encyclopaedia of India is a well brought out and large sized volume. But size, to be sure, is the poorest test of a man's ability or worth; much less is it the determinant of the value of a book.

A well authenticated history of Christianity in India had been a long-felt need; but the difficulty in the venture has been heightened either for want of original sources or for the availability of only scrappy information and undependable secondary sources. Tradition that has spun round many a problem in respect of Christianity in India has in no small measure added to the spirals of the difficulty. The present work is no doubt a bold venture, though it failed to achieve its noble aim in so far as it could not claim comprehensiveness. First, the title itself is more attractive than accurate with reference to the contents. It is suffused from beginning to end with a bias in favour of writing for readers of the Catholic fold. Due to lack of objectivity it has thus sunk low in sentimentalism and attachment, with the result that, the editor has dismissed totally from account denominations and groups which

have also played important roles in the spread of Christian ideals, or explained away in a simplistic manner the contributions of these protestant churches. In doing this he rode rough-shod over many consequential phases in the history of the St. Thomas Christians. An objective and non-partisan approach would have given the book a well-merited welcome. It was necessary to be a little more careful in regard to selection of topics and delimitation of their scope. Second, the topics incorporated in the volume have not been alphabetically arranged as they should be, according to accepted norms of an encyclopaedia. Referencing is thus an uphill task. This difficulty is aggravated by lack of an exhaustive index. And for that matter, though the book is a veritable reservoir of information, its utility is extremely limited; the reader is apt to turn desperate if he tries to locate a particular topic.

The thesis regarding the origin of St. Thomas Christianity as presented in the work is patchy and a jumble of disjointed phases. Recent works like that of Dr. G. M. Moraes, though seem to have been consulted, were not fully utilized to make out a strong case in defence of the traditional belief regarding the coming of St. Thomas to India. Much more deplorable is the detailing of the Portuguese period. It is fragmentary and inadequate as the present volume has shown it to be. The difficulty of the language in which most original sources for the period are recorded has hampered work in this area, but the admission of inability to consult even all the secondary sources (p. 33) is unpardonable. Poverty of scholarship is writ large on many a page of this volume. Some entries partake the character of shallow journalistic polemic. The editor ought to have taken care in the selection of topics and assignment of them to proper specialists in the field.

Some significant aspects of the development of Christianity in Kerala are either dealt with in precis to the extent of reducing their value in relation to others or left out as of no consequence. Denominational attachment or bias should not come in the way of historiography.

Nevertheless the book may be considered as a significant contribution to existing knowledge, though not without a few pardonable mistakes. A discreet selection of pictures would have

taken the cheapness out of this volume. The high price is not commensurate with the worth and size of the volume it, however, deserves to be read by students of history as a preliminary to the understanding of the development of Christianity in Kerala.

M. J. Koshy

Our Exchanges

1. *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Poona.
2. *Brahma Vidya, The Adyar Library Bulletin*, Madras.
3. *Bulletin of the Archaeological Survey of India*, Delhi.
4. *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, London.
5. *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, London.
6. *Folklore*, Calcutta.
7. *Indian Archives*, Delhi.
8. *Indian Review*, Madras.
9. *India Quarterly*, New Delhi.
10. *Indo Asian Culture*, New Delhi.
11. *Journal of the Bihar Research Society*, Patna.
12. *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Bombay.
13. *Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute*, Allahabad.
14. *Journal of the Oriental Institute*, Baroda.
15. *Journal of United Provinces Historical Society*, Lucknow.
16. *Political Scientist*, Ranchi.
17. *Studies in Islam*, New Delhi.
18. *University of Birmingham Historical Journal*, Birmingham.
19. *University of Ceylon Review*.
20. *Vishveshvaranand Indological Journal*, Hoshiarpur.

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